

THE
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Art. 1.—THE REORGANISATION OF EUROPE.

1. *Peace Treaties*: With Germany, at Versailles, June 28, 1919; with Austria, at Saint Germain-en-Laye, Sept. 10, 1919; with Hungary, at Trianon, June 4, 1920; with Bulgaria, at Neuilly-sur-Seine, Nov. 27, 1919; with Turkey, at Sèvres, Aug. 10, 1920; and other treaties. H.M. Stationery Office.
2. *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris*. Edited by H. W. V. Temperley. Henry Frowde and Hodder & Stoughton, 1920.
3. *Some Problems of the Peace Conference*. By Charles Homer Haskins and Robert Howard Lord. Harvard University Press, 1920.
4. *Peace Hand-books*, Nos. 1-162. H.M. Stationery Office, 1920.
5. *League of Nations Official Journal*. No. 1. Harrison, February 1920. With Special Supplements: No. 1. The Aaland Islands Question (August). No. 2. Draft Scheme for . . . the Permanent Court of International Justice (September 1920).

DURING the negotiations at Paris for peace with Germany the press and the public in England, and probably in other countries, constantly complained of the delays between the Armistice of Nov. 11 and the restoration of peace with the principal enemy belligerent. Although the treaty with Germany was signed on June 28, 1919, it did not come into effective operation until Jan. 10, 1920. This interval was necessary in order to procure the ratification of the

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treaty by at least three of the principal Allied and Associated Powers. Germany ratified it on July 10, 1919, Italy on Oct. 7, Great Britain on Oct. 10, France on Oct. 12. There were, however, certain unexecuted clauses of the Armistice agreement which Germany had to fulfil before the Peace Treaty could take effect; and, until that result was obtained, by means of urgent pressure on the German Government, the *procès-verbal* of deposit, which custom requires, could not be signed. Thus the total period consumed between the termination of active hostilities and the resumption of peaceful relations with Germany was one year two months and nine days.

Although the Armistice was concluded so early as Nov. 11, 1918, it was obvious that peace negotiations could not be commenced until the arrival in Europe of President Wilson. He landed in France Dec. 13, came to London a fortnight later, left for Paris and Rome on the last day of the month, and finally returned to Paris on Jan. 7. The members of the British delegation began to arrive there on Jan. 4; but the Prime Minister was a week later. Mr Wilson had taken a leading part in the negotiation of the preliminaries of the Armistice. It was to him that the German Government had addressed itself on Oct. 5, 1918. Correspondence between him and the German Government on the one hand and the Governments of the Allies on the other followed; and it was agreed by the latter that the Armistice Convention and the Treaty of Peace should be based on his addresses and speeches and on the recent diplomatic correspondence. To understand what this basis was, Part IV of Chapter IX of Volume I of the 'History' must be carefully studied. It shows clearly that with the exception of the reservation of the European allies with respect to No. 2 of the famous Fourteen Points, namely, the so-called 'Freedom of the Seas,' the President had been allowed to formulate the principles on which peace should be concluded. Europe expected him to arrive with a thoroughly worked-out scheme of negotiation. But it appears that he brought nothing of the sort with him. No doubt the separate Governments had each formed an idea of what they would demand, but nothing had been settled between

them, and it is pointed out in the 'History' (i. p. 237), that such preparations as had been made by them were

'necessarily of a very general character, made for the most part by subordinate departments, without the direction of the heads of States, without inter-allied consultation and co-operation, and with only a vague idea of how the schemes would be applied in practice. Their influence on the Conference must not, however, be under-estimated. Their labours had produced an enormous amount of material for the use of the men of action; and, though much of this work was wasted, much proved to be of the greatest value.'

No doubt the writer of these lines had in mind the series of Peace Hand-books produced by the Historical Section of the Foreign Office, established for the first time in 1917. Very valuable and interesting as these Hand-books are, it must have been quite impossible for the actual negotiators to become acquainted with even a small portion of their contents.

In any case, it must be evident that the plenipotentiaries of the Allied and Associated Powers had to begin their work by coming to an agreement as to the procedure to be adopted for negotiation among themselves of the provisions which would be embodied in the Peace Treaty, and that this was a difficult task, as the various countries concerned had suffered in quite different ways from the violence with which the war had been carried on by their adversaries, notably by Germany. Compare the devastation of North-Eastern France, the destruction of public buildings in Belgium, the carrying away of public and private property from these two countries, with the almost entire freedom of the British Islands from damage on land at the hands of the enemy; though, on the other hand, the destruction of a great portion of the British mercantile marine was a very serious blow to the prosperity of the country. To reconcile the French and Belgian demands for reparation with the much smaller requirements of Great Britain must have been no easy undertaking, requiring long discussion and much give and take between the representatives of the Allies.

It may seem a very small thing, but it is probable that the want of a common language between the

principal plenipotentiaries must have been an obstacle to a complete and speedy understanding. Only one of them spoke both English and French. Two others understood English only, the fourth was unacquainted with anything but his own language and French. Consequently their conversations had to be carried on with the assistance of an interpreter; and any one who has ever had experience of conversing through that medium, must be aware what a difficult process it is, frequently involving unavoidable misunderstandings.

Some doubt has been expressed with regard to the proper designation to be applied to the negotiations between the representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers for the purpose of agreeing on the specific demands to be presented to Germany and her allies as forming the terms of peace. The Foreign Office List for 1919 gives a List of the British Delegation and Staff, under the heading of 'Peace Congress.' It is conceivable that a Congress of all the belligerent Powers might have been summoned to meet at Paris; and by some persons this was no doubt expected. On a previous occasion, that of the Congress of Vienna in 1814-15, its formal assembly had been preceded by somewhat lengthy negotiations in London, which failed to produce an agreement on all the points under discussion, which are well described by Mr Webster in a paper read before the Royal Historical Society in March 1913, and again in his admirable account of Congress of Vienna published as No. 153 of the Peace Hand-books. This problem, of which the resolution presented difficulties that spun out its duration by several months, reminds us of the similar trouble that was caused by the Fiume question.

Peace Congresses, beginning with that known as of Westphalia, have usually consisted of all the belligerent Powers meeting on a footing of equality, and mostly ending in the signature of a single treaty signed by all of them. This procedure was not adopted on the recent occasion, and it is obvious that it may have to be modified in accordance with the relative position of the parties when hostilities are terminated by the conclusion of an Armistice Convention. The introduction to Vol. I of the 'History' tells us that, according to the stricter interpretation, it was a Congress, and not a Conference,

that met at Paris. With this view we find it difficult to agree. Up to the time when the draft treaty was presented to Germany on May 7, the proceedings must be held to have consisted of a conference between the Allied and Associated Powers. Then it may perhaps be regarded as assuming to some extent the shape of a Congress, although it more closely resembles the negotiations for the second Treaty of Paris, when the Allied Powers presented their demands to the French Government and the latter was forced to accept them. The Conference continued its labours, and drafted treaties of peace, which were presented successively to the Austrian, Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Turkish Governments on June 2, 1919, Jan. 15, 1920, Sept. 19, 1919, and May 11, 1920, respectively. In each case discussion followed with the delegation of the Power on which the treaty was to be imposed, as the result of which modifications were introduced; and these discussions may be regarded as assimilated to the proceedings of a Congress, although the parties thereto were far from being on a footing of equality. On the whole, therefore, it seems more in accordance with facts if we continue to speak of the Peace Conference of Paris, especially as the public voice from before the meeting of the Assembly had used the term Conference.

Although the Congress of Berlin of 1878 furnishes the best model for the conduct of debate, that of Vienna in 1814 presents closer resemblance to the Conference of Paris. The parties to the Congress of Vienna were to be 'all the Powers which had been engaged on either side in the war terminated by the Treaty of Paris of May 30.' This was interpreted in such a liberal fashion that two hundred and sixteen *chefs de mission* made their appearance. The difficulty of carrying on discussions between the members of such an unwieldy assembly was so great that the plenipotentiaries of the Eight Powers which were parties to the Treaty of Paris took on themselves to represent the whole of Europe. But the real Congress consisted of the Five Great Powers. The Committee of Eight, as Mr Webster tells us, met only eight times, while the Committee of Five held forty-one meetings. How business should be carried on at a Congress is well explained in Mr Woodward's

account of the Congress of Berlin (No. 154 of the Peace Hand-books). At Paris, in 1919, there were plenipotentiaries of Five Great Powers, the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan, described as the 'Principal Allied and Associated Powers'; and with them, constituting the full assembly or *Plenum* of the Conference, were the plenipotentiaries of Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba, Ecuador, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, the Hedjaz, Honduras, Liberia, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Rumania, the Serbo-Croat-Slovene State, Siam, Czecho-Slovakia, and Uruguay, being minor Powers that had either declared war against, or broken off relations with, the Central Powers, or been recognised by the Entente Powers, as constituting with the Principal Powers already mentioned 'the Allied and Associated Powers.' Beside these, various other claimants laid their views before the Conference as opportunity offered, such as the Zionist Jews, the Armenians, the Esthonians, Lithuanians and Letts, the Ruthenians and the Georgians, and other subject nationalities of the former Russian Empire, with the Syrians and Lebanese, the Ukrainians, the Aaland Islanders and the Schleswigers. Owing to the difficulty of transacting business in such a large gathering and in public, the Conference was split up into a number of Commissions. The Conference as a whole met only seven times; at Vienna there was never a meeting of the whole Congress.

At Vienna there were present the Emperors of Austria and Russia, and the King of Prussia, but they did not attend the meetings of plenipotentiaries, at which they were represented respectively, Austria by Metternich, Russia by Razoumoffski, Stackelberg, and Nesselrode, Prussia by Hardenberg. Alexander I completely directed and controlled the action of his plenipotentiaries. Talleyrand was there for France, and Castlereagh, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and a vigorous personality, for Great Britain. At the Conference of Paris the United States of America was represented by the President, perhaps a more powerful personage than even a Russian Emperor; the British Empire by the Prime Minister, Mr Lloyd George; France by M. Clemenceau, President of the Council and Minister of War; Italy by her Prime Minister, Signor Orlando;

and Japan by Marquis Saionji, a former President of the Council of Ministers.

It was on Jan. 12, 1919, that the Conference opened with a meeting of the Four Great Powers of America and Europe and their Foreign Ministers, and on the 13th Japanese Representatives were added. Thus was formed the Council of Ten, of which M. Clemenceau was formally elected President in conformity with precedent. This lasted until the middle of March, when it was found that it was too large a body to deal effectively with all the business, and it had also been found impossible to keep its decisions from publication in the press. So the Council of Four was substituted for it. This body consisted of the American President and the Prime Ministers of France, Great Britain, and Italy. During the absence of Signor Orlando between April 24 and June 20 it became a Council of Three. It had a secretariat, on which the Five Great Powers were represented and which recorded the conversations between the members of the Council of Ten, and of the Council of Four which replaced it; but these records have not been published, and possibly never will be. Only a few Committees were at first set up, firstly the League of Nations Commission, next others on the Responsibility for the War, on Reparation, on International Labour Legislation, and on the International Régime for Ports, Waterways, and Railways.

The question of the official language caused some difficulty. At previous Congresses and Conferences French had as a matter of course been recognised as the sole language. This time the Anglo-Saxon Powers maintained the necessity of giving an equal position to the English text of documents, an essential consideration in a treaty which had to be submitted to the United States Senate for its advice and consent before it could be ratified by the President. The Italian delegation asserted the right of Italian to rank as official if to English was accorded equality with French. In the end both the French and English texts of the treaty with Germany were declared to be authentic, and so also in the case of the Treaty of Peace with Poland. The remaining peace treaties were drawn up in the three languages, the French text to prevail in case of divergence,

except in the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Part entitled Labour, where the English and French texts were declared to be of equal force. A similar provision is contained in the Treaties of Sept. 10, 1919, with Czecho-Slovakia and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, and the treaty of Dec. 9, 1919, with Rumania. Of all these treaties only a single copy was signed, to remain deposited in the archives of the French Government, authenticated copies being furnished to each of the Signatory Powers.

In addition to the Committees already mentioned, a Supreme Economic Council was formed, Territorial Commissions were set up for Czecho-Slovakia, Poland, for Rumania and Yugo-Slavia, for Greece and Albania, for Belgium and Denmark, besides Military, Naval, and Air Commissions. Perhaps the most important of all was the Drafting Commission, on which the five principal Powers were represented. Subordinate to this were the Economic and Financial Drafting Commissions. Besides all this machinery, a Council of Five was formed out of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs, which followed the procedure of the original Council of Ten. This was the organ for the insertion in the Treaty of clauses omitted by an oversight, and while the Four were employed in the negotiation with Germany was able to proceed with the discussion of the Austrian Treaty.

Mention must also be made of the rules which were drawn up by representatives of the Foreign Offices for conducting the work of the Conference, including the number of plenipotentiary Delegates to be allowed to each Power. It seems that these regulations, published in 'The Times' of Jan. 20, 1919, governed the proceedings at plenary meetings of the Conference, and that the Councils of Four and of Three discussed the questions that came before them independently of any formal rules. A very useful account of these matters is to be found in No. 139 of the documents published by the American Association for International Conciliation.

With the completion of the draft Treaty with Germany it may be held that the Conference had come to a close so far as that Power was concerned, and that with the delivery of the text to the German Delegation on May 7 it had developed into a Congress. Three weeks were

allowed to the Germans for the presentation of their comments, which were to be made in writing, no oral discussion being allowed. Their final counter-proposals, a very bulky document, were delivered on May 30. They maintained that the draft treaty was in contradiction with President Wilson's Fourteen Points and his subsequent declarations, which they regarded as the legal basis, with previous assurances of the Entente statesmen and the general ideas of International Law. Careful consideration was given to the German arguments and the reply of the Allies and Associated Powers was handed over on June 16. It left the draft treaty practically intact, though important concessions had been made. The 'History' (I, cap. 9) gives a detailed discussion of the German assertions; and Part IV of that chapter, which contains a complete analysis of the addresses and speeches of President Wilson in 1918, and of Notes exchanged between him and the German Government in October and November 1918, should be carefully studied. The conclusion that the Armistice Agreement and the Peace Treaty are in complete conformity with the basis accepted by the Entente Powers will be seen to be irrefutable. The Treaty as it was signed on June 28 has been examined, in all its more important parts and especially in the territorial clauses, in this 'Review' for July 1919.

The Treaty of Vienna (1815) was signed by the principal belligerents, and to it were annexed all the ancillary treaties and particular agreements entered into during the Congress, which together with the main treaty formed a whole binding on all the parties to it. To have attempted to frame on the present occasion a single instrument comprising the terms to be imposed not only on Germany but on each of her allies, and the subsidiary treaties with the new states formed from the territories of the former Austro-Hungarian and Turkish Empires and a resuscitated Poland, would have proved a hopeless task. To ensure the effect produced by the signature of a single treaty on the Vienna model, the following article was inserted in Part xv, *Miscellaneous Provisions*, of the German Treaty:

'Germany undertakes to recognise the full force of the Treaties of Peace and Additional Conventions which may be

concluded by the Allied and Associated Powers with the Powers who fought on the side of Germany, and to recognise whatever dispositions may be made concerning the territories of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, of the Kingdom of Bulgaria and of the Ottoman Empire, and to recognise the new States within their frontiers as there laid down.'

The same is the wording, *mutatis mutandis*, of Arts. 89 and 90 of the Treaty of Peace with Austria, similar provisions being inserted in the Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary, and Turkey. In this manner the same result appears to have been obtained as would have been secured by the signature of a single comprehensive treaty, covering all the achieved purposes of the Peace Conference.

The German Treaty naturally served as a general model for the Peace Treaties with the remaining enemy belligerents. A study of Chapter VI of Vol. II of the 'History,' and especially of its Part VI, p. 341, ought to convince any impartial reader that the Peace Treaty with Germany, and the remaining Peace Treaties, which follow the same lines, are, with one exception, in accordance with the agreed basis of peace, constituted by President Wilson's Fourteen Points and subsequent addresses, as modified by the Memorandum of the Allies of Nov. 5, 1918. By this they reserved to themselves complete freedom on the subject of what is so ambiguously called the 'freedom of the seas,' and stated that by the President's declaration that 'the invaded territories must be restored as well as evacuated and freed,' they understood 'that compensation will be made by Germany for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allies and their property by the aggression of Germany by land, by sea, and from the air.' President Wilson stated that he is 'in complete agreement with the interpretation set forth in the last paragraph of the memorandum above quoted.' According to the 'Matin' of June 6, after examining the German counter-proposals in detail he declared as follows: 'Our Treaty violates none of my principles. If I thought otherwise I should not hesitate to confess it and should try to retrieve this error, but the Treaty we have drawn up is entirely in accord with my Fourteen Points.'

The exception alluded to above is Art. 80 of the German Treaty, providing that the independence of Austria shall be inalienable, except with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations, and Art. 88 of the Austrian Treaty equally declaring the independence of Austria to be inalienable otherwise than with the consent of the Council of the League. Art. 73 of the Hungarian Treaty is similar. This undoubtedly conflicts with the principle of self-determination, and it is impossible to see how the provision can be justified.

The Austrian Treaty was reported to be ready on May 12 (while the German Treaty was still unsigned), and the Austrian Delegation arrived at St Germain on the 14th. Yet it was not till the 29th that an incomplete copy, which did not contain the Military, Reparation, and Financial clauses, was presented to the seventh plenary meeting of the Conference. On June 2, the draft was handed to the Austrian Delegation, and discussion began. The concessions already made to Germany had been introduced into it. On the 25th, the 'Big Three' discussed the measure of Reparation to be required from Austria. In response to the observations of the Austrian Delegation, changes in the Economic clauses were made on July 8, and the revised and amended treaty was delivered to the Delegation on the 20th. They made counter-proposals, to which the Allies replied on Sept. 2; and on the 4th the Austrian National Assembly, after recording a protest, authorised its signature. This formality was completed on Sept. 10.

The conclusion of the treaty with Hungary, which closely follows the lines of the Austrian Treaty, was nevertheless subjected to great delay. This was caused by a Bolshevik movement. From May to July its leader Béla Kun defied the authority of the Supreme Council. Various attempts at setting up a stable administration followed; but it was not till Dec. 1 that the Supreme Council decided to recognise the Hungarian Government. The Peace Delegation arrived in Paris on Jan. 7, 1920. As the result of their representations the Supreme Council decided on certain modifications, and the terms of the Peace Treaty were delivered to the Delegation on Jan. 15. In March a report was presented by the proper Commission on certain observations on Part XII (Ports,

Waterways, and Railways); but, as all the concessions which it had been found possible to make to either Germany or Austria had already been embodied in the treaty, no further alterations were agreed to. The 'History' does not reveal the causes which led to the signature being further postponed to June 4.

The Draft Treaty with Bulgaria was handed to the Bulgarian Delegation on Sept. 19, 1919. It contained all the concessions granted to Germany and Austria, so far as they applied. The Bulgarian observations were held not to justify any alteration of the articles; and, readiness to sign having been expressed by the Delegation on Nov. 14, signature took place on the 27th.

A Turkish Delegation was summoned to Paris and stated its views to a revived 'Council of Ten' on June 17, 1919. They provoked merely a sharp rejoinder and the Delegation left Paris on the 28th. The Turkish Treaty was not signed till Aug. 10, 1920. This long delay may have been caused by difference of opinion among the Allies with respect to the future of Constantinople.

In all the Peace Treaties the most important provisions that excited opposition from the defeated belligerents related to Reparation and the Territorial Clauses. The latter were, generally speaking, the effect of applying the principle of 'self-determination' to subject peoples and races, though there were certain exceptions, the most flagrant of which was perhaps the cession of South Tirol, a purely German territory, to Italy. Reparation is the title of that part of the Peace Treaties which provides for the compensation of damage done to the Allied and Associated Powers and their peoples. Certain acts of damage specified in the Hague Convention IV of 1907, and the Regulations thereto annexed, render the belligerent party liable to make compensation. This covers responsibility for all such acts committed by persons forming part of its armed forces. Among them are included bombardment, by any means whatever, of undefended towns, villages, habitations or buildings; pillaging of towns or places even when taken by assault; destruction or seizure of the enemy's property unless such act is imperatively demanded by the necessities of war; the confiscation of

private property; the violation of family honour and rights; taking the lives of individuals or their property; and the infliction of general penalties, pecuniary or otherwise, on the population on account of acts of individuals for which it cannot be regarded as collectively responsible. All appliances for the transport of persons or goods if seized must be restored, and indemnities for them regulated at the peace; all destruction or intentional damage to institutions dedicated to religious worship, charity, education, art and science is forbidden. Such damage on a huge scale in Belgium and North-Eastern France was wilfully caused by the invaders, to say nothing of other violations of international law and conventions. Evidently the claim for compensation cannot be entirely met by money payments, and must be provided for by the delivery of other forms of property. And this is stipulated for in the various Peace Treaties, as follows:

Germany, Art. 231.—The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by Germany and her allies.

Art. 232.—The Allied and Associated Governments recognise that the resources of Germany are not adequate, after taking into account permanent diminutions of such resources which will result from other provisions of the present Treaty, to make complete reparation of all such loss and damage.

In the Austrian and Hungarian Treaties the corresponding articles are identical with this, except that 'all' is omitted before 'loss' in both places.

The corresponding provisions of the Bulgarian Treaty are:

Art. 121.—'Bulgaria recognises that, by joining in the war of aggression which Germany and Austria waged against the Allied and Associated Powers, she has caused to the latter losses and sacrifices of all kinds, for which she ought to make reparation.

'On the other hand, the Allied and Associated Powers recognise that the resources of Bulgaria are not sufficient to enable her to make complete reparation.'

Whereas the amount of compensation to be paid by
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each of the first three Powers above named is to be fixed by an Inter-allied commission set up for that purpose, Bulgaria's quota is fixed at 2,250,000,000 francs gold.

In the Turkish Treaty the admission of responsibility and recognition of insufficiency of resources are expressed in identical terms with those of the Bulgarian Treaty, except that there is no mention of Associated Powers. But

'inasmuch as the territorial arrangements resulting from the present Treaty will leave to Turkey only a portion of the revenues of the former Turkish Empire, all claims against the Turkish Empire for reparation are waived by the Allied Powers, subject only to the provisions of this Part [Financial Clauses] and of Part IX (Economic Clauses) of the present Treaty.' Such are 'all loss and damage suffered by civilian nationals of the Allied Powers, in respect of their persons or property, through the action or negligence of the Turkish authorities during the war and up to the coming into force of the present Treaty,' also 'such restitutions, reparations, and indemnities as may be fixed by the Financial Commission [set up by Art. 231, 4th paragraph] in respect of damages inflicted on the European Commission of the Danube during the war.'

The maps annexed to the Austrian and Hungarian Treaties show what portions of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire have been detached in favour of Italy (the area of which has yet to be settled), Czecho-Slovakia, the Serbo-Croat-Slovene State and Rumania. These leave the Austrian and Hungarian Republics without any sea-ports. To remedy this inconvenience

'Free access to the Adriatic Sea is accorded to Austria and Hungary [by Art. 311 and Art. 294 of the respective Treaties] who with this object will enjoy freedom of transit over the territories and in the ports severed from the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. . . . Freedom of transit will extend to postal, telegraphic and telephonic services.'

It is when we come to examine the Turkish Treaty of Peace that the losses of territory are found far to exceed what either Germany, Austria, Hungary, or Bulgaria has had to accept. These are contained in Part III Political Clauses, Part II Frontiers of Turkey, and are delineated on the maps annexed to the Treaty.

Firstly, as regards Constantinople. It is an open secret that the question whether the possession of this Imperial City, fitted by its geographical position to be the capital of a mighty State, should be left to the Turks, remained undetermined until a very short period before the draft was finally settled. It is greatly to be regretted that no better solution could be found in present circumstances. The notion that the Ottoman Sultan is the recognised head of Mohammedanism, and that his seat, if he be such a head (it is well known that the Mohammedans of Morocco have never recognised him in that capacity), must necessarily be at Constantinople and nowhere else, is as devoid of foundation as the corresponding imagination that the Head of the Roman Catholic Church must be permanently and unalterably established at Rome. The presence of the Ottoman Turk on the northern side of the Bosphorus since 1453 has been the provocative cause of all the wars that have been waged in that part of Europe; and the pacification of the Balkan Peninsula has been despaired of as long as he remains there. It is useless for his partisans to descant upon his social virtues. Every nation has the government that it deserves; and, if he is such a virtuous person as they maintain, how comes it that he has produced such a succession of tyrannical, sanguinary-minded, and corrupt rulers?

Art. 36 provides that:

‘Subject to the provisions of the present Treaty, the High Contracting Parties agree that the rights and title of the Turkish Government over Constantinople shall not be affected, and that the said Government and His Majesty the Sultan shall be entitled to reside there and to maintain there the capital of the Turkish State.

‘Nevertheless, in the event of Turkey failing to observe faithfully the provisions of the present Treaty, or of any treaties or conventions supplementary thereto, particularly as regards the protection of the rights of racial, religious or linguistic minorities, the Allied Powers expressly reserve the right to modify the above provisions, and Turkey hereby agrees to accept any dispositions which may be taken in this connexion.’

The frontiers of Turkey in Europe are defined by the Black Sea from the entrance of the Bosphorus to a

point about four and a half miles north-west of Podina, and thence an irregular line terminating on the Sea of Marmora about 25 miles west of Constantinople, thus including an insignificant portion of suburban territory.

The Southern limits, marked on Map No. 2, run from point Karatash Burun, nearly opposite to Alexandretta approximately along the parallel of latitude of 37° eastwards to the Persian frontier, and cut off the Hedjaz, Mesopotamia, Syria, and Palestine. Armenia is declared independent, the frontier between Turkey and Armenia in the vilayets of Erzerum, Trebizond, Van, and Bitlis, with access to the Black Sea, being reserved for arbitration by the President of the United States. The right to independence of the Kurdish areas east of the Euphrates, south of Armenia, and north of the Turkish frontier with Syria and Mesopotamia, is placed under the protection of the League of Nations. Smyrna and the adjacent territory remain under Turkish sovereignty; but Turkey transfers to the Greek Government the exercise of her rights of sovereignty over the city and its territory. Thrace outside the boundary of Constantinople and up to the southern frontier of Bulgaria as defined in the Peace Treaty with that Power falls to Greece. This acquisition of territory, it will be noted, includes Adrianople. Turkey renounces in favour of Italy all rights and title to the islands mentioned in Art. 122 (the Dodecanese and Castellorizzo), which are inhabited by Greeks. In favour of Greece Turkey renounces her rights over the islands of Imbros, Tenedos, Lemnos, Samothrace, Mytilene, Chios, Samos, and Nikaria.

During the recent war and for many years before the Turkish Sultan had exercised the power of closing the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles to the ships of other nations, and especially to war-vessels, on the pretext in later times of 'an ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire,' never before described in those terms until the conclusion of the Anglo-Turkish Treaty of Jan. 5, 1809. By Art. 37 it is provided first, that

'the navigation of the Straits, including the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora and the Bosphorus, shall in future be open,

both in peace and war, to every vessel of commerce or of war and to military and commercial aircraft, without distinction of flag.'

Second, that

'these waters shall not be subject to blockade, nor shall any belligerent right be exercised nor any act of hostility be committed within them, unless in pursuance of a decision of the Council of the League of Nations.'

By Arts. 38 and 39 the Turkish and Greek Governments, so far as they are respectively concerned, delegate to a Commission to be called the 'Commission of the Straits,' the control of all the waters between the Mediterranean mouth of the Dardanelles and the Black Sea mouth of the Bosphorus, and the waters within three miles of each of these mouths; and the authority of the Commission may be exercised on shore to such an extent as may be necessary for this control.

Art. 40 stipulates for the composition of the Commission of representatives appointed respectively by the United States (if and when that Government is willing to participate), the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, Russia (if and when Russia becomes a member of the League of Nations), Greece, Rumania, and Bulgaria and Turkey (if and when the two latter states become members of the League of Nations), each Power appointing one representative. The representatives of the Great Powers are each to have two votes, the other four Powers one vote each. The Commission will be completely independent of the local authority, having its own flag, budget, and separate organisation. Art. 43 enumerates the duties of the Commission, other articles define its powers and rights. Arts. 57 to 61 lay down regulations respecting belligerent warships and prizes passing through the aforesaid waters.

In order to ensure maintenance of the freedom of the Straits, Art. 179 defines the zone of operation of the Commission, as shown on Map No. 1. Briefly speaking, it comprises Constantinople and the 'adjacent Turkish territory, the coast districts of Thrace ceded to Greece by the Treaty, including the peninsula of Gallipoli, and the coastal districts of Turkish territory in Asia Minor, starting from the Gulf of Adramyttium and

extending eastwards and then northwards to a point on the Black Sea, two kilometres east of the mouth of the Akabad River. Again, from the mouth of the Biyuk Dere on the Black Sea, the line runs in a south-westerly direction to Karachali on the Gulf of Saros. All works, fortifications, and batteries within this zone and on the islands of Lemnos, Imbros, Samothrace, Tenedos, and Mytilene are to be disarmed and demolished within three months of the Treaty coming into force. There are also certain important provisions regarding roads and railways in the above-mentioned zone, which are placed under the authority of France, Great Britain, and Italy. These three Powers also have the right to maintain in the said territories and islands such military and air forces as they may consider necessary. In the event of the Commission finding that the liberty of passage is being interfered with, it will inform the diplomatic representatives of the three Allied Powers, who will concert with the naval and military commanders of the occupying forces such measures as may be necessary.

The Treaties with Poland, the Serbo-Croat-Slovene State, Czecho-Slovakia, and Rumania, may be regarded as subsidiary to the Peace Treaty with Germany, with Austria and Bulgaria respectively; and a series of treaties of similar import will, it is to be expected, be concluded with Greece as receiving a large accession of territory, and with other States which are formed out of the remaining sacrifices of territory made by Turkey. The basic principles of such Treaties are explained in the covering letter of M. Clemenceau to M. Paderewski, dated May 24, 1919, which was presented to Parliament together with the text of the Treaty; and it is pointed out that it is the established procedure that, when a State is newly created or receives large accessions of territory, it may be required, as a condition of recognition, to undertake compliance with certain principles of government. Accordingly, an article was inserted in the Peace Treaty with Germany, to which Poland was to be a party, whereby the latter State agrees to embody in a Treaty with the Principal Allied and Associated Powers provisions for protecting the interests of racial, linguistic, or

religious minorities, and for the protection of freedom of transit and equitable treatment of the commerce of other nations.

Such stipulations will be perceived to form an important section of the Peace Treaties. They are to be found in the Treaties with Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey. Consequently, Art. 2 of the treaty with Poland, 'guarantees to all inhabitants the elementary rights that are secured in every civilised State.' Clauses 3 to 6 are designed to ensure that all the genuine residents in the territories now transferred to Polish sovereignty shall be assured of the full privileges of citizenship. Arts. 7 and 8 assure equality of rights to racial, linguistic, or religious minorities. Art. 9 provides for education of the children of a linguistic minority through the medium of their own language, and for the enjoyment of an equitable share of public educational funds by such minorities. Arts. 10 and 11 confer special protection on the Jews of Poland. Art. 12 places the foregoing stipulations under the guarantee of the League of Nations, and may not be altered without the consent of a majority of the Council of the League.

Chapter II contains economic clauses designed to facilitate reciprocal diplomatic and consular representation, for ensuring freedom of transit of persons, goods, and of postal, telegraphic, and telephonic services. Poland by Art. 18 agrees to apply to the river system of the Vistula the régime applicable to international waterways set out in the Peace Treaty with Germany, and Art. 19 provides for the adhesion of Poland to certain international conventions.

The remaining three subsidiary treaties are framed on the same model, with certain necessary modifications. Thus in the Treaty with the Serbo-Croat-Slovene State, Art. 10 provides for the special interests of Musulmans. Art. 12 recognises as binding on the new State all treaties, conventions, and agreements between Serbia and any of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers which were in force on Aug. 1, 1914. In the Treaty with Czecho-Slovakia, Arts. 10 to 13 provide for the fullest degree of self-government of the Ruthene territory south of the Carpathians, compatible with the unity of the Czecho-Slovak State. The Treaty with Rumania has an Art. 7

by which Jews inhabiting any Rumanian territory who do not possess another nationality are to be recognised as Rumanian nationals *ipso facto* and without the requirement of any formality. And as Arts. 8 and 9 correspond to Arts. 7 and 8 of the Treaty with Poland, their rights as Rumanian citizens are fully assured to them. Art. 11 accords to the communities of the Saxons and Szecklers in Transylvania local autonomy in regard to scholastic and religious matters subject to the control of the Rumanian State. Finally, Art. 16 corresponds, as regards the river system of the Pruth, with Art. 18 of the Polish Treaty.

The problems discussed in the volume which stands third on our list relate exclusively to the territorial settlements made by the Peace Treaties (excepting the Turkish Treaty, to which America was not a party). It contrasts favourably with 'The History' inasmuch as it is the work of two writers, each of whom undertook one half of the chapters of which it consists. A general unity of style and treatment accordingly pervades the whole, which is more than can be said of the larger book.

No one will doubt that universal compulsory military service enabled the militarist Great Powers gradually to increase the numbers of their trained men, and eventually to realise the theory of 'the armed nation,' which led to the war being conducted on such a ruinous scale. It must be regretted, therefore, that the 'History' has a whole paragraph devoted to the glorification of this.

'There is only one vital argument against universal military service, that it increases the chances of war by developing the martial instinct of nations, and by placing in the hands of ambitious rulers a powerful instrument for imposing their will on weaker Powers.'

Perhaps it will be alleged that, most, if not all, of the autocratic rulers having disappeared from the stage, the danger of their example being followed has vanished. But history teaches that nations are just as easily led away by the love of domination as individual rulers, and this passion is also found to animate individuals in a position to aim at its gratification.

ERNEST SATOW.

Art. 2.—TWO DOMINION STATESMEN.

I. SIR WILFRID LAURIER.

SIR WILFRID LAURIER, as was the case with at least two of his predecessors in the premiership of the Dominion of Canada—Macdonald and Mackenzie—began his political career with neither material nor social advantages in his favour. Macdonald was the son of an emigrant, who was a wage-earner at Kingston, Ontario, almost to the end of his working life. Mackenzie was a stonemason, who, like the parents of Macdonald, emigrated from Scotland; and he was at work at his trade until he became actively interested in politics. Laurier was the son of a land surveyor, Carolus Laurier, who earned only a meagre income by the practice of his profession. He was born in 1841, at St Lin, a picturesque and typically French-Canadian village, in the county of L'Assomption. His mother, who was of Acadian descent, died when Laurier was only four years old.

Until Laurier made his first communion, he attended the parish school at St Lin. The next three years of his life were passed at a Protestant school at New Glasgow, a small town eighteen miles from his birthplace. At the end of his schooling (1854) he entered the College of L'Assomption. He remained there for the full classical course of seven years. At the age of twenty, he began his short career at the Bar, entering the office at Montreal of Rudolphe Laflamme, who was afterwards a member of the Liberal Administration at Ottawa (1874-1878). While in Laflamme's office, Laurier took the law course at McGill University, and achieved some distinction as a student. He was admitted to the bar in 1864, and in 1880 was raised to the rank of Q.C.

Laurier practised law first in Montreal, and later at Arthabaska. He was, however, at no time really prominent among the lawyers of the Province of Quebec; nor was he ever, from the point of view of income, more than moderately successful in his profession. Ten years after the completion of his studies at McGill, he was elected to the House of Commons (1874), and politics thereafter were his absorbing interest. During the greater part of his life he lived on his salary (\$1250) as a Member of Parliament, with the addition, during his

Premiership, of a Premier's salary (\$7500), and during his last phase, as Leader of the Opposition, of the salary of \$5000 paid since 1904 to the holder of that position.

Laurier's career in Dominion politics extended over forty-five years. It is a career, in this respect, without parallel in the history of Canada. It is, moreover, without parallel in the history of the Oversea Dominions, as regards its permanent influence on the relations of all the Dominions with Great Britain. Laurier had no part in Confederation. He was beginning his career as a lawyer when the British North-America Act (1867) was passed by the Parliament at Westminster. But no Canadian statesman of his time had more influence on the relations of the Dominions and Great Britain in the twenty-five years that preceded the Great War, than the French-Canadian Premier of 1896-1911.

The long career of Laurier at Ottawa easily divides itself into three well-marked periods. The first extends from 1874 to 1896. Except for four years (1874-1878) the Liberals were in opposition during this period; and for nine of these years (1887-1896) Laurier was leader of the Opposition in the House of Commons, and national leader of the Liberal party. The second period extends from the general election in 1896, to the defeat of the Liberals, on the Taft-Fielding reciprocity agreement, at the general election in September 1911. This was the Laurier era, as the period from 1867 to 1891 had been the Macdonald era. It was the era during which Laurier left his mark on the relations between the Dominions and Great Britain, and, through the British preferential tariff of 1897, on the foreign commercial policy of Great Britain, and also on the trade policy of four of the five Oversea Dominions. The third period extends from the formation of the Borden Government, in the autumn of 1911, to Laurier's death in February 1919. It was marked by the division of the Liberal party over the Conscription Act, and generally by disruption and misfortune without parallel in the history of Liberalism in Canada.

Laurier was thirty-three when, in 1874, he entered the House of Commons. He was returned at the general election in that year by Drummond and Arthabaska, the riding in which he had practised as a lawyer;

in which he achieved the only prize in his profession that ever fell to him—election as *batonnier* by the Bar of the county; and in which also he had unsuccessfully attempted to establish a Liberal newspaper, published in the language of the province. It is the riding, moreover, in which Laurier established his first home; for in 1868 he was married to Miss Zoe Lafontaine, and until the end of his life his country home was in Arthabaska.

Politics were not a new interest with Laurier when he first entered the House of Commons as a supporter of the Liberal Government of 1874–1878—the Government which had been returned to power as the result of the widespread popular indignation at the grave scandal arising out of the granting, by the Macdonald Government, of the first charter for the Canadian Pacific Railway. In his earlier years in Montreal, and as a lawyer and a newspaper editor at Arthabaskaville, Laurier was a Radical, at times an extreme one; and it was in this period of his career that his Radicalism, especially in the domain of ecclesiastical politics, brought him into collision with the authorities of the Catholic Church.

Before he was elected to Parliament he had served one term of three years (1871–1874) in the Lower House of the Legislature at Quebec. It was his first and only service in provincial politics. In one important respect it was a helpful and memorable term; for, while he was a member of the Legislative Assembly, he greatly distinguished himself by a speech that was remembered to his credit as long as he lived. It was on the relations of French-Canadians in Quebec with the people of the sister provinces—Ontario, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia—and on the relations of the Dominions with Great Britain.

In 1871, the year in which Laurier made what became known as his 'United Canada' speech, Confederation was still in some degree an experiment. Not all the old British North-American provinces at this time had thrown in their lot with the newly-created Dominion. Nova Scotia was still complaining that it had been hustled into Confederation against its will; British Columbia was driving a hard bargain with Ottawa; and there were still some unsettled and disturbing questions, mostly affecting provincial rights, arising out of Confederation as

organised and worked under the British North America Act of 1867. Laurier's speech sounded the key-note of many subsequent speeches on the same subject, made, some in Canada, some in England, after he had established his position in Dominion politics, and, as a political leader, had become as acceptable to the English-speaking provinces as to Quebec.

At this time Laurier was on the back-benches in the Legislative Chamber. His speech, as remarkable for its grace of style as it was for its frankness, brought him into a prominence that extended beyond the boundaries of the French province. He ranked thereafter as an advocate of a united Canada—as a French-Canadian who was opposed to a continuance of the old racial and religious divisions between French and English-speaking Canadians. He showed himself also an admirer of British political institutions and British civilisation, who from his study of English history could state the grounds on which his admiration was based; and an outspoken upholder of the tie between the Dominion and Great Britain.

Laurier's Quebec speech—his first speech that was of more than provincial interest—together with his distinguished personal appearance, his genial temperament, and his grace of manner, soon made him acceptable to his fellow-members from the English-speaking provinces in the House of Commons of 1874-1878. He had the instinct for parliamentary procedure which is characteristic of French-Canadians, and a love for the usages and traditions of Parliament; and he possessed these qualities to a degree that was remarkable even among the men of his province. Moreover, he was a polished and graceful speaker and formidable in debate. He was equally attractive whether speaking in the House of Commons or on the platform in the constituencies. In some respects he was not the intellectual equal of Blake or Cartwright, but he could hold the attention of the House as well as either of these contemporaries; and from his earliest years at Ottawa he was always careful not to weary his audience—a remark that could not uniformly be made of either Blake or Cartwright.

In the Parliament of 1874-1878—the only Parliament in the period 1867-1896 in which the Liberals were in

power—Laurier's success was almost immediate. In a comparatively short time his mental equipment for parliamentary life, and its obvious value to the Liberal party at this juncture in its history, were recognised by Mackenzie and his colleagues of the Cabinet. In October 1877, Laurier was appointed Minister of Inland Revenue; and from 1877 until 1918, the last session in which he attended the House, he was a front-bench member. His seat for Drummond and Arthabaska was regarded a safe one at the time when he received his portfolio as minister; otherwise Mackenzie, whose administration was at this time much assailed, might not (to use an Ottawa phrase) have 'opened' the constituency. But the Church had not yet settled its account with Laurier for his contumacy while he was engaged in the practice of the law at Montreal, and while he was editor of a newspaper at Arthabaskaville. It opposed his return; and, when he sought re-election, he was defeated by a majority of forty. This failure, however, involved no break in his parliamentary or ministerial career. A vacancy was created for Quebec East. Laurier was successful there; and he represented this constituency continuously for forty-two years.

It was about this time that Sir John A. Macdonald and his followers of the Conservative Opposition began the agitation for a tariff for the protection of Canadian industry. There had been tariffs for the protection of home industries during the era of the United Provinces of Upper and Lower Canada (1841-1867). The first of these tariffs was enacted in 1858, the second in 1859. There were duties as high as 20 and 25 per cent. in these tariffs; and the duties were imposed avowedly for the protection of manufacturers in Upper and Lower Canada. But between 1866 and 1878 most of these protectionist duties had been eliminated, because the Maritime Provinces were then hostile to protection. During the lifetime of the Parliament of 1874-1878, there were few duties in excess of 17½ per cent. Notwithstanding much pressure from the manufacturing interests, the Mackenzie Government, in which Sir Richard Cartwright was Minister of Finance, refused, in the session of 1877, to call upon Parliament to enact any protectionist duties. Mackenzie's refusal to accept the principle of protection,

and to embody that principle in the tariff, gave the Conservatives an opportunity. Acting in the spirit of opportunism, Macdonald promptly committed the Conservative party to protection.

Macdonald and the Conservatives thus thrust a new issue into Dominion politics, an issue on which the two parties were to be sharply divided for the next eighteen or nineteen years. The general election of 1878 was fought on what in Canada for forty years has been known as the National Policy. It was the first election in Canada, or in the British North-American provinces, at which protection was the issue. The Liberals were overwhelmingly defeated. Macdonald again became Premier; and he held that office until his death in 1891.

The first National Policy tariff, with protectionist duties ranging from 25 to 35 per cent., was enacted in 1879, a year after the return of the Conservatives to power. From that time, the Conservative party had the unwavering support of all the interests, industrial and financial, that directly or indirectly derive advantage from National Policy tariffs. Despite the fact that there were general elections in 1882, 1887, and 1891, the Liberal party was continuously in opposition until 1896. In the Parliament of 1878-1882, the Liberals, then led by Mackenzie, numbered only 69, in a House of Commons containing 206 members. Mackenzie, who among other distinctions had that of being the only Premier of Canada to decline a knighthood, soon wearied of the uphill task of leading the Opposition, almost a forlorn hope in those years. He retired in 1882, and was succeeded by Edward Blake, who was leader until after the general election of 1887. Blake then retired, because of ill-health. At a caucus of the Liberal members, whose numbers had been increased to 87 at the last election, Laurier was chosen as Blake's successor. He had been elected leader of the French-Canadian group of the Liberal party in the House of Commons in the first session of the 1878 Parliament.

It has always been the rule at Ottawa to elect party leaders in a caucus. In Canada the caucus is older than Confederation. In the course of a parliamentary session at Ottawa, much business comes before the caucus of each party. The Government unfolds its legislative

policy and plans in caucus; and in caucus the Opposition discusses legislation proposed by the Government, and decides on its policy and House of Commons tactics in respect to such legislation. Each party, when in opposition, chooses its leader in caucus; and generally it may be said that the caucus is as firmly established and as frequently in service as it is at Washington.

Laurier, on Blake's retirement (1887), was not anxious to change his position as leader of the French-Canadian group for that of leader of the Opposition. He was aware that it was an excessively difficult position for a French-Canadian. He pleaded first the condition of his health, which from the time when he removed from Montreal to Arthabaska had never been robust. Next, he advanced the fact, already well known, that he was not a man of independent means. Finally, he agreed to accept the leadership for a session, pending an improvement in Blake's health. But Blake was not willing to resume the position. In the early days of the session of 1888, Laurier was re-elected by the Liberal caucus; and thereafter his leadership of the party, whether it was in opposition or in power, was unquestioned. There were, moreover, no divisions in the party until the question of Conscription came before Parliament in the session of 1917.

During the long period of eighteen years through which the Liberals were in opposition, only two questions which have any large place in the political history of the Dominion occupied for any considerable time the attention of Parliament. One was the construction of the Canadian Pacific Railway, and the policy of the Macdonald Government in regard to that undertaking; the other was the so-called National Policy, with its tariff protection to Canadian manufacturers, and (after 1883) bounties from the Dominion Treasury in aid of the iron and steel industry in Nova Scotia, Quebec, and Ontario.

At every session from 1878 to 1885 there were long and often acrimonious debates in the House of Commons on the first of these questions. There were Liberals, of whom Cartwright was the most prominent, who were opposed to the Canadian Pacific as planned and supported by the Conservative Government. These Liberals held that a less costly scheme could be devised to fulfil the

conditions made with British Columbia when that remote and isolated province agreed to come into Confederation. It was a conviction with these members of the House that the Canadian Pacific Railway could never pay; that the Company would become bankrupt; and that the Government would be deeply involved in the failure of the undertaking. Laurier never seems to have gone as far as this in his opposition to the scheme, but he was opposed to the land grants, to the subsidies, and also to the section in the Act which exempted the Company for many years from taxation of its lands and its railway properties. The railway was, however, made; and its success justified the foresight of its promoters.

From 1879 to 1896 the one continuing cause of contention was the National Policy tariff. The Liberals were not free-traders; they always agreed that there must be duties on imports in order to raise revenue. What they objected to was the fiscal system established by Macdonald and the Conservatives in 1879, which was so framed as to afford protection to Canadian industries. Their alternative policy was a fiscal system, with duties on imports devised solely for the raising of revenue, and with no concern on the part of the Government for the interests of Canadian manufacturers. They condemned protection on the ground that it corrupted politics, fostered the growth of trusts and combinations to advance prices, increased the cost of living, retarded immigration, and was responsible for the large and continuing exodus to the United States of native-born Canadians, and also of new-comers from the United Kingdom.

At no time during Laurier's career was he regarded as an authority on trade or commerce, or on the details and operation of tariffs. These were not subjects to which he applied his mind, either when in Opposition or as head of the Government. In Opposition, from 1878 to 1896, Cartwright and Mills, who had both been members of the Mackenzie Administration of 1874-1878, were the foremost authorities on trade, tariffs, bounties, and reciprocity. When the Liberals were in power, Laurier left the details of tariff and bounty enactments, as well as of reciprocity agreements with France and the United States, almost exclusively to his subordinates, H. S. Fielding, Cartwright, and Paterson.

Laurier seldom intervened in debates on tariffs and bounties after the Liberal party, in April 1897, had accepted the National Policy of the Conservatives and, with singular completeness, abandoned or repudiated the fiscal principles advocated by Liberals in Canada from the enactment of the Cayley tariff in 1858 to the Ottawa Conference of 1893 and the general election of 1896. But between 1878 and 1896 he frequently took part in tariff debates in the House, and also made many speeches against the National Policy in the constituencies. In these speeches he invariably confined himself to general principles and broad statements, which, however, made it clear that the principle of protection, and the corruption and exploitation which usually develop when it is embodied in fiscal systems, were to him accursed things. In and out of Parliament, he denounced protection in all its aspects, in terms as vigorous as were ever used by Cobden and Bright, by Peel, Gladstone, Russell, and Grey, by President Cleveland and President Wilson; or, to come to more recent times, by 'The Grain-Growers' Guide' of Winnipeg and 'The Farmers' Sun' of Toronto, the chief organs of the agrarian movement* of the present day.

At the National Liberal Conference, held at Ottawa, in June 1893, one of the strongest of many speeches against the National Policy was made by Laurier, who as leader of the Opposition in the House of Commons issued the call for the Conference, and presided over its three days' deliberations. The memorable Ottawa programme, modelled to some degree on the Newcastle programme of the Liberal party in England, was framed at this Conference, and was widely promulgated in anticipation of a general election that was expected to come in 1895 but did not come until June 1896. It was

* This movement, which in 1920 is represented by an independent group of nine members in the House of Commons at Ottawa, and also by a majority of the members of the Legislature of Ottawa, had its origin as a political movement ten years ago. It developed as a movement in Dominion, as distinct from provincial, politics, out of the pronounced and continuing hostility of grain-growers of Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta, and of farmers in the provinces east of the Great Lakes, to the high protectionist tariffs and the system of lavish bounties to the iron and steel industry, for which the Liberal Government of 1896-1911 was responsible.

in this programme of 1893 that the Liberal party of Canada, as a Dominion-wide organisation, defined its attitude towards the National Policy of the Conservatives. The Liberal party, it is well to point out, did not promise to open the ports by abolishing all import duties. Import duties have been continuously levied in Canada since 1846, when, by the Enabling Act of the Imperial Parliament, the Legislatures of the old British North-American provinces were empowered to enact their own tariffs. In the Ottawa Liberal programme, there was no promise to establish free trade as it existed at that time in the United Kingdom. Exigencies of revenue made impossible any such sweeping reform of the fiscal system, as it had existed since 1879; but the party gave an unequivocal pledge to the electorate that it would, if returned to power, eliminate the principle of protection from the fiscal system of the Dominion. With this object a widely-extended propaganda programme was carried on during the next three years. Laurier, as leader of the Opposition, was at the height of his popularity, and spoke frequently in the constituencies. In 1894 he went as far afield as Winnipeg, and it was in that city that he held protection up to odium as a form of slavery.

There was no surprise in Canada, not even among Ministers at Ottawa, at the success of the Liberal party at the general election of 1896. The party was ably led. Laurier was popularly regarded as the Gladstone of the Dominion. Cartwright had a strong hold on Ontario. Mr Sifton (now Sir Clifford Sifton) was then a power in Manitoba. The late Israel Tarte, editor of a French-Canadian weekly newspaper of wide circulation, was Laurier's lieutenant in Quebec; and 'down by the sea,' in the Maritime Provinces, Mr W. Blair, Premier of New Brunswick, Mr Fielding, then Premier of Nova Scotia, and Mr Davies, an ex-Premier of Prince Edward Island, were acceptable and able leaders. Moreover, the three years' campaign in support of the Ottawa programme infused more enthusiasm into the Liberal party than had existed at any time since Confederation, or has existed at any time since 1896.

The Conservative party, on the other hand, had manifestly been running to seed since the death of

Macdonald in 1891. Its strength and cohesion in the years 1878-1891, and its successes at the election in 1882, 1887, and 1891, were due to the personality of Macdonald, and to the support it received from the protected manufacturers. Since 1891 the party has never developed a leader comparable in any degree with Macdonald, whose personality in the House and on the platform was quite as attractive and quite as holding as that of Laurier. From the death of Macdonald to the end of the Conservative regime in 1896, the Conservatives had had four leaders—Abbott, Thompson, Bowell, and Tupper; and in the last two years it was lamentably short of men of Cabinet rank. Moreover, its leaders had been quarrelling among themselves; and, what was worse from the point of view of the party as a whole, they had been taking the Dominion into their confidence regarding the causes of these quarrels. Bowell, who succeeded Thompson as Premier at the end of 1894, resigned in April 1896, because of difficulties with several members of his Cabinet, whom he publicly denounced as traitors. He was succeeded by Tupper, who had been High Commissioner for Canada in London. Tupper hoped to retrieve the fortunes of the party, and secure for it another lease of power; but the electorate was thoroughly weary of the Conservative regime; and the Liberals had a majority of 34 in a House containing 230 members.

The Laurier régime extended from July 1896 to October 1911. There were four general elections in these fifteen years—1900, 1904, 1908, and 1911. On the first three of these occasions the Conservative Opposition made no additions to its strength in the House of Commons; and the hold of the Liberals on the constituencies was well maintained. Trade was flourishing. Two additional trans-continental railways were under construction. Tens of thousands of people were acquiring fortunes—on paper—from the long-continued boom in real estate in the provinces west of the Ottawa river. Immigration from England and Scotland, and from several countries of Continental Europe, was unprecedentedly large. Most satisfactory of all, the grain-growing industry in the prairie provinces—the mainstay of Canada, as regards export trade—was being greatly extended, to the manifest advantage of Ontario and

Quebec, the central and pre-eminently manufacturing, mercantile, and money-handling provinces of the Dominion.

At the end of 1910, when Fielding and Paterson were negotiating for reciprocity with the United States by an agreement which both political parties would have been eager to conclude at any time from 1866 to 1910, it seemed as though the Laurier regime might continue for years to come. But there was an unexpected development in connexion with the agreement. The protected manufacturers and the financial and transport interests strongly objected to it. All these interests were apprehensive that reciprocity * might weaken the tie between the Dominion and Great Britain. Above all, the manufacturers and the banking companies, whose interests are closely interwoven with those of the manufacturers, were in dread of the inroad that reciprocity might ultimately make in the policy of the Dominion.

The Liberals, it will be recalled, had, thirteen years earlier, abandoned their old fiscal principles and also their former hostility to bounties. In 1897, they made the National Policy their own; and, by the enactment of higher duties in that year and in 1907, they made it of more service to the manufacturers than it was from 1878 to 1896, when the Conservatives were in power. The only innovations in the National Policy made by the Liberals were (1) the introduction of anti-dumping sections in the Tariff Acts of 1897 and 1907—an innovation manifestly in the interest of the protected manufacturers; and (2) the enactment of the British preferential tariffs of 1897 and 1898. Now the manufacturers never liked the preferential tariff. There were woollen manufacturers who, in 1897, threatened to close their mills because concessions had been made to British manufacturers. At no time, moreover, from 1897 to the beginning of the war, did manufacturers in Canada conceal the fact of their dislike. Their persistent demand was for adequate protection against competition whether from Great Britain or from the United States. They regarded such protection as essential to the

* There has been reciprocity in wheat and wheat produce since April 1917, and in potatoes since June 1919.

continued prosperity of manufacturing enterprises in Canada; and, in response to their demands, material curtailments of the preference were made in 1904, and again at the general revision of the tariff in 1907.

But, except as regards the preference, from 1897 to the introduction of the reciprocity resolutions into the Canadian House of Commons in the session of 1911, the protected manufacturers were as well satisfied with the fiscal policy of the Liberals as they had been with that of the Conservatives from 1879 to 1896. The clash between the Laurier Government and the protected manufacturers and the financial and transport interests arose entirely over the proposed reciprocity agreement. The Government, apprehensive of incurring the hostility of the organised grain-growers and farmers, was compelled to adhere to its policy. The opposing interests insisted upon the abandonment of the agreement. The result was that at the election in September 1911, the Liberals were defeated; and the Conservatives, who had suddenly and unexpectedly abandoned their old attitude towards reciprocity, and espoused the cause of the manufacturing, financial, and transport interests, were returned to power with Sir Robert Borden as Premier.

It has seemed expedient to recall these details of the fiscal and trade policy of the Laurier Government for an obvious reason. Laurier gave hearty and loyal support to the British Government during the Boer War of 1899-1902; and in 1910 he was responsible for an act,* which went into effect only in part, for the creation of a Canadian War Navy, which was to be under control of the Dominion Government. The raising and equipping by the Ottawa Government of volunteers for the Boer War, and the Naval Act of 1910, afforded proof that the Dominion, under Laurier, realised and was ready to accept its imperial responsibilities and obligations. But it was manifestly through his fiscal and trade policy that Laurier permanently influenced the relations between the

* The Naval Act was passed in March 1910, but only part of its provisions went into effect, because in the winter of 1910-1911 there came the contest in the House of Commons over the reciprocity resolutions; and in September 1911, as has been stated, the Government was defeated at the general election, and the Laurier regime came to an end.

Dominions and Great Britain, and indirectly influenced the trade relations of all the Dominions, except Newfoundland, with Great Britain, and also the commercial diplomacy of the mother country.

All the influence in this direction that Laurier exercised—and it was undoubtedly a greater influence than has ever been exercised by a premier of Canada or by a premier of any other Dominion—developed out of the British preferential tariff of 1897. The Canadian tariff of 1897 was not the first preferential tariff enacted in a colony that is now of the Dominions. For two or three years after the Enabling Act of 1846 was on the statute book, the Legislature of Newfoundland passed Tariff Acts in which there were preferences for imports from the United Kingdom. But these Newfoundland Tariff Acts of 1848–1850 had been long forgotten when the Parliament at Ottawa, in April 1911, enacted the first preferential Tariff Act of the Dominion.

The Act came as a surprise to Canada. It was quite as much a surprise to the people of the United Kingdom, and to the Australasian and South African colonies. It can now be stated with authority that even the Colonial Office had had no intimation through the Governor-General that in the first Tariff Act of the Laurier Government preferential terms were to be conceded to imports from the United Kingdom. It was apprehended by the Cabinet at Ottawa that the Colonial Office would object to the new departure because of its disturbing effect on the commercial treaty with Germany, and also on some twenty other commercial treaties which were in force in 1897. Hence, contrary to usage, no summary of the changes made by the new tariff was communicated by cable to the Colonial Office before Mr Fielding, the Minister of Finance, submitted it to the House of Commons.

The Fielding tariff had the effect that had been foreseen. It brought about the immediate denunciation of all the older commercial treaties; for, with these treaties in operation, all the countries which were parties to them could have claimed—as Germany did claim—the right to the same tariff concessions as were made to the United Kingdom. Laurier's name must consequently always have place in the history of the commercial

diplomacy of Great Britain; for it was by the stand he took in April 1911, that a clean sweep was made of a score or more treaties that had fettered the action of the self-governing colonies from the time fiscal freedom accrued to them as a result of the free-trade legislation at Westminster of 1846.

Laurier has still another claim to distinction in the history of the commercial diplomacy of the Empire. For sixty years—1847 to 1907—first, the old British North-American provinces, and afterwards the Dominion of Canada, were pressing for the right to make their own commercial treaties. There were many partial and qualified concessions to this demand, from the time of the negotiation of the first treaty of reciprocity between the British North-American provinces and the United States (1847-1854), to the negotiation in 1893, by Sir Charles Tupper, of the reciprocity treaty with France. Full and complete concession to it came in 1907, when Laurier, Fielding, and Brodeur negotiated the second commercial treaty with France. It was carried through without material aid from the British Ambassador at Paris, and without intervention, as regards the details of the treaty, from the Foreign Office in London.

Developments in Canada since 1911—the complete and costly breakdown of Laurier's railway policy; the disruption of the Liberal party over Conscription, which Laurier opposed; and the revolt of the agrarians against high protectionist tariffs, for which Laurier was responsible—make it difficult as yet to determine Laurier's right place in the political history of the Dominion. But his place as a Canadian statesman, who greatly and beneficently influenced the Empire as a whole, is assured.

EDWARD PORRITT.

II. GENERAL LOUIS BOTHA.

GREAT men in all ages have been rare, and the achievements that justify the title vary in character. 'Events make men,' according to Herbert Spencer; but men undoubtedly influence events, though their share in proportion to that of circumstance may be indeterminate. The greatest of men are in no small degree children of fortune; and the effect of their actions, no matter how judiciously conceived, is in a large measure governed by the way in which surrounding factors tumble into the arena, not unlike pieces of glass in a revolving kaleidoscope. Neither results nor man's share in their accomplishment can be truly gauged at short range. These reflexions are inspired by the desire, in framing these brief notes upon the late General Louis Botha, to do justice to him and to his admirable qualities, on the one hand, without prejudicing the work of future historians by contemporary exaggeration, on the other.

First, with regard to his appearance and personality. He stood about six feet in height, broad-shouldered, heavy-boned, deep-chested and muscular, with large blue eyes that looked straight at one, and a delightful winning smile; a round face, small nose, black hair and tanned complexion. He was very intelligent and irresistibly attractive in lighter, happy moods; dark and taciturn in rare moments of anger. Keenly alive and virile, he centred his whole heart on the occupation of the moment, whether on State or other serious affairs or on diversions. In spare moments golf or bridge greatly amused him. I met him once under treatment at Kissingen; he followed the régime scrupulously. Bright-minded and companionable, genial and kindly in his outlook, he was a magnetic being, charming in everyday intercourse, and, in spite of not having had the advantages of public-school training or higher education, dignified in bearing and well-mannered, modest, unassuming, unspoiled by adulation. He had, moreover, a keen sense of humour, coupled with an ample fund of sound common-sense and a practical mind characteristic of his race, and particularly of the portion bred under the friendly African sun on the broad veld. Only those who

are familiar with the gorgeous colouring, the invigorating air, and the immense structural scale of the wide plains and rocky eminences of South Africa, can realise how the environment has dominated the outlook of those nurtured in its amenities.

In this short review we may pass rapidly over the early life of General Botha. His father was a well-to-do farmer; and Louis, one of six brothers, was born at Greytown, Natal, in 1862. At the age of twenty-two we first hear of him as accompanying Lucas Meyer upon an expedition to Zululand, in support of Dinizulu against Usibepu. The assistance of the Boer Commando turned the scale in favour of Dinizulu, who, as a recompense, granted them an area of land, which they called the New Republic, with Vryheid as its capital. Vryheid was incorporated in the Transvaal in 1888, Botha being then twenty-six years of age. Some seven years later he went to Pretoria as a member of the Second Volksraad.

I must not linger over the burning questions of that period, which covered the development of the Witwatersrand gold-mining industry, and the advent of the 'new' population. Botha, even in those early years, was out of sympathy with the narrow and repressive policy which was then the keynote of President Kruger's administration. The President realised that the patriarchal system was threatened, but he was not of the stuff to part meekly with a cherished ideal. Bitter discontent arose, partly from reactionary legislation and the disabilities placed upon new-comers, partly from the insecurity of life and property. Titles to individual mining property were in constant jeopardy—in the main, be it admitted, from assaults by the new-comers themselves. In a heterogeneous community of fortune seekers, drawn from all parts of the world, there were naturally specimens of every moral grade, from the highly cultured gentleman to the most unscrupulous adventurer. Men of the latter class did not find the business of merely attacking the rights of their neighbours sufficiently attractive and began to divert their attention to the Volksraad. Here indeed was a fine field for predatory activities. Playing here upon the ignorance and there upon the cupidity of some of the members—simple peasants be it noted—they created a real danger, and

from time to time the legislature displayed signs of yielding to the allurements of concession-hunters. In one notorious case, that of the Dynamite Concession, President Kruger himself warned members that wrapped up with the granting of this concession was the independence of the State!

Dissatisfaction and grievances accumulated. The Volksraad was deaf to appeals and blind to consequences. Consciousness of the situation was, however, awakening. A section of the Volksraad, led by General Piet Joubert in the upper chamber, and Lucas Meyer in the second chamber, manifested its opposition to Kruger's repressive policy. Botha joined that section, but it failed to stem the reactionary tide. Anger on the part of the Uitlanders reached its breaking-point when Kruger endeavoured to force military service upon them, without, at the same time, granting them any rights of citizenship, and displayed the intention of fortifying the gaol which commanded the town. It was at this stage that steps were taken for the projected rising at Johannesburg; and any impartial student must confess that there was solid justification for the movement. The Jameson Raid ensued, a disastrous incident, which should not, however, be confounded with the original plan or the basis of the intended internal revolt. Whatever view may be held respecting that turmoil, there is no doubt that it enlightened the world upon President Kruger's aims and methods in South Africa, and his intercourse with foreign powers, particularly with Germany. Botha was undoubtedly in sympathy with the Uitlander cause, but the invasion impelled him to take up arms in defence of what he regarded (erroneously, it should be said) as an attempt to steal the country.

During the next few years he did not come into special prominence, but his chance came with the Boer War. Serving at first under Lucas Meyer, he was speedily chosen as the leader of that commando, and, after the death of General Joubert, he became commander-in-chief of the Boer Forces. In spite of his having had no technical military training, he manifested great skill in the field. His exploits in that arena need not be dwelt upon here, as they are upon record. That he should have led his people through an unsuccessful

war, and emerged still enjoying their confidence, is an accomplishment of a remarkable order, the more remarkable in view of the highly developed critical faculties of the Boers and their exceptional disregard of rank or position. It is, moreover, significant evidence of his wisdom, tact, and powers of leadership. From that time he became the recognised head of his people. Having played a distinguished part in the war, he was equally prominent in the peace settlement. He took a leading part in the negotiations that led to the Terms of Surrender; and the Ten Articles that were ultimately signed lent some colour to the claim set up later that this instrument constituted a Treaty of Peace. No useful purpose would be served by a technical discussion upon the differences between Terms of Surrender and a Treaty of Peace, but, in the light of later events, it may be interesting to recall a passage from the 'South African News,' a Bond organ, which shows how the concessions made by the British Government were magnified.

'As every person possessing an ounce of imagination has seen long ago, the main hope of the permanence of the structure, whose foundations were laid at Vereeniging, is just the fact that the Republicans were not beaten to their knees, but entered the British Empire "in cap and plumes erect and free," and, therefore, able to forgive and co-operate with those whose full-blood brethren and partners they then became.'

This is not true of the condition of the Boer forces when peace was sought, nor is it true, unfortunately, that the Boers as a whole became 'brotherly' in their attitude towards the British Empire. It may be interesting to remark that the correspondence preceding the agreement concerning the Terms of Surrender discloses the efforts of the Boers, first to retain their independence, then, while surrendering independence as regards foreign relations, to retain self-government under British supervision. Finally, finding themselves unable to make any headway upon such terms, they obtained powers from the burghers in the field to accept the conditions approved of by His Majesty's Government for the surrender of the Boer forces, and set forth in the Ten Articles. Botha himself, no doubt as a matter of good policy, always referred to this document as the Treaty

or Peace of Vereeniging; but it should be clearly understood that he never wavered in any of his utterances from the position that the Boers were bound by every dictate of honour to respect the obligations into which they had entered.

It was not surprising that, after the conclusion of hostilities, a sea of bitterness remained. Botha and the other Boer leaders stood aloof and denied their assistance to Lord Milner during the period of Crown Colony administration, and they declined the proffered seats upon the Legislative Council formed in 1903. About the beginning of that year, owing to the continued state of depression in the country, agitation for political reform began. Slack times find men without sufficient occupation for their thoughts in the business of life, and they turn to the contemplation of their misfortunes, fruitful foster-parents of political discontent. The British section of the South African population, therefore, split up into two groups, the one desirous of full responsible Government, the other, and, I think, the more thoughtful, of a half-way house in advance of Crown Colony administration as a first step. The divergence of views among the English encouraged General Botha to summon a Congress of the Boers, which was opened in Pretoria in May 1904. Towards the conclusion of his opening address, he said,

‘Our people have made great sacrifices; they have shed their blood and wept tears of bitter sorrow; but they must thoroughly understand that the lowering of their flag and the change of Government do not entail the renunciation of their traditions. Now is the time for us to prove to our new Government that we are and shall remain one people, of whom they must become proud. We have one object in view, and that is to live and to work in unison with the new population; and my earnest hope and prayer is that it may please the Almighty to inspire the entire white population in South Africa with feelings of unity, so that a nation may be born worthy to take its place among the nations of the world, where the name of “Africander” shall be heard with honour and applause.’

I quote this passage because, although Botha consistently pleaded for the unity of the white population, he did not

embrace the golden opportunity of that moment to join the Responsible-Government Party, with whose views he and his friends were in accord. If racial divisions could have been eliminated, there was no ground then for the formation of the third party, 'Het Volk.' It is impossible to say whether or not he could have induced his followers at that date to join with their English fellow-citizens, but at that Congress undoubtedly the first public step was taken to set up an organisation by which the two white races were kept apart. Botha, of course, knew his fellow-countrymen well, and may have had good grounds for considering that the memory of the war was too fresh to permit of a union.

The Progressive Party stood as a whole for the policy of Lord Milner. They were most anxious that the fabric of Government created by him should be fortified, because they foresaw in the consolidation of that system thoroughly progressive control in education, in agriculture and railway administration, in the department of justice, in short, in all those departments of State in which good government is eminent. But the time had arrived for giving to the people greater powers than they enjoyed as a Crown colony. The British Government framed what was known as the Lyttelton Constitution, which was transmitted to the Transvaal on March 31, 1905; and the Progressive Party favoured its adoption as a suitable bridge between the previous system and the grant of complete representative or responsible Government. But the Liberal Unionist Government was then tottering to its fall. The Liberal Party, thanks in no small measure to the effective if unscrupulous use made of the Chinese Labour cry, came into power with a very large majority in December 1905, under the leadership of Sir Henry Campbell Bannerman. They made short work, without a trial, of the Lyttelton Constitution, and in December 1906, granted the full powers which General Botha and his compatriots, as well as the members of the Responsible Government Association, who had split away from the Progressive Party, had demanded.

A Commission, consisting of Sir West Ridgeway (Chairman), Lord Sandhurst, Sir Francis Hopwood (now Lord Southborough), and Colonel Johnston, was

thereupon sent to South Africa to delimit constituencies in view of the settlement of the Transvaal Constitution. After investigation, the Commission determined to discriminate to some extent in favour of the country districts. There was considerable force in the arguments used, namely, that the sparse population of the country districts would be at a disadvantage in exercising their voting rights, as against the population in the towns, and on this account were entitled to some consideration. The net result of the action taken was, however, to throw power into the hands of the South African Party, with which, to no small extent, those who had belonged to the Responsible Government Association threw in their lot. A good deal of heat was generated during the elections; and, in spite of all parties declaiming against the revival of old animosities, a great deal of racial bitterness ensued. Animosity was, perhaps, even stronger between the Progressives and Responsible-Government men than between the Progressives and the Boers. After the elections, Botha's party had secured 37 seats, the Progressives 21, and the Nationalist, Labour, and Independent Parties between them the remaining 11. Botha therefore commanded a majority, and became Prime Minister of the Transvaal in 1907.

When the House met the atmosphere was rather electric, and the leading men on either side hardly spoke to each other. The unfriendly state of feeling seemed to forbode evil consequences, and the situation was one that called for cool-headed judgment. I was not at this period a member of the House, nor had I taken an active part in the elections; I was therefore in an independent position and able to work for less inimical relations between the rival parties. After some time, I came to be on friendly and, indeed, intimate terms with General Botha and General Smuts, not without rather unhappy moments for myself from time to time, because the old and valued friends, with whose political creed I had always been identified, viewed my action with dislike, and even, at times, with suspicion. The effort, however, was not altogether unsuccessful, nor was it, indeed, one-sided, because the Prime Minister discussed matters with me, which, on account of the strained relations, he would

not discuss with his political opponents. General Botha continuously and publicly avowed his desire to do justice to, and bring about a reconciliation between, all sections of the white people. Every one in South Africa realised that nothing could be worse for the country than the widening of the breach.

Happily, there came about a gradual amelioration in the state of feeling; and during those fateful years I learned to appreciate General Botha's breadth of view and his sincere desire to earn the confidence of British and Dutch alike. That, upon his assumption of office, he should have found it necessary to place a number of his own countrymen in positions of responsibility is not surprising; nor, indeed, would it probably be inaccurate to say that his inclinations also leaned in that direction. In any case, the victory at the polls necessitated and justified some consideration for the members of his party; and I do not think his action in this connexion can be deemed extravagant. Some of those to whom he gave appointments may not have been as competent as could be desired; but, be that as it may, one is bound to admit that he was faced with an extremely difficult task, and the manner in which he succeeded in carrying it out is a very high tribute to his statesmanlike qualities. The Progressive Party was naturally critical, because they believed that the welfare of South Africa was, to some extent at least, being sacrificed to political expediency. If exception may be taken to some of Botha's measures, one fact cannot be denied, namely, that he steadily gained in the people's confidence and rose in popular esteem. To him above all other men should be accorded the credit of rendering the National Convention possible.

Lord Milner relinquished office in March 1905, and was succeeded as High Commissioner by the Earl of Selborne, whose affable disposition, coupled no doubt with his knowledge and love of farming, rendered his appointment a very happy one in the circumstances. He set to work to cultivate friendly relations, not only with General Botha and his Cabinet, but also with the people at large. He travelled about the country, visiting the farmers, and contributed in no small degree to the establishment of a better state of feeling. The work of reconstruction and the forward railway policy of

his predecessor began to tell; and the growing commercial prosperity of the young colonies of the Transvaal and Orange River, due in a large measure to the use of Delagoa Bay, created much anxiety at the Cape and in Natal. Tariffs and railway rates caused considerable tension in the relations between the colonies—a tension not free from the danger of counter-steps, reprisals, and ultimately even of open hostilities.

General Botha was fully alive to the gravity of the situation. An Inter-Colonial Conference was held, but failed to find a solution of the problems. When it became evident that some form of political union was the only panacea, Lord Selborne contributed a very able paper to the public discussion then taking place in the press and on the platform. Want of space forbids any critical examination of the burning questions of the time. The general opinion seemed to incline towards some system of federation, but the objection to that form of union was obvious. The retention of colonial boundaries involved the annual publication of budgets which would have exposed the manner in which each colony was materially affected; and this condition alone might, and probably would, have sown the seeds of future disappointment, dispute, and even of disruption. Lord Selborne's sane outlook and unquestioned honesty of purpose were of great value at this critical juncture.

The National Convention assembled on Oct. 12, 1908, and culminated in the Union of South Africa. A truly remarkable feature of the Convention was the spirit of good fellowship that reigned. All racial animosity seemed to have vanished; the lion and the lamb—British Jingoism, on the one hand, and Dutch nationalism on the other—lay down together; and all was peace and amity. Many difficulties of the most serious character, arising from the different characters of what are now the respective Provinces and affecting their welfare in different ways, had to be surmounted. The wealthy Transvaal had to make concessions to its less fortunate neighbours, each of whom in its turn surrendered something. On the whole, it is unquestionably fortunate that complete union was agreed to. General Botha took a broad conciliatory line throughout the negotiations.

The Convention spirit was active, and public men of every party made speeches extolling the Union and uttering paeans of congratulation at the burial for all time of racial animosities. But the test of practical politics put an end to pious aspirations and comforting dreams. Elections for the Union Parliament took place in 1910, and it may be interesting to recall a dramatic incident. The seat at Standerton was a safe one for General Botha, but he decided, unwisely, as it turned out, to contest the Pretoria East constituency against Sir Percy Fitzpatrick. After an exciting fight, he was beaten by 95 votes, and, for the moment, he took the rebuff greatly to heart. The polls, however, were quite decisive, giving the South African Party 67 seats—a majority of thirteen over the rest of the House—which comprised, in addition, 37 Unionists, 13 Natal Independents, and 4 Labour members. The success of his Party restored General Botha's equanimity, and he then accepted the Losberg seat and became Prime Minister of the Union.

Aspirants for the fame and flesh-pots of office abounded; and no Cabinet of workable size could have been created that would not have left a good many ambitions unsatisfied, with the inevitable foundation for opposing factions to build upon. Still, the principles at stake were vital, and the psychological moment presented itself for a really great statesman to have taken the risk of drawing a diagonal line across racial boundaries once and for all. A man with the strength of character and vision of Lord Chatham would have taken the plunge, even had he been overwhelmed in consequence. General Botha preached goodwill and conciliation in season and out of season, but he failed at that moment to put into practice the one effective step towards harmony by disregarding the racial origin of his Ministers. While it is true that the seven members of the Cabinet were not exclusively Dutch South-Africans, they were predominantly so; and, with the exception of Mr Hull, who became Treasurer, they had all been, in previous days, exclusively identified with the South African Party. The one man whose inclusion in the Cabinet would have been accepted as the true emblem of racial union, Sir Starr Jameson, was omitted.

Thus it came about that the first elections for a Union parliament, held in September 1910, were fought practically on the old lines; and to-day we appear to be as far from the 'one-stream' policy as we were then. But appearances may be deceptive. Experience and education, not unmixed with lessons of the Great War, are at work; and, although no practical steps have yet been taken to bridge the gulf, there are not wanting signs of an impending change. The Dutch themselves have recently split into two factions; the one, styled the Nationalist Party, under General Hertzog, wishes to disregard the pledges given at Vereeniging; the other, called the South African Party, under General Smuts, respects them. The latter party, on account of its loyal attitude and more progressive outlook, has attracted to its ranks considerable support from the inhabitants of British birth or origin, with the general result that the English-speaking section has partly lost its identity in the South African Party, and is otherwise about equally represented by the Unionist and Labour members.

It is devoutly to be wished for South African progress and happiness that some means may be found of speedily bringing about more stable conditions in the political arena. The republican propaganda need not be viewed with undue apprehension, because a considerable section of the Dutch, born and bred under the British flag, would be against its disappearance. The whole of the English, of course, are of the same mind; and the natives would be most unquestionably opposed to the formation of what they would regard as a Dutch Republic. They have a lively recollection of their description as *scepsels* (creatures) in the old Transvaal *grondwet* (constitution). I am impelled to say at this point that Mr Bonar Law could hardly have given weighty consideration to the statement he made in the House of Commons on March 30 of this year (in the debate on Irish Home Rule), that, 'if the self-governing dominions chose to-morrow to say, "We will no longer make a part of the British Empire," we would not try to force them.' The Cape of Good Hope is one of the most important strategic points in the whole Empire; and its secession would probably be viewed at home and in the rest of the British Empire somewhat in the same light

as that in which the North viewed the proposed secession of the South from the United States of America.

General Botha came over to England to attend the Imperial Conference in 1907 and 1911; and upon these as on all other occasions his romantic figure marked him out for special popularity in this country. The keynote of his attitude in regard to Imperial affairs has been freedom of action for the Dominions in their domestic policy, and unity in all external matters. His quarrel with Hertzog originated over the latter's unbridled anti-imperial speeches, particularly in connexion with the South African contribution to the Navy, and his 'two-stream' policy, under which he advocated racialism of the worst kind. Botha finally expelled him from his Cabinet. From that event sprang the consolidation and rise of what is now known as the Nationalist Party, led by Hertzog and represented in the House of Assembly to-day by no less than forty-four seats. It would be incorrect to say that the whole of the Nationalist Party would like to see the British flag expelled from South Africa. Some at least of the followers of Hertzog are sufficiently versed in the world's affairs to realise the defenceless position of a country like South Africa, in its present state of population and development, against attack by any first-rate Power, without the support of the British Empire. Still, the great majority of the members of that party are unsophisticated farmers from the back-veld, with little knowledge of the world, a belief that South Africa is the hub of the universe, a partiality for the patriarchal views of President Kruger, and a conviction that the Dutch of South Africa are exclusively 'the people' and should be endowed with exclusive rule. Power in the hands of a Government set up by such a party would bring about a repetition of many of the errors that led to the troubles of the past and might end in civil war.

In the Johannesburg labour troubles of July 1913, Botha at first failed to realise the penalty that always waits upon supineness on the part of the Government. The forces of disorder were allowed to accumulate, and the gold-mining industry was brought to a standstill. Extremist sections marched from mine to mine and forced the workers to come out on strike, until by the

end of the week everything was closed down and the market-square at Johannesburg, which holds tens of thousands of people, contained a seething mass of strikers and sight-seers, inextricably mixed up. At nightfall on the evening of Friday, July 4, the turbulent and destructive elements burned down the Park Station and the 'Star' offices, and were only prevented from wrecking the Corner House by the police using their fire-arms. On the following day, General Botha and General Smuts came over to the Rand and found that order could not be restored without a great expenditure of innocent blood besides that of the disturbers of the peace. Botha, not having realised the effect of previous inaction, was, I think, justified in refusing to face the horror then confronting him. He, therefore, surrendered to the strikers. Work was resumed on the following Monday under conditions better imagined than described. The white miners, who regard themselves as the workers, in spite of most of the work being done by the natives, were masters of the situation and did exactly what they liked. Within six months, a further strike was threatened, and indeed begun; but, profiting by the experience previously gained, the Government took adequate precautions, and the stoppage of the industry lasted only half a day. On this occasion, the leaders of the movement did not succeed in gaining anything by the turmoil they had created. The strikes of July 1913, and of January 1914, are remarkable examples of the effect of weak or of strong government; and no one, I think, grasped the situation more clearly than Botha.

While it would be out of place here to discuss at length the subject last referred to, it is worth while to point out that the white man in South Africa (who enjoys the position of a supervisor, on the one hand, but claims, on the other, all the rights of combination, copied from the procedure in England) is placing himself in a very dangerous situation, because he has but to teach the native worker (which he is doing) to follow his example, and some day he will find himself as well as his fellow-citizens in a most precarious position.

So much has been written of General Botha's course

of action since the outbreak of the world-war that it would be superfluous to dwell at length upon that period, but that he never wavered for one moment from his allegiance to the Empire is unquestionable. That the necessity for crushing rebellion among his own compatriots must have been abhorrent to him is equally certain. He was a man whose cast of mind turned to compromise, conciliation, and persuasion as the way of winning through. To be forced to pursue and destroy men of his own race, even in open rebellion, must have caused him the keenest pain, but he never hesitated. Great Britain was at war, and South Africa was at war; there could be no question in his mind of optional neutrality. He appealed to Mr Steyn, former President of the Orange Free State, to use his influence to bring the rebels to reason, but the answer was unfavourable, as Mr Steyn objected to General Botha's invasion of South-West Africa. Botha brought that campaign to a rapid conclusion in a series of brilliant tactical moves, with but little loss of life. He then deputed his chief lieutenant, General Smuts, to take control of the East African campaign, which proved to be a much more lengthy and arduous undertaking. Finally, when the horrors of the struggle in Europe and elsewhere were brought to a close by the Armistice of November 1918, General Botha came over to England for the Peace Conference, visiting countries in Europe where problems had to be studied in anticipation of the Treaty of Peace. He was welcomed here with all the marks of affection and esteem to which he had been accustomed on previous occasions, and, of course, had he so desired, would have received almost any honour or decoration to which he might have aspired. No doubt partly in deference to the views of his compatriots, he declined any titular distinction, but became a member of His Majesty's Privy Council, having previously accepted an honorary Generalship in the British Army, which he valued very highly as a mark of distinction rarely granted. His intimate friends were aware that the state of his health left much to be desired, but no one anticipated his early death, which took place at midnight on Aug. 27, 1919.

The briefness of this narrative necessitates the omission of a great many points in this distinguished

man's career which might otherwise have been included. Suffice it, in conclusion, to say that, in the history of his own people, no man is entitled to, or likely to be accorded, anything like the position of eminence that his memory should receive and, in the world of men, history will no doubt place him among the elect. His friends will always look back upon Louis, as he was familiarly called, as a most agreeable companion and as a fine example of sagacious and sturdy manhood. General Smuts paid the following touching tribute to General Botha's memory at the grave of his dead friend and leader:

'After the intimate friendship and unbroken co-operation of twenty-one years, I have the right to call Botha the largest, most beautiful, and sweetest soul of all my land and days, great in life and happy in death.'

Lastly, General Botha's breadth of view and benevolent outlook were evinced in his farewell interview, published through Reuter in July 1919; and the following extract is memorable:

'As Great Britain led the war, so she has led the peace, and we look to her to secure its just fulfilment. I do not pretend to agree with all the peace terms. Who does? But I would say to the Germans: Show by your conduct that you intend to carry out the terms in the spirit and in the letter, and you will find salvation. Evasion and shiftiness will not be tolerated, but in honesty of purpose and of fulfilment may repose for you relief. . . . While we all lift up our hearts in thankfulness that the nightmare of the last five years is past, let us remember that with the victors rests the supreme gift of mercy. Should Germany in the near future produce evidence of a changed heart and a contrite spirit, it should be the privilege of Great Britain, just as she has led in war, also to lead in the mercy of peace. The peace must not be marred by vengeance. . . . I go back to South Africa more firmly convinced than ever that the mission of the British Empire now and in the time to come lies along the path of freedom and high ideals. Britain is the corner-stone upon which our civilisation must rest.'

LIONEL PHILLIPS.

Art. 3.—^{LA}THE GINESTRA; OR, THE DESERT FLOWER.*

APART from his poetry, which, like the modest flower on the cinder heaps above Pompeii that overlook the beautiful bay of Naples, brought sweetness and some contentment into his seared existence, Leopardi was one of the most unhappy men who have attained celebrity. Doubtless others have had misfortunes. Dante spent long years in exile, Tasso in imprisonment, Milton lost his sight. But these, and others nearly as eminent who have suffered severely, often had a brilliant past to look back upon; they had received good, should they not also receive evil? In the whole course, however, of Leopardi's life anything 'good' in the ordinary sense of the term would be difficult to find. Harsh parents, unsympathising associates, straitened circumstances, physical weakness and ill-health pointing inevitably to early decease, and the settled conviction that the world is governed without regard to individual welfare, constitute the essentially volcanic soil on which sprang 'The Ginestra'—yet within sight of the most enchanting prospects the world can show, mirrored in his imagination.

Of this poem, the last and longest among the more important Odes—perhaps also the most famous, at least on the Continent—very little need be said in explanation. With admirable lucidity it discloses, gravely and unhesitatingly, a conception of human affairs which sorrow had forced on the writer. It contains magnificent imagery and is enlivened with striking contrasts and similitudes, the moral inculcated being that men should devote their energies—without striving, each, for an undue share—to mutual assistance in the struggle with Nature, here regarded as our true Antagonist; in short, an idealised socialism. That a work of such high moral authority, power, and poetic beauty has not hitherto been made easily accessible may surprise some who now read it for the first time.

* This task of translating the principal Odes in Leopardi's 'Canti' being now completed, the writer wishes to thank Dr Mackail for guidance and encouragement when preparing the following version, and also those versions that have already appeared in this Review, and, more recently, in 'The Fortnightly.'

THE GINESTRA.

First published in 1845; written during the spring or autumn of 1836, in the year preceding the poet's death, while he was staying at a little house in the country situated on a spur of the mountain overlooking *Torre del Greco* and the sea.

'And men loved darkness rather than light.'—John iii, 19.

Here on the arid spine
Of the dread mount
Vesuvo,* the destroyer,
Which other flower or tree delights not, thou,
Fragrant Ginestra, joyful in the wild,
Scatterest thy solitary tufts around.
So, lately, had I found
Thy modest blossom, deck those sombre lands
That gird the City which in other time †
Was to all mortal men lady and queen,
And seem with solemn mien
A silent memory, the traveller heeds,
Of her lost power and pride.
Here in this waste I meet thee yet again,
Lover of sad, forsaken, solitudes,
Misfortune's constant friend!
These fields that cinders strew—
Unfruitful, hard o'erspread
With lava, echoing to the wanderer's feet;
Where in the sun the snake
Nestles, or writhes uncoiled, and rabbits make
Their wonted burrows—once were pastures gay
With villas, yellowed by the ripening corn,
Gladsome with lowing kine;
Gardens and palaces
There were, a loved repose
Made for the mighty in their hour of ease;
Here famous cities rose,
Which, thundering, this proud mountain overwhelmed
With torrents from her fiery throat aflame,
And those who dwelt therein. One ruin now
Involves them all, where, gentle flower, thou com'st
Wafting thy perfumed sweetness to the sky,
As if compassionate of other's dole,
These deserts to console.

* Vesuvus, Latin for Vesuvius.

† L. had recently passed through the Roman Campagna on his way from Florence to Naples.

Before this steep
Let him then come who would exalt with praise
Our state, and see what share
In loving Nature's care
Is ours at need. Here he may justly weigh
And measure well the power and sovereignty
Given to this breed of man whose cruel nurse,
Suddenly moved, when least he fears, annuls
A portion of his race, and on the rest
Destruction in brief space
With but a touch can pour.
Of human progeny
'The lofty destinies progressive ever' *
Are written on this shore.
Here gaze, here see thyself
Elate and foolish age,
That from the path discerned
When thought revived, assigned to us of old,
Hast wandered, backward in thy course returned,
And, still retiring, sounded an advance.
Dreaming of liberty, thou wouldst enchain
THOUGHT, that has led us out from barbarous ways,
That gave us civil life, whereby alone
In public acts a more humane regard
For all may yet be shown.
The truth—the bitter lot,
The humble place Nature prepared for us—
Displeases thee. Whereat, in coward sort,
Thy back turned to the light that makes this clear.
Thyself a fugitive, thou call'st him slave
Who seeks the light, him sole magnanimous
Who, fool or rascal, mocking at his kind,
Or mocked himself, with vile or senseless praise
Our rank on earth above the stars would raise.
The man of modest means and sickly frame,
If honour and a lofty soul be his,
Calls not nor deems himself
With wealth and vigour crowned;
Nor in the world makes an absurd pretence
Of sumptuous life and virile eminence;
But, if a beggar in his purse and health,
Holds it no shame to let the truth appear,
Speaks openly of all

* 'Le sorti magnifiche e progressive dell' umanità.' A quotation from Terenzio Mamiani. It occurs in the dedication to the 'Inni Sacri' (1832).

And gives to things that matter their true name.
 Magnanimous indeed I cannot call,
 But stupid, a frail creature born to die,
 Nurtured in all distress,
 Who says he lives for joy ;
 And with foul-smelling pride
 Fills books that promise new felicities
 And glories all unknown
 (Not only on this orb
 But in the very sky,)

Here, upon earth, to beings whom a breath
 Malarial,* a wave
 Of turbulent ocean, or the rocking soil
 Which tremors shake, destroys so utterly
 That even their memory
 Great pains will hardly save.
 A noble heart is his
 Who dares, with mortal eyes,
 Look on the common fate ;
 With tongue unbound, nought taking from the truth,
 Confess the evils for our journey meant,
 Our weak and low estate ;
 One who in suffering is strong and great,
 And to our other ills
 That deeper misery,
 Fraternal ire and hate,
 Adds not, by charging those of his own kind
 With blame for any sorrows that are his—
 But her, the criminal
 Whose guilt it truly is, who stands to us
 By birth our mother, stepdame in intent !
 Calls her the enemy, against her rage
 Holds that society was first ordained †
 With love of each to each

* l. 139, Bk. II, 'The Task.'

With his breath he draws
 A plague into his blood ; and cannot use
 Life's necessary means but he must die.
 Storms rise to overwhelm him. . . ,

The earth shall shake him out of all he holds,
 Or make his house his grave.

It is significant that the same sequence of ideas appears in the Italian,
 and interesting to compare the effect on Cowper's darkly devotional mind
 of a similar catastrophe.

† Rousseau's theories are here glanced at.

For prompt and mutual aid,
 Expected and accorded in the stress
 And peril of the war that all must wage;
 One in whose sight
 To arm the hand of man against his brother,
 Spread snares and stumbling blocks
 For mutual injury,
 Not less infatuate seems than in a camp
 Beleaguered, pressed, at hottest of the fight,
 If the defenders, careless of the foe,
 On their own soldiers levied hateful war
 And sought with fire and sword
 Their friends to overthrow.*
 When thoughts like these, made clear,
 Shine forth apparent to the general mind,
 And that first dread of Nature which combined
 Mortals in social bonds shall have returned,
 In part, through wisdom learned;
 Then civil intercourse upright and fair,
 Justice and piety, will have some root
 Better than haughty myths tradition feigns,
 Whereon much public probity is based
 With such security as all may see
 That which on error stands elsewhere attains.

Oft on this barren shore
 Clad as in mourning by the lava's flow,
 That still a wavelike motion seems to show,
 I sit at night, and, o'er this wilderness,
 Austere and cultureless,
 See the clear stars in deeps
 Of purest blue come forth,
 Whereto the sea her mirror turns below;
 And in this glittering sphere
 Our universe appear,
 And vast serene of heaven, and all aglow.
 Then, on these lights I gaze which to my eyes
 Are only specks, although in truth so great
 That land and sea with such
 Compared, seem but a speck;
 To whom man and this globe,
 Where man himself is nought,

* l. 71, Bk. II, 'The Task.'

And 'tis but seemly that, where all deserve
 And stand exposed by common peccancy
 To what no few have felt, there should be peace,
 And brethren in calamity should love.

Are both alike unknown :
 And when I see
 Those yet again endless and more remote
 Clusters or knots of stars,*
 Each like a filmy cloud
 To us, for whom not man, nor earth alone,
 But all summed up in one,
 The greater stars, the nearer heavenly host,
 And golden sun
 Exist not, or but seem
 As they to us a point of nebulous light—
 O poor humanity,
 What art thou in my sight !
 When, further, I but think
 On thy estate below,
 Here imaged in the clod beneath my feet,
 How, on the other hand,
 Thou wouldst be lord and ultimate aim of all,
 Fabling so often, as thy pleasure is,
 That on this grain of sand
 Which 'Earth' we call
 The authors of the universe came down
 For thy behoof, and talked familiarly
 With thee in human guise—
 How, too, this age which others would excel
 In manners and a true regard of things,
 Renewing idle tales, insults the wise :
 What thought of thee, unhappy race of man,
 What feeling, at the last, my heart assails ?
 I know not whether pity or scorn prevails.
 As when at autumn, on the happy dwelling
 Of an ant-nation—in the crumbling glebe
 Hollowed with art and toil, competitive,
 By this assiduous race,
 And providently stored against the cold—
 From some high tree a little apple falling,
 By ripeness and no other cause brought down,
 Breaks, shatters and deforms it at a blow ;
 So, deluging from the dark sky above,
 All suddenly, ruin and night conjoined,
 Stones, pumice, cinders, streams of liquid fire
 Shot upward by the mountains thund'rous womb

* 1. 214, Bk. III, 'The Task.'

I cannot analyse the air, nor catch
 The parallax of yonder luminous point
 That seems half quenched in the immense abyss.

Into heaven's vault on high—
 Or, overflowing down her flanks, immense
 A flood of molten metal, burning sand,*
 Over the tender grass
 Descended furiously,
 And those bright cities by the sea that stood
 On the land's furthest verge, in little space
 Crushed, covered and consumed.
 Above them now the goat
 Browses at will; there other cities stand
 To which the buried are but as the soil,
 And on the prostrate ruin at her foot
 The giant mountain treads as if in pride.
 Truly no better care,
 Or tenderness has Nature for the seed
 Of man than for the breed
 Of ants, whom she esteems
 Like him, no more nor less.†
 And if such carnage be indeed more rare
 For man than for the ant, that puny race
 Than ours more fruitful seems.
 Full eighteen hundred years ‡
 Have passed since vanished thus,
 By force of fire o'erthrown these populous seats;
 And still the villager who heedful rears
 His vines, to which on these gaunt fields
 The parched and lifeless soil with drudgery yields
 Poor nourishment, raises an anxious eye
 To that dark summit, in no way appeased,
 Still terrible, still menacing to pour
 Ruin and death on him, his little ones,
 And their scant household store!
 Often the jaded hind
 All night lies sleepless, starting up at times
 To pace the ground, or from his hovel's roof,

* Two forms of activity on the part of the volcano are here indicated. Burning material was thrown up into the sky and then descended in a fiery hail on the district. Lava also overflowed from the brink of the crater and poured down like a sea of fire to the coast.

† L. was well acquainted with Pope whose somewhat similar lines may recur to the reader:

'He sees with equal eye, as God of all,
 A hero perish or a sparrow fall.

And now a bubble burst, and now a world.'

‡ Accurately 1757 years at the date of the poem. A.D. 79 was the year of the eruption.

In the hot wind,
 Watch the descending track
 Of the dread current, seething, that o'erflows
 From the exhaustless womb
 Adown the ash strewn back,
 And burns, and glows,
 Shining afar o'er Caprian sea and land,
 Naples, the port, and Mergellina's strand. •
 Then if he see it near,
 Or, from the bottom of the cottage well
 Ever a sound can hear
 Of water bubbling up,
 In haste he wakes his children, wakes his wife,
 With all that they can carry, swift! away! *
 And fleeing, sees far off his little field
 And dear familiar nest,
 Their sole resource from want,
 Become the prey
 Of the devouring flood,
 Inexorable, that hissing glides along
 And spreads itself o'er all, enduringly.
 Returns Pompeii, dead, to the heaven's light
 After oblivion of the ages flown,
 As from the earth a buried skeleton,
 Which piety or greed † has disinterred,
 Comes forth to open day;
 And in the desolate Forum where he stands
 Mid rows of columns broken or o'erthrown,
 The traveller from strange lands
 Gazes aloft at the divided steep, ‡
 And smoking crest,
 That threaten still the ruins round him strewed.
 There, in the dread uncertain hour of night, §
 Through empty theatres, disfigured shrines,
 And houses rent in twain,
 Where the bat hides her brood,

* The solicitude of the poor man for his children is here contrasted with nature's callousness.

† Piety: to provide more honourable sepulture.

Greed: to rob the dead.

‡ The top of Vesuvius presents a bifurcated appearance. The 'cresta fumante' is the crater.

§ At this point Dr Garnett's criticism comes to mind: 'In L.'s later days his horizon seemed to expand. . . . *La Ginestra*, inspired by the hardy and humble Broom-plant flourishing on the brink of the lava-fields of Vesuvius, is more original in conception and ampler in sweep than any of its predecessors.'

Like a funereal torch
Through silent palaces that flickering goes
Wanders the ominous lava's mournful gleam
And, reddening in the darkness from afar
Tints dimly all around.
Thus ignorant of man and of the ages
That he calls ancient, ignorant of all
The sons who follow as their grandsires led,
Stands Nature ever young—
Or rather she *proceeds*,* but by so long
A course she *seems* to *stand*.
Meanwhile the kingdoms fall,
Peoples decay, their languages are lost;
She sees it not; yet of Eternity
Man proudly makes his boast.
And thou that with thy fragrant woods adornest
These wasted lands, gentle Ginestra, thou
Must also yield to the relentless sway
Of the dread power beneath
Who, to the accustomed place
Returning, soon will spread
Over each downy spray
Her ravenous mantle's verge.
Under that mortal burden thou wilt bow
Thine innocent and unresisting head;
Not meanly bent to supplicate in vain,
Ere it shall be the oppressor of that hour;
Not led by pride to seek
Vainly the stars, nor scornful of the waste
Where, not thy will, but fortune placed
Being and birth for thee, that art indeed
Wiser than man, less weak
In this—thou deemest not thy feeble flower
Immortal made by Fate, or thine own power.

HENRY CLORISTON.

* 'Or rather she proceeds.' 'This is a correction or explanation of "stands," It means; she does not stand still, she advances; her path is, however, so limitless that the movement is indiscernible' (Stracalli's note) (e.g. The 'fixed' stars).

Art. 4.—THE LAST OF THE HABSBURGS.

1. *Historische Aufsätze.* By Heinrich Friedjung. Stuttgart and Berlin : Cotta, 1919.
2. *Die Vereinigten Staaten von Gross-Oesterreich.* By Aurel C. Popovici. Leipzig : Elischer, 1906.
3. *Im Weltkriege.* By Count Ottokar Czernin. Berlin and Vienna : Ullstein, 1919.

I. THE EMPEROR FRANCIS JOSEPH.

It has become the fashion in Austria and Germany to rail against the 'cursed race' of Habsburgs and to accuse them of every conceivable crime and wrongdoing. The foreigner who reads and hears this kind of thing cannot but believe that the House of Habsburg was the acme of inefficiency and wickedness; that, degenerate and corrupt, they ground down their people, thus bringing the Empire to ruin; and that, above all, they were guilty of having brought about the world-war. The foreigner who is not prepared to give unquestioning credence to these accusations will, indeed, wonder how the people of the Habsburg Empire could have put up with so depraved a race of sovereigns for so many centuries, and how it came about that, under their rule, this Empire attained importance and prosperity; how it was possible for it to become a great Power and even, at one time, to take the lead on the Continent of Europe. He will find an answer to these questions in history. In so far as we are concerned with the last rulers of the house of Habsburg—and it is against them, more particularly, that these accusations are aimed—an attempt will be made in the following pages to give the foreigner a sketch of their personalities to which he can supply the context for himself.

Franz Josef, the son of Archduke Franz Karl, one of Kaiser Ferdinand's brothers, and of the Archduchess Sofie, a Princess of Bavaria, was, by virtue of his whole personality, a living refutation of the reproach of degeneracy which has been made against his race, a reproach which was fully justified in the case of Kaiser Ferdinand alone. His father and uncles, with their

abnormally long faces, shapeless, box-like skulls, and drooping lips, gave the impression of degeneracy, outwardly at any rate, although they were in reality not degenerate—it is only necessary to recall Archduke Karl, the victor of Aspern, and Archduke Johann, the Vice-regent. In contrast to them, however, Franz Josef was very well built, an advantage which he owed to his mother. His slim, elegant figure, with the upright military bearing and elastic step which he retained to an advanced age, was combined with a normally shaped head and a handsome, sympathetic face, in which the characteristic Habsburg lip was only slightly indicated. Not one of the many portraits of Kaiser Franz Josef taken in his youth betrays signs of degeneracy. Again, his iron constitution which, in spite of the terrible accumulation of misfortunes heaped upon him, enabled him to reach a patriarchal age and at the same time to retain a remarkably strong memory, emphatically contradicts the reproach of degeneracy.

Just as his outward appearance showed no sign of morbid degeneracy, so neither did his mentality. Even as a boy of eighteen, when he came to the throne, contemporary accounts show that he gave evidence by his bearing of a personal majesty which was quite unusual in one so young. Although he was not by birth the son of a ruler, he was, nevertheless, a born ruler. This majesty of bearing and conduct, which placed an impassable gulf between him and the rest of the world, was one of his most characteristic qualities; it adhered to him during the whole of his long life and in course of time developed ever more markedly. Once Kaiser, he remained at all times and to all men, even to his nearest relations, always the 'Kaiser.' He dwelt, as it were, on inaccessible heights, and only occasionally condescended to relax a little within the circle of his own family. His need to be sometimes not only Kaiser but also man was practically limited to his pleasures as a grandfather when in the company of the children of his daughter Valerie, and his intercourse with his friend of many years' standing, Frau Katharina Schratt, an actress of the Hofburg Theater, in whose house he was a daily visitor.

But, however sharp and well-defined the gulf between himself and the rest of the world might be, it would be

a mistake to conclude from it that his manner towards others was such as to cause offence. This was by no means the case, for his strongly developed sense of the dignity of royalty was combined with great distinction of manner which could be, as occasion demanded, friendly, benevolent, and even charming. His courtesy towards women, in particular, was well known. Thus, the imperial halo surrounding him not only caused no feeling of resentment or even of estrangement, but served to strengthen the feelings of reverence and devotion to him. The public audiences, also, which he held every week and to which the lowest labourer had as much right of entry as the greatest magnate, so long as he had any reason to give for demanding it, must have helped to prevent the people from resenting this distance between themselves and the Kaiser. Those who had much to do with him, especially those in direct personal relation with him, regarded him with great devotion and affection, an affection particularly marked in the case of his servants and household guards, among whom there was hardly one who would have hesitated to give his life for him.

Towards those far beneath him in the social scale he could be particularly affable, because he was so far removed from them that he had no need to fear any loss of dignity. His perfect tact and his long schooling in self-restraint prevented him, also, from expressing his consciousness of sovereignty in so loud and insistent a manner as was habitual with Kaiser Wilhelm II, although this consciousness was no less strongly developed in him. Nothing could have been further removed from his distinguished nature, and, doubtless, nothing could have been more repugnant to him than such demonstrations. Although he never referred to the subject except perhaps in his most intimate circle, it can be safely assumed that the resounding trumpet tones in which Kaiser Wilhelm liked to make himself heard were repellent to him. No doubt he was unable to understand how a monarch could allow himself to indulge in such inordinate extravagance of behaviour. One is justified, therefore, in assuming that he was but little in sympathy with his ally's conduct as a whole, and that, on his part, the friendship between them was solely of an official nature. The contrast between the

characters of the two rulers was too great for it to have been otherwise.

In marked contrast to Kaiser Wilhelm, Franz Josef avoided any expression of opinion in public which might have far-reaching consequences. Statements such as the notorious 'Sic volo, sic jubeo,' or, 'Whoever is against me, him will I destroy' (*Wer wider mich ist, den zerschmettere ich*), were quite unthinkable as coming from his lips. Rather did he anxiously avoid giving any definite character to remarks made by him in public, so that they appeared colourless, conventional, insignificant, even sometimes ridiculous. But the derision which they occasionally excited was not in the least justified. It is true that he did not give an impression either of intellect or distinction when, at the innumerable exhibitions and ceremonies which he considered it his duty to open or to attend, he invariably made use of the same words: 'It was very fine,' or 'It has given me great pleasure.' But the mockers, had they been in his place, would in all probability have had nothing more intellectual or significant to say, if they had been opening and inspecting exhibitions and fêtes for more than half a century and had been obliged thousands of times to make gracious remarks to the exhibitors or the organisers of these shows. No doubt the Kaiser himself would often have preferred to say something quite different, even to express the wish to have done with such things for ever, and doubtless he often had grounds for expressing dislike or disapproval. But his tact and sense of duty prevented him from doing so, because he knew that to every word uttered by him great significance was attributed, and for this reason he wished to avoid causing injury to any one by making disparaging remarks. Even when an exhibit was quite contrary to his taste, as for instance the crazy daubs of the secessionist painters, he confined the expression of his opinion to a smiling: 'That is too extreme for me.'

Where he did not feel himself to be, as it were, a guest, but on duty, above all in his capacity as Supreme War Lord at manœuvres and parades, he did not refrain from criticism, and let fall many an emphatic remark. His extraordinary quickness of vision where military formalities such as precision of movement and accuracy

in drill were concerned, seldom failed to observe faults in this direction, and for this reason was very much feared by the officers. The so-called 'Kaiser-Parade' of the Vienna garrison, which was held every spring on the 'Schmelz' parade-ground, cast many an ominous shadow before it. Not infrequently, on such occasions, an imperial storm burst over the head of one or other of the regimental commanders; but it should be added that, as a rule, these outbreaks had no further consequences for the victims.

It was not therefore lack of temperament, as might be supposed, which caused Kaiser Franz Josef to refrain from such expressions of opinion as were often uttered by Kaiser Wilhelm; but he always had his temperament so well under control that it never played him any tricks. Indeed his excessive reserve in speech and manner alienated many people, and even in Austria Kaiser Wilhelm was held to be by far the more distinguished monarch; this was especially the case in German nationalist circles and among the Magyars. There were indeed plenty of people who were not a little impressed by Kaiser Wilhelm's pompous manner and loud-sounding phrases, and who, because he spoke on every imaginable subject, considered him to be gifted both as man and ruler, which was in fact very far from the truth. Beside this loud and glaring personality, Kaiser Franz Josef, from whose lips a notable word was never heard to fall and whose sphere of interest was so much more restricted, did indeed appear pale, impersonal, even insignificant, quite apart from the fact that the great difference in age was to his disadvantage. Those, however, who did not permit themselves to be dazzled by Kaiser Wilhelm's versatility and excessive self-assertion, had to admit that he was something of a braggart, whereas Kaiser Franz Josef had a genuine individuality and was certainly the better and wiser ruler of the two.

It is indeed incontestable that he was lacking in originality; his was a more conventional nature which travelled along the well-worn grooves of tradition and carefully avoided any divergence from that path. Nevertheless, it would seem that, in his youth the Kaiser had a more definite personality, which was worn down and obliterated in the course of time by the many experiences,

mostly unhappy, of his long reign, so that the distinct colours which were perhaps there at first had faded more and more and gradually vanished. But this much is certain and cannot be denied, that his sphere of intellectual interests had always been a very narrow one. He never cared much for science or art, with the exception of painting; and it has never been reported of him that he expressed sympathy with this or the other poet. As a matter of fact, he had one favourite pursuit only—hunting, to which he remained faithful to the end of his life. Apart from this, he sought in the society of his friend Frau Schratt the relief and recreation in which his great sense of duty only permitted him to indulge to a limited extent.

His relations with this lady were an open secret, which no one took amiss, with the exception of the clergy. He himself made no mystery of it, and during his summer residence at Ischl he used to spend every afternoon at his friend's villa. An indication of the unusual nature of this relation was given by the fact that his wife knew of it and gave evidence of a real feeling of sympathy with Frau Schratt; that the Empress went so far as to present this lady with her portrait was surely by no means an ordinary occurrence. The people begrudged the Kaiser this relief all the less because it was well known how unhappy he was in his family life. His marriage with Princess Elizabeth of Bavaria had been a love-match on his part, which is not surprising in view of her extraordinary charm. But her independent and self-willed nature, which had developed in comparative freedom, could not feel at home amid the Spanish ceremonial of the Viennese Court, and put her out of sympathy with her husband, so that a feeling of coldness and estrangement arose between them, which led, in the course of time, to an actual though not official separation. They led their own lives apart and met but seldom. If the Kaiser was in any way to blame for this state of affairs it was certainly much against his will, for, just because he had at other times always to be the 'Kaiser,' he occasionally felt the necessity of being human also; and, as he could not satisfy this need at home, he sought to do so elsewhere and found what he sought in the company of Frau Schratt.

In spite of this estrangement, he felt the tragic death of his wife very deeply; perhaps, as a man, he felt it even more deeply than that of his only son Rudolf. The effect on him of the news of Archduke Rudolf's death is said to have been terrible; but here it was doubtless rather the monarch who found himself bereft of his sole heir than the father who had lost an insubordinate and troublesome son; for the relations between father and son had been very unhappy. Like his mother, whose nature he had apparently inherited, Rudolf felt ill at ease in the strict, narrow-minded atmosphere of the Court; and in his rebellion against it he turned to a far worse extreme—a deliberate contempt and scorn of those considerations which were due to his position. Such behaviour was especially calculated to offend and embitter the Kaiser, who set such store by dignity and the duties of royalty, so that a gulf stretched between them which grew ever wider and deeper. The Kaiser, however, cannot be altogether absolved from blame for this unhappy estrangement, for, by the very fact that he jealously kept his son apart from affairs of State, he naturally helped, though unintentionally, to drive him deeper and deeper into the wild Don Juan-like paths which led to so tragic a conclusion. It was the ugly and painful circumstances attending the Crown-Prince's death that probably caused his father the bitterest suffering of his life, suffering more bitter than could have been caused by his death alone. For how deeply must the Kaiser have suffered—with his proud nature, his dignified reserve, his horror of anything which might excite scandal—through the enormous sensation caused by this death, which stirred the whole world with its blood-stained eroticism, and unloosed a perfect deluge of the most revolting type of sensational journalism.

Of the population of his kingdom, numbering over fifty millions, there can, indeed, be but few who have experienced such an abundance of tragedy within their own family circle. His brother Maximilian, executed as Emperor of Mexico; his wife killed by the hand of an assassin; his nephew and heir also; added to these, other painful events in his family, not to speak of the heavy blows dealt him by fate in his capacity of ruler. The whole constituted such an immense tragedy that it would

not have been wonderful if he had collapsed beneath it. The wonder was that he did not collapse—a miracle to be explained not only by the extraordinary elasticity of his physical constitution, but doubtless also by the self-sufficiency and calmness of his nature which gave him a spiritual equilibrium that even the most terrible blows of fate could not permanently injure. This tragedy helped, moreover, to gain for him, through pity, feelings of sympathy which would otherwise probably not have been accorded him to such an extensive degree. People saw a crown of thorns upon his grey head, from which a radiance emanated. This radiance added a warmer tone to the frigid halo which had encircled him, and thus increased his popularity. For popularity he enjoyed, however far removed from the people his nature essentially was. In the early days, indeed, especially at the time when he was under the evil influence of General Count Grünne, there were few signs of popular favour. It only became evident in the course of years, and was perhaps mainly due to the force of habit. His people had become used to regarding him as their ruler; three generations, from childhood to age, had known no other Kaiser; and they could scarcely imagine that there would ever be any other Kaiser in Austria than this kindly old gentleman with the characteristic white whiskers, who had suffered so many misfortunes and still had to endure so much as sovereign, owing to the difficulties of his position. Thus custom and pity wove about him a species of popularity which his own personality would scarcely have won.

II. ARCHDUKE FRANZ FERDINAND.

ALTHOUGH Archduke Franz Ferdinand never came to the Habsburg throne, nevertheless in considering the last of the Habsburgs he must not be omitted; for, in spite of the fact that Franz Josef's jealous love of power limited his sphere of action, he succeeded, as he appeared, in making his influence felt very effectively, and would have been destined to play an important part on the political stage. To the public, Franz Ferdinand appeared as a sort of shrouded figure like that of Sais, whose veils their fingers were always itching to lift.

But these veils were never to be completely raised, this curiosity was never to be entirely satisfied, for Franz Ferdinand passed into the great darkness before the *chiaroscuro* in which he was hidden during his lifetime could be illuminated. Those, however, who were closely connected with him, or who had any opportunity of considering him attentively and impartially, even if it were through the veils which shrouded him from publicity, were able to perceive the outlines of his personality so clearly that for them it had no mystery, and they realised that his individuality was the most remarkable produced by the House of Habsburg since the Emperor Josef II.

The tragic death of the Crown Prince Rudolf on Jan. 30, 1889, caused Archduke Franz Ferdinand to take a prominent place before the world. Although the next heir to the throne would, in fact, have been the Emperor's brother, Archduke Karl Ludwig, it was taken for granted that the latter would resign his right to the throne in favour of his eldest son, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, especially since, in view of the Emperor's vigorous constitution, he would not have succeeded until he was well advanced in years. The public knew little of Franz Ferdinand, and that little was not calculated to excite sympathy for him or to cause any great hopes to be set on him; for rumour attributed to him, as to his younger brother Otto, all manner of frivolous escapades in which he had played no very creditable rôle. When it became known that he was suffering from tuberculosis, a disease which he had inherited from his mother, who had died while still in her youth, and that on this account he was obliged to go south, it was generally believed that there was no question of his succeeding, even if he survived the Emperor; and his younger brother Otto, who was married and had sons, was regarded as the future sovereign. But this belief was, before long, seen to have been erroneous, for Franz Ferdinand soon let it be known that he was not prepared to renounce the throne to which, after the death of his father, he had become the immediate heir.

The first time that he courted publicity was when he accepted the patronage (*Protektorat*) of the Catholic Schulverein and, on this occasion, let fall a significant

remark on the 'Los von Rom' movement, so active at that time. 'Away from Rome,' he said, 'is equivalent to "Away from Austria!"' In this *mot* he hit the nail on the head, for the propaganda against the Catholic Church set on foot by the Pan-Germans was solely to be attributed to the fact that the latter regarded the Catholic Church as the greatest obstacle to the spread of Pan-German thought among the people. The object of this school of thought, however, was none other than to hurl the Habsburgs from the throne and to affiliate Austria to the German Empire as a vassal State. But this movement naturally roused the indignation of the heir-apparent and provoked him to severe condemnation of the Pan-German propaganda. His words called forth a very vehement and hostile response from the public. The Liberal Jewish press, at that time leading opinion in Austria, vied with the Pan-German and Social-Democratic press in expressing its indignation that the future sovereign should, in accepting the patronage of a confessedly Catholic association, have taken up a definitely partisan attitude, and they disputed his right to do so. There is no question that, if he had accepted the patronage of a Liberal or German-nationalist association, and had given utterance to opinions in sympathy with these, the very same journals would have hailed his utterances with enthusiasm; as, however, he had adopted the contrary standpoint, they assumed an air of virtuous indignation and demanded impartiality. Indeed, the Liberals, Social-Democrats, Jews, and—a strange medley—Pan-Germans were all beginning to have fears for the future, which held no promise of good to them when Franz Ferdinand should come to the throne. Hence the commotion.

The Magyars were also to have a foretaste of this future, which was but little relished by them and gave them much food for reflexion; for, when the Archduke was about to pay a visit to the court of the Tsar at Petersburg and chose Count Zichy, a man of his own political views, as his Hungarian Lord-in-Waiting, the Liberal clique in Hungary expressed themselves as highly offended, brought a protest before the Emperor, and demanded that the Archduke should make his choice from their ranks. This objection was so far successful

that the Archduke was obliged to exclude Count Zichy from his retinue, but, in spite of this, he would not have a member of the Liberal party, to which he was antagonistic, forced on him, and, rather than suffer this, he decided to have no Hungarian Lord-in-Waiting to accompany him, so that Hungary was not represented in his retinue at all. It was the first time for decades that the Magyars had met with opposition at Vienna; they now became aware that a strong man was there who, once he came to power, would brook no interference.

By these two indications of his views and aims the Archduke had slightly raised the veils in which his personality had hitherto been shrouded and had given a hint of what was to be expected of him as ruler. By his marriage with the Countess Chotek, which he finally achieved after a long and difficult struggle, in spite of the vehement opposition of the Emperor and the Court in general, the Archduke showed that he was capable of obstinacy not only in political matters but also in regard to his personal affairs, even when in conflict with the most powerful man in the Empire. Although this alliance was dangerous and regrettable from a political point of view, because it was calculated to render Austrian politics, already difficult and complicated enough, more confused than ever, yet, judged from the other, the human standpoint, it did great credit to the Archduke's constancy and will-power.

It may at once be said that it proved an entirely happy marriage; and the Archduke was never so contented as when in his family circle, especially at Schloss Konopischt in Bohemia, which he had bought and furnished with extravagant magnificence and exquisite taste. He withdrew from life at Court, not only to avoid the painful disputes as to precedence, and to spare his wife the slights to which the stiff Court etiquette would have exposed her; but also because he did not feel at ease in the atmosphere of the Court and did not get on particularly well with the other Archdukes. At Schloss 'Belvedere,' once the seat of Prince Eugen of Savoy, he held, when he was in Vienna, his own rigidly restricted Court, which was to a certain extent, and occasionally very markedly so, a direct contrast to that of the old Emperor. Indeed, the relations between the

Emperor and his heir were anything but friendly, not merely by reason of his unsuitable marriage, but also because the old man recognised in him an opponent whose energy and perseverance made themselves unpleasantly felt when any debatable question arose, and through whom his autocracy was threatened and obstructed. Had he been a younger man, the conflict between him and Franz Ferdinand would probably have become serious. As it was, however, he was too weary and broken to take up the challenge; and thus their relations continued, outwardly at least, to be more or less friendly, however strained they may have been in reality.

If the Archduke stood in the Emperor's way, the Emperor stood no less in his, not only because his succession to the throne was deferred, but also because he was forced to look on helplessly and see how the timid policy of the old man, who avoided the solution of all serious problems for fear of possible strife, was making it more and more difficult for him, when the time came to assume power, to straighten out the ever-increasing tangle of intricate political problems, and to find for them even a partially satisfactory solution. The Emperor was blind to the dangers with which he and his Empire were threatened by the inflammable material which had been accumulating for years, or at any rate he refused to see them; but Franz Ferdinand saw them, and realised the enormous danger menacing the Monarchy if these explosives were not unloaded in time by an expert hand. But it was such aims as these that were obstructed by Franz Josef, who would not hear of these dangerous things being handled at all. Of such a nature were the various national problems, the solution of which was growing more and more necessary; the Southern-Slav question, in particular, was becoming urgent, and also the highly complicated Hungarian problem, so closely connected with it. Then there was the question of *Italia Irredenta*, which tended to exacerbate the relations of the Monarchy with Italy.

To be a powerless and inactive onlooker while the ship of state became ever more and more involved in the whirlpool of national currents, must have been nerve-racking to a man of such insight and energy as the

Archduke, and must have exasperated and embittered him, especially as he had a definite political programme in view. This programme was called 'Great Austria,' a title adopted by a Hungarian of Rumanian origin, Aurel C. Popovici, who, in his book, 'Die Vereinigten Staaten von Gross-Oesterreich,' had proposed a complete reformation of the Habsburg Monarchy on an ethnographical basis. His view was that each nation in the Empire should, as it were, find its soul in its own way, its boundaries being fixed on ethnographical grounds, and full national autonomy being accorded. But, in order that this conglomeration of nations should not fall to pieces, they were to be bound together by a strong cement; and this cement was to consist of the institutions common to *all* the nations of the Monarchy, such as national defence, transport, currency, and trade. The central point of this *Austria rediviva* was, of course, to be Vienna, and the diplomatic language was to be German, not out of regard for the Germans, who were not to take front rank by any means, but because it is a widely-spoken language—an advantage that cannot be claimed for the Magyar or the Rumanian tongue, any more than for the various Slav dialects. Popovici's scheme was a happy union of the ideas of federalism and centralisation, and it was unquestionably capable, as no other scheme had been, of satisfying the just national demands of the various nations in the Empire. This scheme appealed very strongly to the Archduke, although he did not propose to carry it out quite so radically as Popovici suggested. The complete abandonment of Crown-land boundaries in favour of a purely ethnographical division was repugnant to his highly developed historical sense.

When the Archduke's preference for the Great-Austria programme became known in Hungary—Popovici's book had been placed on the index there—the public, naturally, were not too well pleased, and looked forward to his accession with increasing anxiety; for an essential condition of this programme was the transformation of Hungary in accordance with a nationalist sentiment. But it was common knowledge that nothing enraged the Magyars more than any rash attempt to interfere with the political ideal of the Magyar

'National State.' The Czechs, on their side, were no more enamoured of a 'Great Austria' than the Magyars, in spite of the fact that a rigid division between them and the Germans in the Sudetes region would have put a satisfactory end to the vexatious disputes about language. For they too had a nationalist ideal—the Bohemian constitutional principle, which would not admit of the division of Bohemia into two territories, in one of which the Czech language, and in the other German, should be spoken. On the other hand, Popovici's scheme met with all the more sympathy from the peoples of Hungary who were oppressed by the Magyars, and from the Slovaks, Rumanians, and Croats, who saw in the Archduke their future saviour.

In foreign politics Franz Ferdinand turned his attention first of all to Italy. He was under no illusions as to what the Monarchy might expect from this 'ally,' and believed that the latter was only lying in wait for the moment when she could take the Monarchy unawares and attack it, of course with the help of another Power. Italy's expedition to Tripoli gave him, indeed, a foretaste of what awaited the Monarchy at Italy's hands under certain conditions, and must have strengthened him in his feeling of distrust and resentment. It was not surprising, therefore, that the official political attitude of the Monarchy in regard to Italy enraged him, for this attitude was in keeping with the Emperor's desire for peace at any price. The Archduke did not conceal his displeasure from Count Aehrenthal, the chief representative of this conciliatory policy; and, as the Count obstinately persisted in it, there were some sharp disputes. In the eyes of the public it was Count Aehrenthal and the Chief of Staff, Baron Conrad, who were in opposition, but behind the scenes it was, in fact, the Emperor and the heir apparent who were in conflict. At first Franz Ferdinand was obliged to give way, for Conrad was forced to retire, and Aehrenthal continued to hold office and to carry out his policy. But the Archduke was not the man to admit defeat for long; a year later, Conrad was again Chief of Staff, and Aehrenthal's hour would undoubtedly have struck had not a higher power removed him from office for ever.

The leading Vienna papers sided, of course, with

Aehrenthal in this dispute, and were never weary of assuring their public that Italy was the Monarchy's best friend, that aggression was far from her intentions, and that the Italian danger was a bogey set up by the clergy and by ambitious generals so as to mislead the public and to conceal their own sinister designs. These people—they called them the 'War Party' in public, but referred to them privately as the 'Belvedere Party,' recognising the Archduke to be their moving spirit—had in view, so they said, nothing less than the invasion and annihilation of Italy, in order to reinstate the Pope's temporal power on her ruins. And, since the indiscriminating masses are always ready to believe the most improbable lies, they swallowed this bait readily enough, and thought the Archduke was really an agitator and a fool, who was ready to plunge the Monarchy into war for the sake of the Pope.* As a matter of fact, Franz Ferdinand, in spite of his energetic nature, was by no means of a warlike disposition. He gave proof of this at the time of the annexation crisis (1908) when, in spite of a favourable opportunity—Russia was still disabled by the Japanese war and Italy would not have dared to attack the Monarchy single-handed—he could not make up his mind to seize his advantage and settle the account with Serbia.

As regards Germany, Franz Ferdinand was certainly in favour of maintaining the alliance, but not on the terms of German supremacy. Germany's dominating influence in this alliance must have been a thorn in the flesh for a man of such strong individuality; and there is no doubt that, if he had ascended the throne, he would have taken good care to put an end to Austria-Hungary's tutelage to Germany. No real intimacy, such as the official press persisted in proclaiming so emphatically, ever existed between him and the Emperor Wilhelm; their characters differed too widely for that. His reserved nature, averse from all theatrical display, must have been repelled by the Emperor's boisterous

* I published a full account of the relations between Austria-Hungary and Italy in this Review in January 1911 under the title 'Austria-Hungary and Italy'; this article pleased the Archduke so much that he wished to have it made known in Austria, whereupon I published a second article to the same effect in the 'Oesterreichische Rundschau.'

manner and heroic postures, especially as he was inclined to sarcasm, which such behaviour could not fail to evoke.

He had few friends in his immediate entourage, but found full compensation for this lack within his family circle. He set little store by popularity, less than was wise in a future ruler; and a regrettable pettiness in regard to matters of economy helped still further to make him disliked and to draw upon him the reproach of miserliness. Moreover, his positively morbid passion for the chase, or rather for killing, was not calculated to embellish that portrait of him formed in the public mind, the sinister tones of which, displaying not a single sympathetic feature, were in urgent need of a redeeming ray of light.

Although the general public did not trouble very much about him, because he was too far removed from them, certain officials at the Court and in the Government looked forward to his accession with great anxiety, for they knew that, even during the Emperor's lifetime, a strong breeze blew from Belvedere; what would happen, therefore, when the Emperor was dead and the Belvedere breeze could wander unhindered among the Court and State officials and sweep away the antiquated wigs! Not a few of these officials had already had a foretaste of what was to come. Even personages whose position might have been regarded as unassailable had experienced the weight of Franz Ferdinand's displeasure. Such was Baron Beck, for many years Chief of Staff, who was in high favour with the Emperor, but had been obliged to give way to Conrad, in whom he had placed absolute confidence. This trial of strength proved conclusively that Franz Ferdinand had sufficient courage and strength to show his disapproval even of those whose persons the Emperor's favour had apparently rendered sacred, if they appeared to him to be incapable of filling their office. The Minister of War, General von Schönaich, also felt the weight of his hand when he coquetted too flagrantly with the Magyars over the Army question. The same fate had already overtaken Count Goluchowski, Aehrenthal's predecessor at the Ballplatz.

Very few people had an intimate knowledge of the Archduke, but these few, although aware of the darker

side of his character, knew his good qualities also, and were able to estimate his importance correctly. One of these good qualities, and one which would have been of special value to him in the future as ruler, was his dislike of sycophants and flatterers, who merely strengthened his contempt for men. On the other hand, he could bear sharp criticism from those whom he esteemed—their number, it is true, was not great—and, if he was offended at the time, he bore them no grudge for it. In contrast to other great personages, he was in the habit of going to the root of matters and did not content himself with a superficial knowledge; this characteristic, though praiseworthy, was nevertheless extremely inconvenient to his courtiers. Thus, should some event have aroused in him a desire for information on any question, scientific or otherwise, the lot of the officer on his military staff concerned with such matters, and on whom this difficult task fell, was not an easy one; for he had to acquaint himself as thoroughly and quickly as possible with the subject so as to be able to satisfy his master on any point. To deceive him, as other people in high places are often deceived, was quite out of the question; and he who ventured to attempt it inevitably brought about his own downfall. Again, contrary to the usual custom of princes, he required his officials to tell him, not only what was pleasant, but the truth, even if it were disagreeable and not at all flattering to himself.*

* I may give, from my own experience, a small example of this characteristic of the Archduke's. When he was nearing his fiftieth birthday (Dec. 18, 1913), the editor of the 'Oesterreichische Rundschau,' Baron Chlumecky, a first-rate publicist who was in great favour with the Archduke, decided to publish a special number in his honour for the occasion. In this number Franz Ferdinand's personality was to be shown from various sides, from that of a soldier, promoter of the Navy, patron of Art, sportsman, etc. Each of these sections was to be written by a different author, after the consent of the Archduke had been obtained, for no one would venture upon such an undertaking without his knowledge. These articles were to be prefaced by a biography, and the Archduke decided of his own accord that I was to write it, although my name had not appeared in the list of suggested authors laid before him. This in itself was evidence of an independent judgment unusual in a prince; but the reason which guided his choice was still more significant. Shortly before this I had published, at the request of the firm of Cotta, an article on the Archduke for their new journal 'Der Greif,' which was not by any means in the customary Byzantine manner, but which had met with his approval for this very reason. For the purpose of carrying out this work a number of

When the Emperor Franz Josef became so seriously ill in the spring of 1914 that, in view of his great age, the worst was feared, many at the Vienna Court, in Hungary, and in all the extreme national strongholds of the Monarchy, must have trembled, not because of their affection for the Emperor, but because of their fear of his heir, in whom they recognised their most powerful opponent. Other hearts must have beat high with hope because at last the Habsburg throne was to be occupied by the man who alone was capable of saving from destruction the Empire now rocking on its foundations. But their wish was not destined to be fulfilled; the Emperor recovered, and Franz Ferdinand's enemies could breathe again.

During those critical spring days the hour of the Monarchy had struck; Franz Josef's life signified Franz Ferdinand's death. If Franz Josef had died then, instead of two years later, his successor would probably not have gone to Serajevo and would not have been assassinated there; * the world war, if inevitable, would have broken out at another time and under different conditions; and the Habsburg Empire might still have been in existence to-day. These are, it is true, fruitless speculations after the event; but they may well be correct, for it is quite probable that, if Franz Ferdinand had ascended the throne he would have endeavoured to arrive at an understanding with Russia, and he would have made a special effort to be on friendly terms with England, for which country he had a special affection and to which he had paid a protracted visit not long before his death. The murderer of Franz Ferdinand did not know that he had killed a man who not only was no enemy to Serbia, but was also one who, when on the

albums at Belvedere were placed at my disposal, in which all the references to the Archduke which had appeared in the papers since the year 1895 had been collected and pasted. Among these—and this is the significant point—were included those in which mention was made of the miserliness of himself and his wife, and even one, from a French newspaper, in which he was described as a *crétin*. It is obvious that the officials entrusted with the collection of these cuttings would never have dared to show him any of such a nature if they had not had strict orders to include every mention of him, even the most insulting.

* It is questionable whether Franz Ferdinand would have escaped his fate in any case. His name had long been on the death-list, not only of the actual conspirators but also on that of the continental Freemasons.

throne, would have restored their rights to the Southern Slavs. But he did know that in striking him he struck at Austria, for Franz Ferdinand was the embodiment of the idea of the Austrian State.

III. KARL THE FIRST AND LAST.

When Archduke Karl, son of Archduke Otto, the younger brother of Franz Ferdinand, found himself unexpectedly, through the assassination of the latter, in the position of heir apparent, he scarcely realised the difficulty and magnitude of the task which presumably awaited him in the near future, and entered upon his office to all appearances without misgiving. All his portraits of this period and of the period immediately following his accession wear a contented, smiling expression, showing clearly how pleased he was with his new and exalted dignity, and how little, in spite of the terrible war which raged around him and shook his kingdom to its deepest foundations, he felt as yet the burden he had taken upon his shoulders. Not so much his youth as the easy-going temperament inherited from his father prevented him from realising the immense difficulties of his task and the fearful possibilities of his situation. If he is to be blamed at all for this lack of perception, a great part of the responsibility must fall on those who encouraged him in his optimism by fooling him with Byzantine flatteries and concealing the dangers which threatened him on every side. He was greeted with enthusiasm wherever he appeared; and those who read the daily papers and considered them worthy of credence must have thought the young Emperor and his wife the most popular royal couple under the sun. This Byzantine cult reached its climax on the occasion of Karl's coronation as King of Hungary, which was staged with a display of magnificence worthy of the Middle Ages, and, in the 20th century, had the effect of a provoking anachronism, which, moreover, was a positive mockery of the terrible gravity of the situation at that time.* The young Emperor and his consort

* As a matter of interest it may be mentioned that the Byzantine manner was extended even to the menu cards for the banquet, which furnished remarkable examples of servility and bombast.

were the centre of orgies of servility. If he had not possessed so modest and unassuming a nature, these endless panegyrics, these stifling clouds of incense must have completely stupefied him and deluded him into the idea that he was an omnipotent and omniscient being. He was even glorified as a great general, at the expense of the real generals who had carried out the successful offensive in South Tirol in May 1916.

If, in these circumstances, it might almost be called a miracle that the young sovereign did not give way to crazy dreams of his own greatness, it was quite natural, nevertheless, that he should cherish pleasing illusions as to the position of himself and his kingdom, and that he should be quite unable to realise how closely disaster was dogging his footsteps. The glamour of the celebrations, however, was quickly followed by cruel disillusionment; and only a few months later, in the spring of 1917, he knew that his country would not be able to bear the strain of the war much longer, and that the time was approaching when peace would have to be considered, whether it was to be a 'victorious' peace or not.

When Count Czernin had explained to him the gravity of the situation, he made it clear to the Emperor Wilhelm that Austria-Hungary could only hold out until the autumn of the year 1917. Full of anxious fears for his throne and Empire, no doubt he would have preferred to conclude peace with the Entente at once, especially since co-operation with Germany was growing increasingly difficult to him. He, too, experienced the well-known Prussian arrogance and quarrelsomeness, which must have wounded his self-conceit all the more because, though not naturally excessive, it had become sensitive from constant flattery. He felt most bitterly of all the subordination of the joint armies in the East to the command of Hindenburg and Ludendorff. It can readily be understood, therefore, that he was anxious to be delivered as soon as possible from this oppressive and insulting tutelage.

This state of mind furnishes the explanation of his letters to his brother-in-law Prince Sixtus of Parma, the publication of which were to do him so much harm and to cause Germany to reproach him with treachery. A storm of resentment passed through Austria and

Germany when these letters were made public, a storm which was aroused and kept going factitiously by the Pan-German party, and did more to shake the Habsburg throne than any previous event. Quite wrongly, for the Emperor's good intentions were obvious; and it was ungrateful and foolish of the people, who never ceased to wail for peace and to grumble at the unbearable burden of the war, to reward with reproaches and abuse their Emperor's efforts to obtain this peace for them.

This was the first severe shock sustained by the Habsburg throne. The second was not long in coming. It was the failure of the offensive on the Piave in June 1918. The foolish and disastrous system of deception in force in Austria shrouded this tragic catastrophe in mysterious darkness, which, naturally, had far worse consequences than the truth, however sad, would have brought in its train. For out of this darkness there crept sinister rumours which, encouraged by Pan-German and socialistic agents, crystallised into the legend that the Empress Zita, in league with her two brothers fighting in the opposite camp, had betrayed the offensive to the enemy. To this story an air of false probability was given by the fact that the two Princes of Parma were really serving in a foreign army, and that the Empress came of an Italian royal house and had been brought up as an Italian. 'The Empress has betrayed us!'—such was the explanation found by the people for the defeat on the Piave, an explanation which, encouraged by the hatred of the Pan-Germans and Social-Democrats for the Habsburgs, and rooted in the ignorance of the masses, became a smouldering fire which ate away the foundations of the Habsburg throne.

If the people—and this applies not only to the uneducated masses but also to the so-called intelligent classes—had not been deprived of all power of judgment by this hypnosis, they would surely have realised that the Empress would not do anything so mad as to undermine the throne occupied by herself and her husband, to which her eldest son would presumably succeed. And, if they had only known a little history, they would have been aware that, although the Empress was an Italian, yet she came of a royal house which had been deprived of

its throne and country by the House of Savoy, and that there was absolutely no reason why she should assist this family, so hostile to her own, to triumph over Austria in general and the Habsburgs in particular. But the people were far from possessing such insight and historical knowledge; they adhered obstinately to their fable of treachery, and, led on by the German nationalists and Social-Democrats, they coupled this with the Emperor's supposed betrayal of Germany. Of these two calumnies they concocted an accusation against their own royal house which was eventually to become a bomb for its destruction.

The wrath of the German nationalists against the Emperor was of longer standing and had its origin in the amnesty granted by him to the Slav leaders, which had evoked vehement expressions of anger from the Germans, who considered that this action had put a premium on high treason. This point of view was erroneous, for, in acting thus, the Emperor's intentions had been good and, in themselves, by no means unwise; by this means he had hoped to conciliate the disloyal Slavs and win them back to allegiance to Austria. The worst thing about it was the clumsy, hasty manner in which the act of mercy had been carried out. Before putting it into force it should have been ascertained whether the Slavs were prepared to be conciliated by these means, and it should not have been undertaken until sufficient guarantee of this result had been given. As, however, these precautions were not taken and the Slavs continued to maintain a hostile attitude, this act of grace proved a vain attempt and merely roused the resentment of the Germans.

In order to win back the Germans, whose behaviour appeared to cause the Emperor no uneasiness, Dr von Seidler, the Austrian Prime Minister and the Emperor's most influential counsellor, hit on the naïve and unlucky idea of declaring solemnly that, henceforward, Austria would follow the lead of Germany. This declaration did indeed call forth the tempestuous approval of the Germans, who had always been Austria's most short-sighted politicians; but it naturally destroyed the last remnants of loyalty among the Slavs. Subservience to Germany in a kingdom inhabited by 10 million Germans and about 18 million Slavs (reckoning those in Cisleithania

alone), Slavs, moreover, who were on the point of forsaking the country! A more unfortunate remedy could not well have been chosen. But the Emperor in his distress grasped at any and every means suggested by his counsellors; and, as he lacked experience and perhaps, like Franz Josef, did not possess the gift of judging men and making good use of them, he sought advice and support from inept and even frivolous persons, who led him to make one mistake after the other.

One such mistake was the unlucky Manifesto of Oct. 17, 1918, in which he announced to his people the reconstruction of Austria on a national basis. This was a most superficial piece of work which, apart from the fact that it came much too late, was rendered valueless because it only took into consideration the nations of Austria and not those of Hungary, who were to continue to suffer under the Magyar knout. This Manifesto had, therefore, only one result, in direct contradiction to the effect intended; and this was to cause the people of Austria to find in it a welcome summons to break asunder, a summons which they obeyed with alacrity.

All the unhappy young Emperor's efforts to maintain his crumbling Empire and tottering throne were in vain. In such hopeless conditions as these a continuation of the war was not to be thought of, and he was forced to plead with the Entente for peace. But this merely gave the Germans in Austria and Germany another opportunity to cry 'Treason' and to heap hatred and abuse on him and his house. Once more the crazy and revolting scene was enacted in which the very same starving people who were longing for peace showed their gratitude to the man who was endeavouring to procure it by branding him as 'Traitor.' There could, indeed, be no question of treachery on his part, for so early as the spring of 1917 he had informed Germany that he could not hold out after the autumn of that year. The fact that, in spite of this, he had continued to fight beside Germany for a whole year beyond that period, was sufficient evidence of his loyalty as an ally.

Many a ruler has had to learn the lesson of the uncertainty of popular favour by personal experience—it is only necessary to recall the classic example of Louis XVI—but never has the change been brought about so

suddenly ; no monarch has ever been hurled so suddenly as was the Emperor Karl from the summit of popularity to the depths of ostracism and execration ; no one, perhaps, has experienced mankind's shameful lack of principle in so crude a form. Surrounded by servile, fawning courtiers as he was, he found himself, when the storm broke out, almost entirely deserted, and not one raised a hand to help him. In his need he recalled the days of rejoicing at Budapest at the time of his coronation and sought refuge with the Magyars, who had taken every opportunity of assuring him of their 'intense love' and 'humble loyalty.' There, in the midst of this devoted people, he hoped to find a refuge for himself and his family. But he had scarcely arrived before a retreat was forced upon him, which in truth was a flight, a flight from the fate of Tisza. He remained for a short time in Austria, not at Vienna or Schönbrunn, but at a lonely castle called Eckartsau, cut off from all intercourse. When he left Schönbrunn for the last time the sentries did not even salute him ! But neither was he to remain at Eckartsau ; even there his life was in danger. Under British protection, and pursued by the vilest accusations, he left Austria, which was engulfed behind him in the seething, crimson morass of anarchy.

THEODORE VON SOSNOSKY.

Art. 5.—THE AGRARIAN MOVEMENT IN CANADA.

1. *Deep Furrows*. By Hopkins Moorhouse. Toronto and Winnipeg: McLeod, 1918.
2. *Wake up, Canada! Reflexions on Vital National Issues*. By C. W. Peterson. Toronto: Macmillan, 1919.
3. *Profitable Grain-growing*. By Seager Wheeler. Winnipeg: Grain Growers' Guide, Ltd., 1919.
4. *Farm and Ranch Review*. Calgary.
5. *Grain Growers' Guide*. Winnipeg.

THE prosperity of Canada must always be a subject of vital interest to residents of Great Britain in several respects, firstly, because of the close ties between the Mother-Country and the Dominion, both in peace and in war; secondly, because of the importance of the Canadian farms as a source of food supply; thirdly, because of the wide-open field for emigration and development by personal exertion or capital investment, provided by the varied and to a large extent unexplored natural resources of British North America.

There is no good reason why the history of the agrarian movement in Canada should not be discussed in a purely English publication. England, indeed, is full of potential Canadian citizens. The man who has thought of emigrating, the man who might emigrate some day, the man who intends to emigrate soon—all these should know as much as possible about matters under discussion in the country of which they may become actual citizens. Moreover, since the whole movement represents an attempt by the newer citizens of Canada—by those who have settled and pioneered within the last thirty years—to drive from power the old Canadians of the eastern provinces (whose Canadian citizenship dates from thirty to three hundred years further back), and, since it has its root in economic conditions which official propaganda has always been careful to conceal, the struggle is bound to be the personal concern of the Canadians of to-morrow.

There was an old saying in British Columbia that 'a mine is a hole in the ground the owner whereof is a liar.' It is assuredly not in this sense that Mr Moorhouse's book '*Deep Furrows*' is hereby recommended to

the curious reader as a mine of information. Dedicated to the 'Men and Women of the Soil,' it 'tells of pioneer trails along which the farmers of Western Canada fought their way to great achievements in co-operation.' Mr Moorhouse has dug deep, and brought up masses of stuff that must be pronounced genuine. Making full use of printed records, the author has supplemented this scanty material by personal contact and familiar intercourse with the pioneers of the Grain Growers' Associations in the provinces of Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta. It is largely from their lips that he has learned the story of their pressing needs, their purposes, their early mistakes, their continual struggle, their final success. Concerning each, he has some vivid anecdote to tell; and every anecdote helps to form an atmosphere of raw beginnings and primitive conditions, of which people who have not lived and worked in them can have no conception.

I cannot resist giving a short sketch of the career of one old-timer, a man whose name deserves to be known in the land of his birth, a man who by patience and a dogged fortitude and contempt for immediate reward, through long years of penury, hardship, and a combination of almost incredibly adverse conditions, fought his way to victory at last, and in doing so conferred upon the land of his adoption benefits of a permanent and far-reaching nature. This man is Seager Wheeler, of Rosthern, Saskatchewan, cereal-growing wizard, who has originated three or four new varieties of hardier, earlier-maturing, heavier-yielding wheats, and has obtained yields of forty bushels per acre and more, on three inches of rainfall. Born of a sea-faring family in the Isle of Wight, news-boy for five years at a W. H. Smith & Son's book-stall, he joined an uncle in Saskatchewan about 1885. The uncle was not yet a millionaire, but he had a roof over his head. It was a sod roof; the rest of the house was made of logs.

'The first harvest at which he helped,' writes his biographer, 'was thirty acres of wheat. He and another man cut it with cradles and tied the sheaves by hand. The hay was cut with scythes, and raked with hand-rakes. Grain was sown broadcast and harrowed in with branches of trees. Wheat-birds, blackbirds, and later on gophers, went after

the wheat. They raced wild geese and crows to see who could get most of it.'

There followed for Wheeler the usual incidents of a poor settler's life—two or three years of labour as a farm-hand, a season or two on a railway construction gang; and then, with just enough money saved to pay down \$10 for a homestead entry, and perhaps an instalment on a team of horses and a plough, he took to farming on his own account. From the very first he was a pure seed enthusiast, a believer in careful farming. He would only sow the best seed on the best-prepared land. He picked over his seed grain by hand, kernel by kernel, throwing out all impurities. In a period of careless and hit-or-miss farming, where the accepted practice was to throw any kind of seed on the largest possible area, in the least possible time, and trust to luck for a yield, his neighbours looked upon him as crazy. With luck, they might reap a crop large enough on a big acreage to 'make a stake.' But what sort of a stake could Wheeler make, with the best possible crop, off the thirty or forty acres which was all he had?

The strength of a character is measured by its resistance to the contagion of accepted ideas. Herein consisted Wheeler's great originality. While everybody else trusted to luck, and gambled in wheat-growing with the usual result of gambling in the long run, Wheeler set to work to eliminate every element of chance, in seed, in seed-bed, in climate, in rainfall. Through years of semi-starvation, he clung to his purpose with the obstinacy of a maniac. In those days, the worst enemy was frost. 'Red Fife,' the best available spring wheat of the period, did not ripen early enough. Two years out of three the frost would destroy the crop a week or two before it was ready to harvest. The first problem, then, was to find a wheat of equal milling quality, of equal or better yield, but ripening earlier. Wheeler set out to discover for himself the principles of seed-selection and improvement. He was unaided, unknown, without any resources except his energy, perseverance, and enthusiasm. 'He worked (says Mr Moorhouse) like the proverbial nigger! He was at it all day, and, when it got too dark to see, he went into his little bachelor shack,

lighted the tin lamp, got out his wheat selections and kept right on working half the night, minutely examining and sorting wheat kernels and tying wheat heads in tiny bundles and writing down comparisons and endless data.' There was a small mortgage on his farm. More than once, it was nearly sold over his head. It was years before he could afford to build himself a decent house.

His first real success was in obtaining a pure red strain of 'Preston' wheat, which had the merit of ripening earlier than 'Red Fife.' This was about 1907-10. Thereafter his progress in the field of scientific achievement was rapid; and prosperity followed, though with laggard feet. In 1911 he won with a sample of 'Marquis' wheat the world's championship and a prize of \$1000 in gold offered by the C.P.R.—the largest amount of money that had so far come in his way. After that he acquired the regular show habit, and usually swept the board. It is chiefly due to these awards for all manner of field produce, including old and new varieties of cereals, grasses, and potatoes, that his name has become a household word in Western Canada. But it will be remembered still more on account of the permanent contribution he made to the list of plants likely to thrive on a commercial scale in a rigorous climate with a short growing season, and the enormous improvement in methods of cultivation which enabled him to grow a good crop of wheat even in years of severest drought. In the end, he accomplished to the full what he had set out to do. He eliminated from wheat-growing the two most familiar gambling elements: he overcame the danger of frost by developing wheat strains that mature from fifteen to twenty days earlier than 'Red Fife,' and defeated the handicap of deficient moisture by his special summer-fallow system.

To pass from Seager to other leaders of agriculture—such as W. R. Motherwell, for several years Minister of Agriculture in the Saskatchewan Provincial Government, founder in 1901 of the Territorial Grain Growers' Association; E. A. Partridge, who first conceived the idea of a Farmers' Company to market the farmers' own wheat, and started the Grain Growers' Grain Company in 1906; and Charles A. Dunning, the Leicester lad, who

devised the scheme of co-operative hail insurance, and organised the Saskatchewan Co-operative Elevator Co., deserve a more than local fame.

Quite apart from physical or climatic risks—drought, hail, frost, gophers, mosquitoes, bad roads, remoteness from railways, and so on—the early pioneers were beset with enormous economic difficulties. They had no capital, and there was no local market for their product. They could get no price for oats or barley or wheat or hogs or cattle, unless these goods could find an export market. Fifteen or twenty cents a bushel was a common price for oats, for which there was no export market twenty years ago. Hogs were often worth no more than five cents a pound dressed. In theory there was an export market for wheat, the price of which ought presumably to have been based upon the world-price, but the world-market could only be reached through the elevators and the railways; and the elevators generally managed to control the price in their own districts by more or less express agreements between themselves. Besides arbitrary prices, the grain-growers suffered at the hands of the local buyer through excessive dockage, exorbitant storage charges, even short weights. Before 1901 they were completely at the buyers' mercy. The first step in the farmers' emancipation was taken in that year, when the just organised Territorial Grain Growers' Association compelled the Railway Company to distribute freight-cars as and when required to farmers who desired to load direct, instead of being forced to sell to the local elevator. There had never previously been any real competition among buyers for the farmers' grain; each elevator enjoyed a local monopoly. The monopoly was now broken, but only for a time; it was quite possible for separate elevators to combine under one management. They were very soon combined; and the old antagonism broke out again on a different level.

The farmers' counter-stroke came in 1906, with the formation of the Grain Growers' Grain Company, a joint stock company composed wholly of farmers, with a capital of \$250,000 in \$25 shares, no member being allowed to hold more than four shares. It started business with a paid-up capital of \$2500, supplemented

by the unlimited liability of its enthusiastic promoters, whatever that might be worth, in a small Saskatchewan village, with Partridge as its first President.

To the critical student, the whole plan appears so destitute of all the acknowledged elements of success as to be farcical. The grain trade had long been a strongly organised business, supplied with ample capital, with the Winnipeg Grain Exchange as the focus of chains of local elevators. The Farmers' Company had no capital to speak of. The \$250,000 were purely nominal; only about 10 per cent. had been paid up; the rest might or might not mature. The executive officers knew something about growing grain, but they had no business training whatever; common-sense was their sole endowment. The only real assets were the good-will of other farmers having wheat to sell, and their determination to stick together and see the thing through. Carrying war into old preserves of vested interests, they could expect no quarter, and got none. Vulnerable, owing to their inexperience, in half-a-dozen places, their unavoidable blunders left them open to attack on many sides. They committed a technical breach of the rules of the Winnipeg Grain Exchange. The Exchange excluded them from membership, and only reinstated them when the Manitoba Government threatened to suspend the Charter of the Exchange. As heavy borrowers without security beyond the good-will of their business, they were at the mercy of their Bank; and the Bank, dominated by the elevator interests, suddenly requested them one day to close their accounts. The story of the first two or three years is one of hair-breadth escapes.

Under the direction of T. A. Crerar, whom Partridge selected to succeed himself in the president's chair (1907), co-operation and the Grain Company marched in step with each other; the success of the Company destroying the remnants of scepticism among farmers as to the possibility of close co-operation, and the spread of the co-operative idea adding to the capital, increasing the clientèle, and widening the sphere of action of the Company. Henceforth the story of its growth on all-fours with the life history of any business supplying a real need in a practically virgin field—a story of logical development, of progressive aggregation, each step in

advance leading to the next, each hard-won position disclosing a new position within easier grasp. If a Farmers' Company could sell grain on commission to millers or exporters at Winnipeg, what was there to prevent it from selling this grain to the ultimate British importer? If it could dispense with one set of middlemen whose charges were comparatively small, why not dispense with another set of middlemen whose charges were comparatively high? For the margin between the price at which the exporter bought in Winnipeg and the price at which he sold in Liverpool was, even after deducting ocean freights, the heaviest charge on the whole grain trade. It is true that the business was speculative and complicated, and called for large capital. The Grain Growers' Grain Company launched into the export trade and eventually placed it on a paying basis.

Since the life-blood of co-operation is propaganda, and the enemies of the Grain Growers' Company were well supplied with newspapers and magazines, the institution of a farmers' paper, owned exclusively by farmers and devoted solely to their interests, was a highly advisable measure. Accordingly, the 'Grain Growers' Guide' was founded, with the effervescent Partridge as its first editor (1908). To-day, with a circulation of 70,000 copies weekly, it is the most potent political force in the West. As a factor in emancipating the farmers, as a distinct economic group, from the guidance of other people, the importance of the 'Grain Growers' Guide' can scarcely be exaggerated. There were plenty of rural papers before the 'Guide,' but they were controlled and subsidised by, and edited in the interests of, governments or railway companies or Manufacturers' Associations who wished to fill the country with settlers, and were anxious that these settlers should produce as much as possible, but not so anxious that they should thrive to the extent of acquiring mental and financial independence.

Accordingly, while such papers were often full of excellent matter on the side of farming technique, they closed their eyes resolutely to the economic aspect of farming. Their backers laboured under the strange delusion that they could succeed for ever in attracting settlers to the West from the four corners of the globe

on the plea that farming in Canada was a money-making business, and yet reconcile these men, once safely fixed on Canadian soil, to a condition of permanent economic serfage. The man on the land was to produce for a bare living, or less than a bare living, the raw materials of industry. To the traders, manufacturers, and financiers were to belong all the profits of the industry. The aim of all immigration propaganda was to create in one-half of Canada a race of peasants subservient to a race of business men in the other half. Such was the real reason for the flood of Ukrainians, Galicians, Mennonites, Doukhobors, with which the country was deluged during the Laurier régime. These people, at all events, would prove docile; starved and beaten in the countries they came from, they would not kick over the traces in their new country, where they were not beaten and only half starved. As for politics, they did not understand the English language; they were absolutely devoid of democratic instincts; and their votes were as cheap as dirt. Fifteen years ago, the British were not wanted as immigrants. They were too stiff-necked, too obstinate; their economic standards were too high; they would never fit in with the plan. And indeed, had none but aliens from Russia and Austria invaded Western Canada, there would be to-day no co-operation, no farmers' economic movement.

If it were possible to eliminate middlemen on the grain-selling side of the farming business, why should it not be possible to eliminate middlemen on the purchasing side? Many of the things needed were handled in great quantities by a host of small traders all over the country. But lumber, coal, flour, apples, agricultural implements could all be bought in large quantities, and distributed co-operatively through the farmers' elevators. This was a logical step, and it was the next to be taken. Timber limits were purchased in British Columbia, and saw-mills installed, supplying the grain-growers with lumber for their barns, their grain-bins, their houses, without the intervention of half-a-dozen middlemen. Apples were purchased by the train-load in Ontario or British Columbia and distributed direct to the consumer, at an enormous saving. Other staples were gradually added to the list—cement, sashes and doors, hardware and

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builders' supplies, oil, salt, sewing-machines, type-writers, and so on. Anything for which there is a universal demand, and which is more or less standardised, can be and before long will be distributed through the Farmers' Companies in Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta. Still greater economies and higher efficiency were bound to result if, instead of acting separately, they were all amalgamated into a single body. The final step was taken in 1917, when the Grain Growers' Grain Company, the Saskatchewan Co-operative Elevator Company, and the Alberta Co-operative Elevator Company were all merged in a new body under the name of 'United Grain Growers, Ltd.,' with a paid-up capital of \$5,000,000.

A few years earlier, the Canadian Council of Agriculture had come into existence. It did not spring into immediate spectacular prominence. Hardly any one foresaw the weight that would come to be attached to its pronouncements. Most people have only become aware of it in the course of the last two or three years. It was an outgrowth of the various Territorial Farmers' Associations, a committee formed from among their officers, for the purpose of sifting, discussing, and codifying any resolutions passed by local conventions concerning desired reforms which could only be brought about by Federal legislation. It was a new form of lobbying, a method long known and brought to a fine art at Ottawa; but it was lobbying by the pressure of opinion, not by bribery. The Council acted as political spokesman on behalf of the Grain Growers, standing strictly aloof from any ties with either of the old political parties. Farmers, as a class, were practically unrepresented in the Legislature. If we accept Mr Charles W. Peterson's data in his 'Wake up, Canada!', while farmers in 1918 made up 46.5 per cent. of the total adult population, their percentage of total representation (Provincial and Federal) was but 18.3. Business and professional classes, on the other hand, making up but 16.7 per cent. of the adult population, engrossed no less than 81.2 per cent. of the total representation. The lawyers alone, numbering less than 5000, monopolised 25 per cent. of the total representation. It is clear then that the Council of Agriculture performed a very necessary service in counterbalancing the inadequate representation of farmers in Parliament.

In the third year of the war, its influence had already become so considerable that Sir Robert Borden, when forming the Unionist ministry, found it advisable to include some of its leaders. Mr Crerar took the portfolio of Agriculture; Mr Dunning joined the Board of Food Control.

The most contentious issue, then as now, was of course the Tariff. By their own efforts, along the lines of business co-operation, the United Farmers had removed many a handicap; but the most serious of all could only be removed by Federal legislation, by a complete reform of the fiscal system. No impartial student has ever come forward to defend or even to excuse the Canadian Tariff. It transgresses every known canon of sound taxation. It has signally failed to accomplish the purpose for which it was supposed to be created. It was an economic blunder from the first; it has become a serious political danger. Introduced by the Conservative Party under Sir John A. Macdonald as a national policy of protection for infant industries, perpetuated by the Liberal Party under Sir Wilfrid Laurier as a revenue-producer, this hybrid system, which only produces revenue by accident in so far as it does not protect, and protects only in so far as it fails to produce a revenue, has succeeded in dividing the country into two sharply-opposed camps, of which Winnipeg is the dividing point, and has succeeded in nothing else. The infant industries of fifty years ago claim to be infant industries to-day and clamour for still higher protection. The possible benefits of protection, supposing there were any, are purely local in character and extent, for the object of the system is to secure the home market, that is to say, the farmer-consumers; while the farmers' market is not in Canada but overseas. One-half of the total population is thus taxed, with no counterbalancing advantage, in order to bolster up the prosperity of a few towns in the East. And as the general cost of living is artificially increased to the extent of 40 per cent. all round, the advantage to mechanics and labourers who form 37 per cent. of the total population is illusory. Their real wages would be higher in the United States. Regarded as a system of taxation, it will not bear discussion. It strikes with blind indifference alike at implements

of production, and at articles of consumption ; and every dollar it brings into the State Treasury from a limited proportion of the population, costs the general body of consumers at least two dollars and a half.

But its greatest failure from a business point of view lies in its effect on the development of western farming. The aim and hope of the protected interests has always been to create a large clientèle west of the Great Lakes. This aim was illusory from the first. For, if a large clientèle did come into existence, if the prairies filled up to even 20 per cent. of their capacity, the western voters, being in a majority, would quickly seize the reins of power, and consign 'the robber tariff' to the limbo of hated tyrannies. And, if the prairies have failed to fill up as was expected, it is largely on account of the Protective system. For its effect has been, and must clearly be, to destroy any differential advantage in the production of food-stuffs that virgin soil possesses over the soil of older countries. Whatever part of the world the settler might come from, he found that, while the price obtained for his products in Canada was from 30 per cent. to 50 per cent. less than the price he would have obtained at home, every tool that he used in production, every article that he and his family consumed in the course of the year, cost him from 40 per cent. to 60 per cent. more. Small wonder, then, that the prairie populations are still largely nomadic, that, almost as fast as new people come, old-timers go, and that, while in the last ten years 1,250,000 immigrants came in from the United States, during the same period there were nearly 1,000,000 emigrants from Canada to the United States.

Here, then, is a pretty dilemma : if the West fills up, the Tariff will go, and if the Tariff does not go, the West will not fill up. The country, as a whole, will have to make a choice before long. The mind of the West is fully made up. Partly from interested motives, easy to understand, partly from a wide survey of all the facts of the case, the West is solidly in favour of a lower tariff, and will presently be in favour of no tariff at all, of reciprocity with the United States, and of Free Trade with Great Britain. For indeed, if, owing to the Tariff handicap, the West fails to fill up, Canadian manufactures in

general must always remain comparatively insignificant. Apart from a few which are to-day quite able to hold their own against outside competition, the remainder never can hope for an outlet beyond the home market. Excluded from the export market in normal times by their lack of coal, their bad strategic position, and the inferior quality of their products, they cannot expand except inside the Tariff wall; and the Tariff wall prevents any large increase in their home clientèle. It is not along that blind alley that Canada, as a whole, can hope to extend her material prosperity. Her real wealth lies in her untilled fields, in her vast stretches of virgin land, in the development of her almost limitless agricultural resources; and these must remain untapped for many years unless the Tariff handicap is removed.

With such or similar arguments, the Council of Agriculture has been approaching the Federal Legislature for several years past. Persuasion fell on deaf ears. The Tariff was sacrosanct; it was out of politics altogether; Conservatives and Liberals were alike wedded to it. The only Free-Trade members of the Lower House were the half-dozen farmer members from the West. Clearly the Tariff had to be dragged into politics again. Logic failing, there was no choice left but a recourse to the force of votes. Thus the Council of Agriculture, mouth-piece of the co-operative associations, after remaining aloof from politics for many years, was forced at last to enter the political field in opposition to both the old parties, as well as to the fusion of the two old parties, and to appeal to the electorate with a comprehensive National Platform.

Let us now pass to a short examination of that Platform, in such a way as to give the English reader some idea of the complex and divergent forces at work in Canadian political thought to-day. The first and foremost plank refers, of course, to the Tariff, and the farmers' demands are formulated as follows:

- (a) An immediate and substantial all-round reduction of the customs tariff.
- (b) Reduction of the customs duty on goods imported from Great Britain to one-half the rates charged under the general tariff; then gradual reduction so

as to ensure complete free trade between Great Britain and Canada in five years.

- (c) Reciprocity with the United States.
- (d) Abolition of import duties on agricultural machinery, vehicles, fertilisers—in a word, all the implements and raw materials of agriculture—and also upon the raw materials used in the manufacture of such goods.
- (e) All tariff concessions granted to other countries to be immediately extended to Great Britain.

The Reciprocity Agreement negotiated by the Liberal Government in 1911 was rejected on political grounds. The same Agreement would be rejected again to-day unless combined with clauses (b) and (e). Free Trade with Great Britain would be a sufficient safeguard against Americanisation, in the two respects of economic influence and voting strength. Offshoots of British factories would rapidly be established in Canada, instead of the field being left in the undisturbed possession of Americans. British goods would be on view in every shop-window, to the general delight of all Englishmen in Canada, who, if they want English boots or clothes, must send their orders to a London shop. British immigrants would pour into the vacant country, would regard it as their permanent home, and stay there, infusing into the whole heterogeneous mass that love and respect of British institutions, of toleration and personal freedom which is the most precious as well as the exclusive inheritance of the sons of Britain. If combined with Imperial Free Trade, Reciprocity would probably receive the support of the British-born. When it is remembered that a very large proportion of the C.E.F. was British-born, that the returned soldiers, through their Great War Veterans' Associations, are a political influence of no mean strength, that these men are not fervent worshippers of democracy *à l'américaine*, it may be safely surmised that they would consent to reciprocity only on condition of simultaneous Free Trade with Great Britain.

The next planks of the new Platform deal with Taxation matters, some of them not contentious, others contentious in the highest degree. They advocate:

- (a) A direct tax on unimproved land values, including all natural resources.

- (b) A graduated personal income tax.
- (c) A graduated inheritance tax on large estates.
- (d) A graduated income tax on the profits of corporations.
- (e) No more natural resources to be alienated from the Crown, but brought into use only under short-term leases.

The income tax was late in gaining a foothold in Canada. It was regretfully and after much hesitation introduced by Sir Thomas White as a war measure. Himself a high protectionist, he no doubt foresaw that to inaugurate a system of direct taxation was to sap the foundations of the indirect system. But it is easier to put on a tax than to take it off. The income tax has come to stay. It is no longer a political question. The only thing that remains to be done, in Canada, is to collect it. The graduated income tax on the profits of corporations may be passed over as not worth discussion. It is a mere piece of corporation-baiting, a clumsy attempt at vote-catching. There is no sound economic reason why the shareholders of corporations should be taxed twice over, if that is the object.

It is the direct tax on unimproved values which is the *pièce de résistance* of the new Platform. How such a proposal came to be introduced in a programme supposed to be drawn up by farmers, in the interests of farmers, it is almost impossible to understand. Rent is the result of any differential advantage in production. Even supposing that the farmers, the largest land-owners in Canada, have not enjoyed in the past, and do not yet enjoy to-day, any differential advantage in production, even supposing that they are not to-day in receipt of rent, they will not always remain in this condition. Indeed, all their economic and political efforts are directed to the removal of this condition. In so far as they become really prosperous, it can only be from the realisation of rent. Do they actually propose that the State should absorb all rent in taxation? The question answers itself. But it is not merely actual rents that are aimed at by this measure, it is potential rents; that is to say, the speculative value of land that is idle. But no land would be idle in Canada if it were possible to turn it to beneficial use. Moreover, a tax on the supposed value of idle land is the worst possible form of tax; it

is a direct tax on capital, a direct confiscation of capital, since, if the land held speculatively does not increase in value at least to the extent of the tax *plus* interest, the tax comes out of the capital of the present holder; and, if it does increase in value, the tax comes out of the capital of the next holder.

There are two classes of speculators in land—the small man and the large capitalist. The latter can always hold out and finally collect interest, tax, and profit out of the future settler. The small man, who has bought on margin, and whose resources are slender, will not be able to pay the tax for many years in succession, and will be crushed. If the object, then, is to force large land-owners like the railway companies and the Hudson's Bay Company to part with their holdings, the tax would have to be so large as to wipe every weak holder out of existence. The disastrous experience of all municipalities throughout the West should have been a sufficient warning. Practically their only source of revenue is this very tax; and precisely on this account they draw nearer to the inevitable bankruptcy year by year. Most of them carry on their books as assets uncollected taxes to the tune of 30 per cent., 40 per cent., or 50 per cent. of the total revenue. These taxes are uncollectible. The land-owners have fallen into arrears; they cannot pay; the land reverts to the municipality, but it cannot be sold, for the tax has destroyed its capital-value. It is an economic axiom that a tax on capital is self-destructive in the long run.

How, then, did such a tax find a place in a Farmers' Political Platform? How long will it stay there? The answers to these enigmas are purely conjectural; there is no documentary evidence to guide us; the hidden hand of Socialist Labour may be guessed at, but it is nowhere manifest. Indeed, if it is there, it dare not manifest itself, since farmers as a body are anything but Socialists. They are individualists to the marrow of their bones, perhaps the only real individualists left. Socialism, in order to capture the farmers' vote, must adopt the methods of 'Pussyfoot,' tread softly and make no noise. Thus it is that we find in another section of this Platform the demand put forward for State ownership of all Public Utilities, of water-power, and of

coal-mines; but the demand suddenly stops at coal-mines, and does not proceed to include, as logically bound, all other natural resources, including land; for, if the demand had gone so far, the farmer would have taken alarm! And again, the unimproved land-values tax, borrowed from Henry George by muddle-headed demagogues, tends towards the confiscation of all rent, actual and potential; but not a word is said about land-nationalisation, which is its only logical and just consummation. For, again, the farmer would have taken alarm!

For a good many years past, there has been a kind of tacit alliance between some of the earlier farmers' leaders and the Socialist Labour wing. Partridge, the first editor of the 'Grain Growers' Guide,' was a Radical Socialist; and the 'Grain Growers' Guide' has carried on the tradition to this day, in spite of the fact that the United Grain Growers' Company has come to be one of the most powerful aggregations of capital in the country. But the truth is that there is no natural connexion, there can be no abiding connexion, between the Canadian farmer and Labour, for he is both capitalist and labourer, and occupies for the moment an intermediate position between two warring forces. And, considering that all his efforts are directed towards lifting him out of the inferior into the superior position, it is not difficult to guess on which side his sympathies and his interests will ultimately lie. It would, therefore, be premature for English readers to take it for granted that, because the taxation of unimproved land-values occupies an important place in the Farmers' Platform to-day, it would necessarily become Federal law if the Farmers' Party triumphed at the polls.

Two obvious and grave instances of the contagion of American ideas are the demand for the 'establishment of measures of direct legislation through the initiative, referendum, and recall,' and the demand for a 'bone-dry Canada.' In both these we can trace the insidious methods of American penetration. Prohibition, indeed, which has swept like a plague all over North America (with the exception of Quebec) is *prima facie* repugnant to the spirit of British institutions. It is an outrage on

the freedom of the subject; it is the denial of the private rights of the individual. Accept Prohibition as anything more than a temporary war measure, and the first breach has been made in that liberty of conscience which it has required so many centuries of struggle to win. The American view appears to be that a bare majority is to have the right of dictating to the private individual in the matter of his tastes and habits. Such a view is utterly at variance with British traditions. If it spreads in Canada, if it gains a permanent foothold, it can only be because Americans there outnumber the British-born. From the regulation of habits and tastes, it is only a step to the regulation of speech and thought. The tyranny that would ensue from the Pussy-footing of Canada is too horrible to contemplate.*

Direct legislation is equally out of harmony with British institutions. Indeed, it must in the end result in their complete overthrow. Responsible government would be destroyed; for the real leaders would no longer be the prominent men in Parliament, but the agitators and nameless conspirators who engineer referendums. Here, again, the people of Canada must make a definite choice. They cannot mould themselves at one and the same time on the pattern of British Democracy and on the pattern of American Democracy.

To complete the picture of the conflict and confusion of political ideas in Canada to-day, it is enough to add that the very Platform advocating the Referendum and Prohibition, which taken together strike at the roots of personal freedom and secure the tyranny of the bare majority, nevertheless advocates the removal of the press censorship and the restoration of the right of speech, and includes proportional representation among its items. Here, again, a choice must be made. The object of proportional representation is the adequate representation of minorities, the safeguarding of minority rights. The object of the Referendum is to ride roughshod over minorities of any kind, and to reduce them to impotence and silence. How can the two be reconciled?

A critical study of the Farmers' National Political

* Since this was written British Columbia has set an example to the rest of the Continent by rejecting Prohibition with a majority of two to one.

Platform thus reveals many divergent influences at work, many hands bringing from all directions pieces of lumber that may or may not fit into a lasting edifice. At first sight, the political struggle might appear as a plain case of West against East, a solid West battling for freedom from the economic strangle-hold of the East, and a solid East grimly resolved to preserve its vested interests. Closer examination shows that the West, while united on the negative side of the Fiscal question (namely, the destruction of the Tariff), is by no means united on the constructive side of the Fiscal question (new taxation) and still less on other matters of vital importance. Reciprocity with the United States appeals with special force to former citizens of that country. To conciliate the British element, the sop of Free Trade with Great Britain is thrown to it. But lest the American should take offence, the preamble of the whole document includes a strongly anti-imperialist pronouncement. The Labour-Socialist element has its finger in the pie, preparing the way for the full triumph of its own special tenets, but careful not to intrude itself too obviously upon the notice of the wary farmer; and the organisation of labour is almost purely American. As Mr Peterson says: 'Canadian labour organisations are international, which merely means that United States bodies dominate the situation. Whether Canadian labour may or may not strike is determined south of the line.'

The farmers' movement, which, in the sphere of economic co-operation, was purely agrarian in management and inspiration, appears to have lost much of its agrarian character in the political sphere. It has been skilfully diverted by hands working in the dark for purposes which have little in common with agrarianism, and cannot be called truly national. For to such an eclectic hodge-podge as the programme of the Council of Agriculture the epithet of national can scarcely be applied. Canada grew during the war to the full stature of a nation. She has nothing to learn from her neighbours south of the line. She must emancipate herself from the tutelage of American ideas; but can only do so with the help of a large influx of British-born population.

Art. 6.—THE MEANING OF RUSSIAN LITERATURE.

1. *Profils et types de la littérature russe*. By E. Combes. Paris: Fischbacher, 1896.
2. *The Collected Works of V. G. Byelinsky* [In Russian]. Second edition. Four vols. St Petersburg, 1900.
3. *Collected Works of A. M. Skabichevsky: Critical Essays, etc.* [In Russian]. Third edition. Two vols. St Petersburg, 1903.
4. *History of Modern Russian Literature, 1848-1908*. By A. M. Skabichevsky. [In Russian.] Seventh edition. St Petersburg, 1909.
5. *History of Russian Literature*. By A. N. Pypin. [In Russian.] Third edition. Four vols. St Petersburg, 1907.
6. *Sketches for the History of Modern Russian Literature*. By P. Kogan. [In Russian]. Moscow, 1910-12.
7. *Russian Literature*. By Prince P. A. Kropotkin. Duckworth, 1916.

THE English student of Russian life and character finds himself confronted by what appears at the outset a baffling enigma to which Russian history in itself does not supply a satisfactory clue. The science, the art, the music of Russia yield each something to his search, but it is only in the literature of the Russian people that he finds the master-key to the mind and heart of the nation. It is hardly too much to say that in no other language is the literature so expressive, so intimate and searching in its psychology, so true an index to the mentality whence it proceeds. In the words of Byelinsky,

‘Our social life finds its chief expression in our literature. Art with us is still a weak and tender shoot which has not had time to spread its roots, much less to develop into a fine and goodly-smelling flower. That does not mean that there is no art, but only that art in Russia is something of the nature of the Eleusinian mysteries, the exclusive possession of a small, select class.’

Of Russian literature, on the contrary, it may be said that at birth it sprang direct from the peasantry of the land, and after centuries of suppression and diversion from its original channel, it has returned in modern times to the source of its earliest inspiration, there to be strengthened, enriched, and revived beyond all

measure. To explain how Russia, with millions of her population steeped in ignorance, has come to possess a literature such as this, it is not enough to give a list of men of letters, or to describe their personalities and works. We must trace the growth of national thought and aspiration from the earliest dawn of Slavonic civilisation, before the fatal supremacy of the Mongol Khans, when nomadic tribes were in process of becoming communal settlers, when along the banks of the great watercourses prosperous cities spread themselves, and the boats or sledges of traders plied to and fro laden with merchandise.

To those far-off times, the eighth and ninth centuries of the Christian era, belong the epic songs of Russia, the *bylinys*, or metrical tales of "What was." They tell of the golden age of Kiev, under the rule of Prince Vladimir, whose conversion to Christianity was consummated by his marriage with a Byzantine princess. In the Kievan epic cycle, heroes endowed with super-human strength perform doughty deeds in the cause of Christianity, but their attributes are those of the Pagan demi-gods. The Greek Church gradually introduced changes of nomenclature, and saints in place of the ancient heroes; it could not so easily estrange the people from polytheism. The *bylinys* are full of rich and fanciful imagery, and picture the semi-barbaric splendour of the Kievan Court in language that often rises to a high level of poetic beauty. The knights vie with one another and deem it not unseemly to boast of their deeds and their possessions. Vladimir and his spouse, the fair princess Apraxin, bear a certain resemblance to King Arthur and Guinevere; but Vladimir is outshone by the heroes who surrounded him, by Mikula, by the protean Volga, and the mighty Ilya of Muroum. A large number of the *bylinys*, after descending for hundreds of years from father to son by oral tradition, have been collected in latter days by Slavophiles, and are now recognised as a priceless national inheritance. Several have been rendered into English prose, and deserve to be read by every student of Russian literature.

In speaking of what is usually regarded as the earliest written epic of mediæval Russia it should be said that there is a wide divergence of opinion among

Russian critics as to the period at which it was composed, but 'The chant of the band of Igor' is commonly supposed to date from the 12th century. It describes a defeat of the Kievans under their prince Igor, in an expedition against the Polovtsi, a hostile tribe in the South of Russia. There are many allusions to the ancient Slavonic deities—to the Sun-god Dajbog, Stribog, the God of Ocean, and Volos, guardian of the flocks and herds. The forces of nature league themselves with the enemy, and a witch-maiden, in the form of a swan, hovers over the Slavs to compass their destruction. Finally Prince Igor returns in safety to Kiev and the city is filled with rejoicing.

Among the few remaining secular works that survived the stormy period of the Middle Ages, is a code of laws, the *Russkaya Pravda*, dating from the 11th and 12th centuries. It records the scale of payment for labour, the legal procedure of the time with regard to the management of estates, and kindred matters. Apart from these exceptions, almost all the manuscripts of the period are religious in character, the monasteries being the sole repositories of learning, while the princes of petty states warred continually one against another, and hordes of Mongols and Tartars devastated the land.

But the fierceness of the conflict between Christian and Mongol absorbed the whole vitality of the Greek Church. There was practically no general education. Even in historic records like the 'Chronicle of Nestor,' every event is viewed from a theological standpoint. From Cyril and Methodius onwards Russian literature consisted of Scriptural paraphrases, selections from the Holy Fathers, and collections of prayers and homilies.

At length, towards the close of the reign of Ivan the Terrible (1533-84), a printing-press was set up in Moscow; and among the earliest secular works to issue from it was a famous book known as the 'Domostroi, or Book of the House.' It was written by a monk named Sylvester, who was tutor to Ivan, and it contained precepts and maxims of conduct for the members of a family of the upper class. The husband was enjoined to treat his wife kindly, but at the same time he was free to inflict bodily chastisement on her, and she for her art must not show resentment or even ill-humour at

such treatment. The sons were taught to say prayers by heart and to perform martial exercises. The daughters had little teaching other than how to make garments and house-linen intended for their dowry.

The social conditions of the time rendered literary progress slow and fitful. No perceptible advance was made until the reign of Peter the Great, when there were signs of an intellectual awakening in response to the Tsar's stirring activities. A peasant writer named Posssofchkov gave expression to views which were too much in advance of his generation to be appreciated. Not merely an iconoclast, he suggested means of improving the conditions of his class, but his theories fell on stony ground; his advocacy of compulsory universal education received no attention, and the appeal he made to land-owners to keep their peasantry well-housed and cared-for was equally unavailing. It was too soon to preach to Russian statesmen that education and economic prosperity must go hand-in-hand; and his contemporary, Tatischev, was equally disregarded. Tatischev also sounded the first notes of a cry for political progress and liberty, an appeal that was to go on gathering volume for two hundred years.

Peter the Great, while engaged in introducing better methods of shipbuilding, manufacturing, and all kinds of improvements in economic matters, cared little for purely intellectual acquirements. He brought in English, German, Dutch, and Swiss workmen, who disseminated new scientific ideas and introduced Western methods to Russian craftsmen; but he was ready to crush independence of thought whether in the Church or the laity. Nevertheless, at his death, Prokopovich, the Bishop of Novgorod, himself a man of distinguished learning, bore witness to the great Tsar's qualities of mind and heart.

'Oh! Russia,' he says, 'he is your Moses; are not his laws the firm protection of truth and the unbreakable fetters of wrong-doing? And are not his statutes clear, a light upon your path? And are not the high-ruling senate and the many institutions founded by him so many beacons on the road of progress, the warding-off of harm, the safety of the peaceful, and the unmasking of wrong-doers?'

But, in spite of what has been termed the renaissance

of Russia under Peter, the starting-point of the great classic literature of Russia cannot be placed much earlier than the latter half of the 18th century. To this period belong the initial stages of popular education, which owed much to the Freemasons, who included many men of intellect and of active benevolence. Byelinsky, the greatest literary critic that Russia has produced, dates the true beginning of Russian literature from the publication of 'The Ode on the Capture of Khotin.' This poem was from the pen of Lomonosov, a native of Archangel, of peasant birth, to whom was given the glory of first creating beauty of style from the Russian language. Lomonosov, though he stands so high in the annals of his native literature, is held in greater honour in foreign countries as a scientist. In the words of a learned American professor, 'Only when he described the phenomena of nature or scientific facts did he become truly inspired and write the poems that have survived him.'

Perhaps, at this point, we may digress for a moment, in order to draw attention to a curious lack in the history of Russian literature; it is the lack of influence, both as to form and matter, exercised by the Russian Bible. It has been often said that Shakespeare and the Bible are enough in themselves to form a literary style. In Russia, where this honour has been ascribed to Lomonosov, a man of only moderate genius, the Bible has played no such vitally important part; and this for several reasons. In the first place, the Russian Bible was not printed until 1580, more than a hundred years later than our own, and then in Slavonic only, which continues in use in the churches although it has long become a dead language to the laity. The Epistle to the Romans was printed in Russian in 1815, but it was not until 1875 that the Holy Synod published a complete Russian version of the Bible; and under the Imperial laws no other version of the Bible in Russian could be introduced into Russia. Thus a source to which English writers have owed so much has remained practically closed to Russian authors, who have nevertheless found in their native tongue an instrument capable of expressing the finest shades of meaning, with infinite varieties of rhythm and cadence.

It was the French literature of the revolutionary period that the Russians of the 18th century chose for their guide and model. Catherine the Great, who herself translated French plays for the Imperial stage, was for some years an ardent admirer of the French encyclopædists, of Voltaire, Diderot, and d'Alembert. But when the French revolution reached its climax, she became alarmed for her own security, and not only grew cold to the Continental progressives but proceeded to crush the society of Freemasons, which had grown rich and influential and exercised its power in the direction of spreading knowledge and publishing a quantity of books of an educational kind, at prices that brought them within the reach of the poorer classes. The leader of this altruistic crusade was a writer named Novikov, who became the head of a great printing and bookselling business in Moscow; but his former friendly relations with the Empress came to an end as soon as she realised that he was a serious reformer.

In spite of his widespread philanthropy and good works in a time of famine, Novikov was thrown into prison and condemned to death on a charge of conspiracy. The death sentence was not carried out, but he remained in close confinement in the terrible Schlüsselberg prison until Catherine was succeeded by her son, Paul I (1796). Another progressive writer of the same period, Raditschey, was similarly treated, and after many years of exile in the remotest part of Siberia, was released at length, only to end his life by suicide, in despair of the conditions of his countrymen. The publications of both these men were confiscated and destroyed; but not before they had sown seed that was destined to flower in the inspired verse of Russia's greatest poet.

We have now reached the critical period of transition in politics and literature, and of open conflict between the forces of reaction and progress. It is a remarkable feature of Russian Liberalism that it has, as a rule, emanated in the first place from the upper ranks of society. The spirit of change, stirred into activity by the French revolution, was manifest among the highest in the land, long before it reached the lower class. The accession of Alexander I was signalised by the wane of

German influence in Court circles, where it had roused the bitter jealousy and enmity of the Russian nobility during the reign of Paul. Alexander set himself to the reform of abuses and the spread of popular education; but unfortunately the measures he passed were not sufficiently radical to fulfil their purpose. It is noteworthy that he found not only the military caste, but the leading writers of the time, in opposition to his reforms; but, in spite of lack of support from those who should have been most eager to second his efforts, he favoured the diffusion of knowledge to a degree beyond any of his predecessors. It was he who authorised the English Bible Society to extend its work to Russia.

The writings of two great men of letters, the historian Karamzin and the poet Batiouchkov, reveal how closely interwoven with social and political interests was the intellectual life of the early 19th century. In his 'History of Russia,' Karamzin upholds the autocratic system and extols the past glories of the Slavonic race. He may be said to have been the originator of Slavophilism in politics and literature.

'Russian history,' he writes, 'casts lustre on our land. How strangely and wonderfully drawn we are to the banks of the Volga, Dnieper, and the Don, knowing as we do what happened there in remote antiquity! Not only Novgorod, Kiev, and Vladimir, but even the huts of Eletz, Kozelsk, and Galich become of monumental interest. . . . The shadows of past centuries rise in visions before our eyes.'

The Napoleonic invasion roused the nation to patriotic fervour, which found expression in the poetry of the time; but unhappily little was achieved beyond the awakening of futile hopes, which finally culminated in the tragedy of the Decembrist conspiracy. Ryléev, a brilliant young writer, died on the scaffold in the prime of manhood, but was already known throughout Russia as the author of a number of fine patriotic ballads, and of a poem descriptive of the struggle for liberty of Little Russia under the famous Hetman Mazepa, ending in the disastrous defeat of Charles XII at Poltava.

Ryléev died untimely, but he was followed and eclipsed by his friend and admirer Pushkin, by general consent the greatest of Russian poets. It is not too much

to say that Pushkin was the first truly national poet of Russia, and the first to make Russian poetry admired and honoured beyond her frontiers, just because he threw off the domination of foreign influence so noticeable in the works of his forerunners, and clothed his thought in purely Russian dress. Eugene Onéguine, Pushkin's chief hero, is typically Russian. He is the prototype of the superfluous man, of whom we have many later examples, such as the 'Oblomov' of Goncharov. Talented and amiable, but wanting in energy and steadfastness of purpose, he seems to have been oppressed and paralysed by the vastness and inertia of the land of his birth. It is a type that still exists in Russian life and fiction, that of the man who meditates on the meaning of life, without ever coming to a conclusion, who aspires to greatness and has transient fits of energy, but quickly lapses back into indolence and apathy. He is ever waiting for the vital spark that will fire his energies; but in waiting life passes, and is ended before he is aware. The character of the heroine, with whom Onéguine only falls in love when she is married to another, shows on the other hand strength, dignity, and fortitude. The love she felt for Onéguine in her girlhood does not change, but she resists him none the less, when at length, too late, he returns it.

Pushkin owed much to childish associations, to the fireside folk-tales of his old nurse and the familiar talk of the peasants on his estate. Homely everyday modes of expression, details of life and character slighted by lesser men as unworthy of regard, all went to give his verse the essentially Russian spirit which till then had been absent from Russian poetry. The depth of thought and mystic intensity of a Milton, a Wordsworth, a Goethe, were not within his province, but his lyric melody, vivacity, and ease are untranslatable and perhaps unrivalled.

With Pushkin one associates the name of Lermontov, whose poem on the death of the former occasioned his exile to the Caucasus. Lermontov has been compared to Byron, but probably, if a comparison is worth making, he had more in common with Shelley than with any other English poet. He was a devoted lover of the wild beauty of the Caucasus; and his finest poems, such as 'The

Demon,' are those inspired by Caucasian legends. He is, however, better known to English readers as the author of a novel translated under the title 'A Hero of our Times.' The scene is laid at Piatigorsk, a fashionable inland watering-place at the foot of the Caucasian mountains, much frequented by Russians of the upper class. The hero Petchorin is of the usual type. A military dandy, well-born, intellectual, cynical, and inconstant, his love-affairs end in satiety, and the story closes in the vein of melancholy characteristic of Russian novels.

After Pushkin and Lermontov, the whole range of Russian literature widens out. Literary stars appear not singly but in groups and constellations, and their light penetrates to the lowest planes of the social scale. The general tendency and character of Russian literature in recent times may be defined as realistic, psychological, and pessimistic. The most uncompromising realism is evident in the studies of actual life taken from all classes of people. Idealism, as we understand it, is practically absent; while the psychology of the Russian school of fiction is carried far deeper than anywhere in English literature.

Turgenev, in his 'Sportsman's Tales,' which are presented as light sketches of country life, incidentally exposes the cruelty and selfishness of the landlord class, and the miseries of the serf. Gogol, his senior by nine years, had undermined the whole fabric of Russian society by attacking the serf-owner; and Tolstoy, after apparently acquiescing in the *status quo* of rich and poor in 'War and Peace,' and 'Anna Karenina,' became the greatest iconoclast of these three. These great pillars of the Temple of Russian literature undoubtedly prepared the way for a social revolution, by sweeping aside the glamour that surrounded an hereditary landed aristocracy, and, not satisfied with arraigning the ruling section of the community, poured unmeasured scorn upon the idlers, the futile dreamers and ineffectual altruists whose flow of talk achieved no tangible result whatever.

In Turgenev's principal novels we find a succession of Onéguines and Petchorins. Let us take Rudin in the novel of that name. Rudin associates with the nobility on terms of equality, without having an assured position

of his own. He is lazy, ill-educated, luxurious, and fond of displaying his gifts of eloquence and social charm. He goes from house to house, and finds enthusiastic listeners in every drawing-room he enters. He is incapable of any definite course of action and is lamentably lacking in will and character, yet he pleads the cause of patriotic endeavour with so much eloquence that he himself is woefully disappointed that nothing comes of it. Rudin is Turguenev's finest psychological study. Other personalities, less carefully drawn but true to type, are Daria Lasunsky, the lady with a country-place who entertains lavishly and is secretly detested by those of lesser position, who regard her as 'haughty, overbearing, and immoral'; Lejnef, also of the landlord class, honest-hearted, simple, and with a limited range of ideas; and Natalia, the embodiment of goodness, moral courage, and steadfastness. The plot of 'Dmitri Rudin,' like those of so many Russian novels, is little more than an essay in psychology, amplified by pictures of so-called good society. Rudin, the social favourite and to all appearance master of the situation, realises the falseness of his position the moment he aspires to marriage with Natalia, the daughter of his hostess. He has no means, no position, and the pride of the Russian aristocrat of fifty years ago rises in arms against such a *mésalliance*. Rudin, incapable of resistance to opposing forces, resigns his love without a struggle, but yet with a certain dignity which inspires respect. His weakness has been unsparingly exposed throughout; but, as age and misfortune close in upon him, the author sums him up in the words of his one loyal friend, with the sympathy that Russians invariably show towards failure and moral laxity.

'It is not the spirit of idle restlessness, it is the flame of the love of truth that burns in you, and clearly, in spite of your failings; it burns in you with greater fire than in many who do not consider themselves egoists, and dare to call you a humbug perhaps . . . and you have not even been embittered, Dmitri. You are ready, I am sure, to-day, to set to some new work again like a boy.'

Rudin is shot down at the barricades in Paris in 1848. He had long ceased to be an egoist and a parasite.

Again, in 'A House of Gentlefolk,' Turguenev makes a study of the men and women of his own standing and

generation, and introduces us to Panshin, a smart young bureaucrat, bent on a career, and Lavretsky, the scion of a noble house who returns from his travels to live among his peasants, seeking to gain their confidence and spread the democratic views he has acquired abroad. But Turguenev, for all his sympathy with the oppressed *moujik* and serf, is not able to place himself on their level. He writes, glancing downwards from above, with pity but hardly with complete understanding.

The same, at the outset of his career as a writer, might be said of Leo Tolstoy. 'War and Peace' is a novel of high society. Levine, it is true, is a philanthropic landlord, who lives on his estate and seeks to help and benefit his peasants by every means in his power; but Levine is subsidiary to Pierre, the natural son of a nobleman, and Prince André, a young officer whose fastidious and arrogant spirit reflects the disposition of Tolstoy himself in early manhood. 'Anna Karenina' is similarly a novel devoted to the old exclusive, aristocratic and official class which disdained to associate with the merchants or even with the Intellectuals—the 'Intelligentsia' as they are called in Russia. I need not describe the characters in 'Anna Karenina,' a novel almost as well known to English as to Russian readers. Suffice to say that it is an admirable and faithful picture of a régime that is past and gone, and which had even then reached the verge of its downfall.

Not only the unrest that lay below the surface was working towards revolution, but the modern development of a middle class was changing the whole aspect of Russian life. A great industrial advance manifested itself when Russia recovered from the shock and strain of the Napoleonic invasion. Factories rapidly increased in number; banks and commercial enterprises of all kinds multiplied. Merchants and tradesfolk grew rich, and could no longer be left out of the reckoning. Their sons thronged the gymnasiums and colleges, fired by the desire for culture and expansion, and swelled the ranks of the Intelligentsia, a term which includes without distinction all men who devote themselves to literary pursuits. The old noble families were beginning to disintegrate. In many cases their estates passed out of their hands, or were preserved by means of intermarriage

with the sons and daughters of self-made men. Fiction ceased to concern itself principally with the doings of a privileged few, and presented an entirely new gallery of portraits. The lower ranks of the bureaucracy, the professional men, the trading community, in fine the 'bourgeois,' occupy the first places in these novels of the transition period. *Hogol*

~~Tolstoy~~ wrote a short, pathetic story of a poor little clerk, whose idea of happiness had been to possess a fur-coat. He arrives at the moment when his savings suffice for the purchase, only to have it stolen from him, after which he loses heart for the struggle of life and dies for want of anything to live for. Later, Chekhov and Saltikov and Sologub, all masters of the art of the short story, devoted themselves almost exclusively to studies of intellectuals and bureaucratic underlings. Saltikov, during exile in Viatka, a remote provincial town, wrote the series of 'Provincial Sketches' which made his name famous throughout Russia. They constituted a formidable attack on the administration of local government, of which few men could be better judges, since he had occupied every official position in town-life, from clerk to governor. Saltikov had many imitators; and, step by step, the novel with a purpose came into being, as the sole outlet for the ventilation of grievances and for giving forth the aspirations of the progressive section of the nation.

Chekhov, a greater artist than Saltikov, is pre-eminently the novelist of the Intelligentsia. He views his own class as a weak minority, seeking a breathing-space between highly placed reactionaries and stagnating peasantry, and deplors their lack of energy and force of character. His novels are models of penetrating, incisive criticism in the guise of fiction, the best known among them being perhaps 'The Duel,' 'The Valet,' and 'Room No. 6,' and the play entitled 'Uncle Vanya.'

The leading part in 'Uncle Vanya' is played by a learned professor named Serebriakov, who is worshipped by his whole family on account of his genius. His brother-in-law manages his estate for him and, like the rest, makes sacrifices to provide him with money. The professor spends his time in writing a book on the sacred mission of art, regardless of the wants and

pleasures of any one. His is the life of pure egotism, given up to the phrasing of beautiful sentences. Finally, he gets tired of living in the country, and proposes to go abroad. To accomplish this he wishes to sell the estate, which in reality belongs to his daughter Sonia. He communicates his intention to his family, whose eyes are at last opened to the egoism of their idol, and an estrangement ensues. But shortly afterwards matters are adjusted and a reconciliation takes place. Sonya, who is the heroine of the drama, devotes herself to the village and its needs, while she shows herself willing and ready to face work. She is the one character in the drama who keeps firm hold of her father, in spite of personal unhappiness and disappointed love, and prevents those around her from being overwhelmed by despair.

Thus it may be seen that idealism is not in reality absent from the Russian novel, although it is of a character totally different from what we understand by that word. The Russian writer's idealism shows itself in a continual search for inner truth and for the highest pinnacle of justice. In Dostoevsky this search is everywhere evident; and he does not scruple to put his best and most elevated thoughts into the mouths of the fallen and the wretched. But Dostoevsky, one feels, great as he is, may be almost left out of the category. He is a psycho-pathologist of universally acknowledged genius, who devotes himself to the abnormal. Healthy, commonplace human nature is rare in his pages. His people are Russians, but Russians seen in a mirror which gives to those it reflects an appearance of malformation. My concern here is chiefly to choose from the vast mass of Russian literature studies of national types from highest to lowest, that are at once critical and just.

Such a writer is Ostrovsky, whose plays, few in number, must be numbered among the finest productions of the 19th century. His characters are mainly drawn from the newly-enriched merchant class. The elders are harsh, domineering, and unscrupulous; the young of both sexes are weak and subservient or silently strong and inwardly rebellious. There is rarely a scene in which love triumphs over an evil destiny, except by escaping, like Catherine in 'The Storm,' by the gateway of death. The heroines are either, as she is, under the

cruel yoke of a shrewish mother-in-law, or puppets in the hands of an ambitious father, like Avdotia, in the comedy 'Everyone in his Place,' who is driven to the verge of desperation by the discovery that she has sacrificed her honour and her father's affection to a worthless fortune-hunter who only eloped with her to secure a rich wife. The heroes, hardly to be called such, are ineffectual figures, lacking energy to overcome, or fortitude to endure, adversity. These are gloomy pictures, but they are alive and arresting.

The same criticism applies to Gorki, who depicts the bourgeoisie with equally relentless realism, but also reveals, as it were incidentally, a spiritual ideal never wholly eclipsed in the encompassing darkness. His 'Foma Gordeiev' is a minutely faithful picture of the tragedy of wealth allied to unbridled sensuality. Ignatius Gordeiev, the father of Foma, is a successful merchant, given to coarse pleasures and incapable of generosity or any unselfish action. His advice to his son is shrewd and unprincipled.

'It's utterly impossible to walk perfectly straight in a matter of business; one must be politic! So, my boy, when you approach a man, hold honey in your left hand, and in your right—a knife! Every man wants to purchase a five-kopék piece for two kopéks. . . . Life, my dear Foma, is very simply regulated: Bite everybody, or lie in the mud.'

The life-story of Foma Gordeiev is the story of a man of whom one may say that he never had a chance. But, although he passed through the same stages of debauchery and sensuality as his father before him, there is always a flicker of aspiration towards something higher, which struggles, although too feebly to be effectual, towards a better life. In the tragic hour when his reason becomes disordered, he utters the truth that is in him to a group of merchants who have set on him and bound him hand and foot.

'What justification have you all in the sight of God? Why do you live? . . . I have lived. I have observed. I have thought. . . . Now I am utterly worn out. . . . Something flared up within me; it has burned out and there is nothing left, nevertheless, although my truth against you is weak, it is the truth. You are accursed!'

By the mental collapse of Foma, his evil genius Mayakim gains control of his large fortune, amasses wealth and leaves a flourishing business to his children; but we are made to feel that in the despised and degraded Foma there is a spark of the divine fire, feeble but unextinguished. It is in this instinctive sympathy with moral weakness, with failure and crime itself, that the Russian writer appears most different from ourselves. English readers expect to find in fiction the golden prize of success and the happiness which has eluded their grasp in actual life. To men of British race failure is abhorrent, almost sinful; and moral lapses may be condoned but are not to be forgiven. Our modern fiction has sometimes sought to exalt the sinner, but the nation as a whole resents the attempt.

In placing Gorki before Uspenski and Zlatovratsky I have departed from chronological order, so as to present the social grades of the Russian people in due sequence from top to bottom. I am led to make this variation from the usual manner of treating my subject, because it is not merely a question of describing Russian Literature, but of defining its significance. It appears to me in the light of an unending struggle towards political liberty; a struggle originating with the educated upper class and slowly extending to the lower strata. It may be traced in the letters of the noble Chiuski written in exile to Ivan the Terrible; it strengthened the Freemason Novikov to brave his sovereign's displeasure; it led countless men of literary genius to endure exile, imprisonment and death, in the hope that they might thereby arouse their countrymen and free them from ignorance and slavery.

Russian literature is consistently saturated with politics in some shape or other, and in modern times has been devoted almost exclusively to the cause of the ignorant and down-trodden peasantry. The Russian phrase, 'going in among the people,' was not simply an equivalent for 'slumming.' It meant that men and women of education and refinement were exiling themselves to isolated villages far distant from the capital, becoming doctors, teachers, nurses, and fellow-labourers with untaught, uncomprehending *moujiks*, who were hard to

conciliate and slow to believe in their good faith. But the seeds of culture and political unrest sown year by year did gradually penetrate the soil. Revolution became not only inevitable, as it had always been, but imminent; and the signs of its approach were written large throughout the country.

Uspenski and Zlatovratsky are among those whose peasant stories are most instinct with reality. Of the two, the latter is on the whole the more optimistic; but neither writer gives way to sentiment. Each is giving utterance to his political faith disguised as a work of fiction. Zlatovratsky founded his hopes for the betterment of Russia on the communal life of the *moujik*. He rejoiced in all that made for unity of purpose, in the *artel* or workman's unions, in the co-operative farms and the *mir* or village council. He desired to see the Intellectuals associating themselves with the peasantry, and devoting themselves less exclusively to their own culture. But he makes no attempt to idealise the *moujik*. 'Foundations, the Story of a Village,' and 'Rural Week-days,' are two novels in which he puts forward these ideas with characteristic force. Peter, the hero of 'Foundations,' after receiving a rudimentary education, has been placed by his father in a business house in Moscow. His affairs prosper, and he presently returns home, becoming the owner of a farm and a man of substance. In this position he grows arrogant and merciless towards the poor and the drunken and unthrifty. The villagers grow restive when he wishes to reserve the communal land for those who will work it most profitably. He returns in disgust to Moscow. Zlatovratsky points out that his failure is due to want of education, and to a false idea of his own superiority.

Uspenski, a contemporary of Zlatovratsky, goes still further in the direction of unvarnished realism. Tolstoy in his short stories of peasant life had given the world many beautiful and pathetic pictures. He described the miserable condition of the *moujik* and at the same time held him up as worthy of imitation. In stories such as 'The Death of Ivan Ilitch' and 'The Snowstorm,' it is the servant and the man of humble birth who appears as a type of simple unconscious heroism and self-sacrifice. Uspenski saw the peasant as a less lovable being. In

his earlier works he describes him as a drunken sot, with hardly a redeeming quality. To him we owe a repulsive picture of the village bully, a word which, however, does not accurately define the exact meaning of the original. A *Kulak* is a well-to-do peasant, of a usurious turn. The whole village is under his thumb.

‘What is this phenomenon? What is a Kulak? The opinion obtains that the village is being ruined by a man who comes from outside. In truth, wonders are being accomplished before our eyes. Here is the Barin losing thousands of roubles on his estate, not knowing what to do; and here is a *moujik* making a fortune out of tallow candles. Yes, literally out of tallow candles. How is it possible to make a profit on a tallow candle, the price of which is a penny? Well, as every one knows, there are soirées on winter evenings organised by the village girls. As the young men have nowhere to go, they perforce attend these entertainments, the cost of which is borne by the girls, so that the prospective bridegrooms may be put to no expense. The girls pay for the hire and lighting of the room. For the former the charge is not high, about forty kopéks [1s.] a month, but the lighting is another matter; for this they go to the one practical man of the village. He provides the candles, doling out to each girl two or three, which she must pay for in labour, at the rate of five kopéks a candle. For each five kopéks’ worth of lighting the girls undertake to cut ten sheaves of corn. Now reckon up how many candles are burned and with how much labour they are purchased. This practical man of the village knows everything—when the hens lay, when the women want money; in a word, he knows the most secret thoughts of the village, and on this knowledge he thrives.’

And Uspenski sums up the Kulakchestvo as a ‘phenomenon that is native to village life; not a blot to be effaced, but an ulcer, a disease.’

Uspenski’s best novel is considered by Russian critics to be ‘The Power of the Soil.’ Written under happier auspices than his first novels, it sets forth a more sympathetic view of peasant life and character, although, like his predecessors, he still surveys the peasant from above. The hero of this story, Ivan Petrov, from leading a life of prosperity in a good position, becomes an agricultural labourer, and by close contact with nature is redeemed from the moral abyss into which he was

falling. He embodies, in fact, the new faith in 'The Power of the Soil' which Uspenski had learnt to feel. At the same time he is under no illusions as to the *moujik's* vaunted patriotism in war-time.

'No one ever explains anything to him and he himself has lost the habit of asking or finding out. I should tell an untruth if I were to assert that a desire to go to fight or the childish wish to defend the right is concealed in that absence of deliberation which we see in the people. There is nothing of the kind in him. No one knows why, nor what is the matter, but every one goes without a murmur, because he is accustomed to go; he is accustomed to pay when he is told to pay, and has quite lost the habit of asking whither, why, or wherefore. For the idea of a greater or lesser phenomenon happening in the general life of the empire has never reached his village. The village never even knows the circumstances which react on its own economical position.'

It is noteworthy that Russian realism has undergone a process of change during the past twenty years. The novels of Turguenev, Tolstoy, and others of their generation depicted the peasant in a light which the later writers regard as sentimental or unreal. Tolstoy, in particular, fell a victim to his own ideals. He drew the peasant, as Landseer drew dogs and horses, with super-senses to which they had no claim. He brought to the surface qualities that might be and probably were latent, but of which the ordinary observer could see little or nothing. In the novels of to-day another method is apparent. The peasant is still, or more than ever, the central dominant figure, but he is shorn and denuded of every vestige of false sentiment. Modern realism has retained the detailed description of nature, of dress and appearance, but the classical synthetic vision has given place to a thirst for individualism, to a beclouded dream of a free unfettered existence where the naked truth is to be enthroned and worshipped. Among the leading representatives of this latest development of Russian literature are to be numbered Veresaev, Saitsev, and Yushkevich.

Of the representatives of the younger generation, Yushkevich is one of the most gifted. He presents the sufferings of the individual, the stupefying effect of unremitting toil, the wail of the hungry, in a way that

brings it all home to the reader as the novelists of the previous decades failed to do. The faint rumble as of a distant storm has grown to a volume of sound such as rises from a modern battle-field. Boris Saitsev, again, like most of his contemporaries, devotes his talents to the description of the sufferings of the poor. Veresaev strikes deep into the heart of things. He describes in 'Pathless' how Chekanov, a philanthropic doctor, gives up his career to go and live in an isolated village, devoting himself to the peasantry, body and soul. They mistrust him, accuse him of poisoning them, and at length set on him and beat him to death. With his dying breath he forgives them and puts the case as he sees it to his cousin Natasha, a girl with aims similar to his own. 'So must it ever be, for we have ever been strangers to them, beings belonging to another world; we disdainfully avoided contact with them, without seeking to understand them; and a terrible gulf separated them from us.'

Russian literature represents a wonderful history of intellectual evolution. The writers whose works have built up that literature in the course of centuries began as a child begins, by being receptive and imitative. By slow degrees they freed themselves from outside influences and became at length exclusively pre-occupied with the problems of their national development. I have sought the answer to the inquiry underlying the title of this article in the fiction of Russia, because that fiction is essentially an historical panorama of the Russian people. Uspenski, says Kropotkin, is rather an ethnologist than a writer of fiction; and, generally speaking, the novelist in Russia is a social historian, a politician, a preacher. He is not 'out' to amuse the idle or to provide relaxation to the weary; he is 'out' to impress on one and all the woeful condition of his countrymen, to cry aloud for freedom and justice. This, is, I think, the meaning and intention of the Russian literature of the present day; and this, from the first, was the pathway of its destiny.

C. HAGBERG WRIGHT.

Art. 7.—THE REORGANISATION OF THE NAVAL STAFF, 1917-19.

1. *The Crisis of the Naval War*. By Admiral of the Fleet Viscount Jellicoe. Cassell, 1920.
2. *Der Dienst des Generalstabes*. By Bronsart von Schellendorff. 4th edition; edited by Major von Schellendorff. Berlin: Mittler, 1905.
3. *Field Service Regulations*, Part II, 1914.
4. *Handbuch für Truppenführung und Stabsdienst*. By Cardinal von Widdern. Gera: Reisewitz, 1884.
5. *Le Grand État-Major Naval*. By Lieutenant de vaisseau Castex. Paris: Charles-Lavauzelle, 1909.

THE direction of any large business, whether it be a government service or a great soap industry, or an oil company with branches all over the globe, involves numerous problems of organisation and management, whose elucidation has attracted increasing study and attention in recent years under a variety of forms. The careful observation of the motions involved in some ordinary task, such as bricklaying or shovelling, with a view to economy of effort and standardised conditions of work, has given rise to a branch of investigation* termed 'time-motion' problems. The welfare and contentment of personnel are universally recognised as another matter of primary importance, intimately related to political stability, as well as to industrial efficiency, and giving rise to numerous side-issues of investigation, such as the effects of fatigue and strain, not only on the output, but on the whole character and social outlook of the worker. But, though the wide scope of the subject is beginning to be appreciated, there is a failure to observe that, if principles of efficiency are discoverable, they will be discovered in the business of war, for war is a business terribly intense and stern. In trade, man contends with time and tide and circumstance, and with his fellow-man in terms of gain; in engineering and medicine and the physical sciences, he contends with nature and the stubborn texture of atoms; but only in war does he contend with

* 'Twelve Principles of Efficiency,' by Harrington Emerson, 1912.

human intelligence consciously intent on encompassing his immediate destruction, and directing every available means to this end.

War is not merely a business, but a terrible business, for an enemy determined to appeal to the arbitrament of force allows no time for deliberation or delay. In war, time is measured in seconds; and the soldier, therefore, was long ago compelled to discover the very elements of efficiency which now engage so much attention—for gun-drill is only a soldier's name for the 'time-motion' system of scientific management, whose object is to perform a given task with the greatest speed and least effort. The tendency of a navy or army in peace time to fall into artificiality and formalism should not blind us to the fact that a great war-service, emerging from a long war, is almost bound by the nature of things to bring with it certain principles of efficiency hammered out on the anvil of hard and bitter experience. But a clear conception of such principles is not a monopoly of the victorious side, for the vanquished may discover them if they study diligently the causes of their defeat. At Jena the sun of Prussia suffered a disastrous eclipse; 'A nation breathed on us,' said Heine, 'and we melted away.' But the lesson was not forgotten. The ablest thinkers in Germany set to work to analyse the causes of defeat; and the principles they evolved were embodied by Scharnhorst and Moltke in the Prussian system of staff organisation (not to be confused with the spirit of Prussian militarism), which has been adopted by all modern armies, and may rightly be regarded as one of the monumental achievements of the 19th century.

The master-key of this system lies in one fundamental principle—the necessity of a clear-cut distinction between fighting and supply; that is, between the general direction of operations on the one hand, and routine and technical services on the other. The general direction of operations is the business of the Chief of the General Staff; and ranged beside him are the great quarter-master services of administration and supply. The Chief of the General Staff stands at the right hand of the Supreme Command, co-ordinating the work of the whole towards a single

end ; and closely in touch with him is the Quartermaster-General, responsible for the important background of transport, equipment, and supply.

This great triplicity of service is the hall-mark of an efficient organisation. At the head is the Commander-in-Chief, unburdened and unfettered by details, and bringing to difficult problems at a critical hour a large reserve of authority, and a clear outlook undimmed by a hundred minor matters of routine. At his right hand is his Chief of Staff, a master of the use of the instrument, responsible for a correct appreciation of the situation and for the general conduct of operations ; and behind him is the Quartermaster-General, responsible for the gigantic task of supplying the instrument and keeping it efficient.

It may be legitimately argued that, if this is a general principle of efficiency, it will not be confined to the army alone, but will be discernible in all successful organisations of any size. And, in some form or other, this appears to be always the case. In a great newspaper, for instance, the editor may be regarded as the Chief of the Staff ; and his work corresponds to the 'operational' aspect of the machine. The managerial or 'maintenance' aspect is concerned with the supervision of personnel, the conditions of service, the supply of all the equipment required, and the general superintendence of the work of printing, issue, and despatch, which involves the technical aspect of the whole craft and mechanism of printing. Again, in a large store, it is probable that the managing director is chiefly concerned with markets, sales, and the analysis of profits and loss, for these constitute the operational aspect of a business ; and it may be assumed that he leaves to others such questions as the upkeep of the buildings, and the regulation, entry, and training of personnel, which concern the maintenance of the business rather than its extension and development. These two aspects may be given a variety of names,* but the fundamental distinction lies in the fact that the one is concerned with the use of the instrument, the other with its supply and maintenance in an efficient state. The analogy may even be carried further. In the work

* The Army term is General Staff and Administration, usually designated G. and Q. (Quartermaster). The Admiralty in 1917 adopted the terms Operations and Maintenance.

of Christian evangelisation, one of the great dynamic movements in the history of mankind, the Apostles refused to leave the work of preaching in order to 'minister to tables'; and again, in the human body, which is the archetype of functional co-ordination, the automatic, unconscious, and what may be called the 'routine' processes of the body, such as the movements of the heart and lungs, are controlled by one portion of the brain, while the conscious, or what may be called the 'operational,' activities, such as walking and speaking, are directed by another.

It may appear at first sight that this principle would naturally commend itself to all administrators, but experience shows that this is far from being the case; men brought up in a small sphere of business, where they have been accustomed to exercise a large measure of direct and personal control, cling to a system of centralisation, and cling to it the more tenaciously the older they grow. They take a real delight in detail and in the exercise of personal supervision over every branch of work, and are never assailed by the desire to be free in order to think of things unthought of, or to study the wider aspects of their work. All the currents of the 19th-century Navy tended in this direction. The naval officer was brought up in a limited sphere of work; his education gave him a strong sense of personal responsibility; and his promotion was gained by personal attention to the paint and brass work of his ship. As a commander or a captain he learnt to love to pry into all the corners of the ship; as an admiral he still hankered after detail, and was apt to be absurdly busy and pre-occupied over all sorts of trifles. He was *maximus in minimis*—very great in very little things. Sir Percy Scott has pointed out how the admiral of the 19th century decided what clothes the men were to wear, what boats each ship was to use, whether awnings were to be spread, when and how washed clothes were to be hung up, and how insistently each ship had to follow the flagship motions, and to do exactly what the flagship did.*

This tendency to centralisation became an ineradicable

* 'Fifty Years of Naval Life,' 144, 198, 212. 'As regards housemaidling and tailoring, no inspection could have been more searching.'

trait of most flag-officers; * and the average Commander-in-Chief lost himself in a morass of detail. Nor was this tendency confined to the British Navy. Moltke has pointed out that the Austrian staff orders in 1866 were not bad orders, but had one insuperable defect; they went into enormous detail, and reached the Army Commanders only after the battle had been fought.† The same fault characterised our staff work in South Africa. The German official account, commenting on the Spion Kop operation orders, says: 'The above orders are typical of English methods; they contain a mass of detail which could be perfectly well left to junior officers.'‡ Similarly, in the Russo-Japanese war, the orders issued by the Great Headquarter Staff dealt with a vast mass of local administrative detail. Kuropatkin states that 'the amount of writing done by the various staff officers was colossal; they worked the whole evening and all night; their effusions were lithographed and sent off in all directions, but they were rarely received by the troops in proper time.' At the battle of Telissu the operation orders never even reached the First East Siberian Division, and the battle was one long string of blunders from beginning to end. Compare this with Moltke's system. The order of Aug. 21, 1870, directing the movements of more than 200,000 men for the next four days, did not fill one printed page.

Brevity and despatch are the life of war; and brevity and despatch are only possible if all extraneous effort has been eliminated from the controlling centre by the adoption of some vital principle of distinction, such as exists between operations and supply, that is, between the science of the use of the weapon and the science of its maintenance in an efficient state. Curiously enough, this very distinction, which is now one of the recognised principles of staff organisation, is to be found in the system of naval organisation established by Henry VIII in 1546, which held sway in our Navy down to 1832. It is true that the analogy must not be pressed too closely,

* 'I never omitted to analyse all shootings personally.' Bacon's 'Dover Patrol,' i, 93.

† 'It is lengthy documents which make the Austrians so slow.' Kraft, 'Letters on Strategy' (1898), vol. II, 133.

‡ German official account, trans. Colonel H. Du Cane, 139.

for the circumstances of the time were different, but it is there, and is plainly discernible. In Henry VIII's organisation the Lord High Admiral represented the function of general control, while the actual administration was performed by the four Principal Officers, namely, the Treasurer, Comptroller, Surveyor, and Clerk of the Acts, who were responsible respectively for finance, the general supervision of accounts, the building and upkeep of ships, and the record of naval business. These officials were known as the Navy Board. Another official acted as President of the Board, under the title of Lieutenant of the Admiralty.*

The offices of Lord High Admiral and of the Navy Board were sometimes in commission,† but this fact serves to distinguish the two separate functions all the more clearly. The supply system was doubtless often bad and insufficient—sometimes deplorably so; but its insufficiency seems to have been due rather to the inevitable limitations of the time than to any inherent defect of principle. There can be little doubt that the old conception attached to the office of the Lord High Admiral was that of general direction and command, and that the work of supply—victualling, equipment, pay, clothing—was kept separate from it. All our old wars were fought under this dual organisation, in which the Admiralty was responsible for the general direction, and the Navy Office for the maintenance and provision of all the multifarious requirements of war. It was under this system that Hawke and Nelson fought; and it was this system, in a modified form, which was finally adopted by Sir Eric Geddes and Lord Jellicoe in 1917 as the result of experience gained in the recent war.

In 1832, when the memory of the French wars was beginning to fade, Sir James Graham merged the Admiralty

* This officer would have been in general charge of all administrative or 'maintenance' functions; and the retention of the office might have served to remedy many of the subsequent defects in the system, but it fell into abeyance.

† The functions of the Principal Officers, for instance, were performed by Commissioners from February 1619 to February 1628. The office of the Lord High Admiral was in commission from September 1628 to March 1638. The Principal Officers were again replaced by Navy Commissioners at the outbreak of the Civil War by an ordinance of Sept. 15, 1642, and these Commissioners continued till the Restoration. Nine Commissioners of the Admiralty were similarly appointed by both Houses on Oct. 19, 1642.

and the Navy Board into one on the plea of economy and efficiency—a plea which seemed sound enough, and was made more plausible by the unsatisfactory working of the supply services.* This amalgamation was regarded as a master-stroke, but its real nature was not discerned. The Admiralty congratulated itself on swallowing up the Navy Board, but the work of the Navy Board swallowed up the real functions of the Admiralty. The successors of St Vincent became slaves of the lamp of administration and supply; and, to use a lowly analogy, the mistress of the house, because the range was out of order, installed herself in the kitchen to supervise the cook. The consequence can be traced in the naval literature of the 19th century, which is almost barren of any contribution to the science of naval war. The naval officer became more and more immersed in the business of peace administration; and the effect of the change was enormously accentuated as technical services multiplied.

Progress and development in the technical branches of naval knowledge had hitherto been relatively slow, but the advent of the steam engine, and what may be called the hydro-carbon era of industry, altered the whole aspect of affairs. Marine engineering thrust masts and yards into the background; ships and ordnance underwent an enormous change; technical crafts multiplied; the sciences of gunnery, torpedoes, hydraulics, electricity, and wireless telegraphy grew up almost in a night, and became transformed in a single decade. The naval officer of the past had aimed only at being a seaman. He now became imbued with the idea that it was his business to be a master of every craft practised on board a ship. The brains and talent of the service were mortgaged to the schools of gunnery and torpedoes †

* The faulty functioning of the supply services is remedied by reforming the supply services. If the Quartermaster General is inefficient, he must be replaced by one who is efficient. To make the Chief of the Staff do his work may remedy the evil, but it only introduces another—Who is going to do the work of the Chief of the Staff?

† It is interesting to observe the casual way in which electrical engineering became an adjunct of the torpedo branch. The first torpedo was towed, and fired by electricity when in contact with the enemy. Hence torpedoes became associated with electricity; and, as electrical science developed, the whole electrical service of the ship became an adjunct of the torpedo officer, though the torpedo itself is driven by compressed air, and quite independently of electricity. But, while the torpedo officer was

—schools very necessary in themselves, but representing only the technical branches of naval warfare. In this world of change and new fields of study there were, however, two factors which did not change. One was human capacity, the other was time. The brain could hold only a certain amount; the day was still only twenty-four hours long. The result was inevitable. The study of strategy and of staff work, which is the business aspect of war, was ignored, while navigation and hydrography, which are the handmaids of strategy and the real technical crafts of the sea, became the 'Cinderella' branches of the service, and for years were regarded with something like contempt.

Here again, if the evolution of these new technical branches be studied, the same neglect to distinguish between the use of the instrument and its construction and maintenance will be found retarding progress and development. From 1870 to 1900 the gunnery lieutenant concerned himself much more with the gun than with gunnery; and the gunnery that existed prior to the era of Sir Percy Scott was a mere exercise entirely divorced from reality, while the name of tactics was given to certain quadrille movements, useful enough perhaps as an exercise in handling ships, but with no earthly relationship to gunfire or to the actual movements of a fleet in battle. In the same way, the torpedo lieutenant spent his time in taking torpedoes to bits* and putting them together again, and had none left for the study of their use and tactical control in action.

The gunnery reform initiated by Sir Percy Scott about 1897 marked the genesis of a new era. In Lord Fisher, a kinetic man, eruptive and disruptive, there glowed an instinct for reform; but, though a big man, he lacked perspective, and was a man of action, indisposed to study a subject deeply and exhaustively. His early training had wedded him to a system of centralisation; and he was strongly opposed to the idea of staff organisation. There was something to be said for this view, for it may

worrying over a fault in the dynamo, he was neglecting the study of torpedo tactics and control.

* Not only the torpedo lieutenant. It is narrated of a distinguished Admiral of the Fleet that as a captain he would spend a spare forenoon in stripping and assembling a torpedo.

be doubted whether a service which had wandered for forty years in the barren deserts of technical knowledge could supply the capital of intellect necessary for the conception and initiation of a naval staff on the scale of modern war. The brains of the navy had been mortgaged almost irretrievably to technical subjects; gunnery, torpedoes, wireless, and ship administration were all sufficiently studied, or at least received a large measure of attention, but in the spheres of strategy and tactics little progress had been made.

It may be said with a large degree of truth that between 1830 and 1880 the words 'strategy' and 'tactics' passed out of naval vocabulary and were lost. One or two men like Sir Geoffrey Hornby and Philip Colomb sought for them, but they were not to be found. The dawn of a new era came between 1880 and 1890, and found its first expression in the Intelligence Department, instituted about 1886,* and later in the War College, which started about 1900. The development of these institutions would require a book in itself. The Intelligence Department was the forerunner of the Naval Staff, but it lacked a school of staff training, made no effort to compete with the great technical schools for the best brains of the community, neglected the vital principle of differentiation between Operations and Administration, and sank more and more into the position of a mere handmaid for the collection of data and the making of translations from the foreign press. The War College, which was started largely on the initiative of the late Rear-Admiral Henry May, supplied an element of organised instruction, but there was still no real Naval Staff; and the older admirals, wedded to the methods of individualism and centralisation, strongly opposed it.

The Agadir incident in 1911 revealed the bankruptcy of the no-staff system. Under the system of centralisation a 'great plan' was concocted, possibly very remote from reality and entirely independent of the other great departments of State. It was kept carefully secret, ready to be revealed at the critical hour. The critical

* It first appeared in the Navy List in 1887, but a Foreign Intelligence Branch had been started about 1883.

hour came in 1911. The secret safe was opened and was found to contain a military campaign of which the General Staff had never heard. According to common report it included a landing on the Frisian Islands—a long, low sandy group of islands fringing the German coast. The General Staff protested against it as inconceivable. What was the army going to do when it had landed on the Frisian Islands? Their arguments were irrefutable, and the broken shards of the plan drifted away, carrying much wreckage with them. A new Board was then created and a War Staff instituted. Unfortunately it had no commanding intellect like Lord Haldane's to watch over its cradle. Mr Winston Churchill supplied enthusiasm and energy, but he had never made a deep study of staff organisation, and his task was a difficult one. In spite of difficulties, however, he accomplished a great deal, and established the beginnings of a staff system. The term 'Staff' was introduced, and a Chief of the War Staff was appointed to co-ordinate the work of the three divisions of Intelligence, Operations, and Mobilisation, which were usually as intent on a war with one another as with the enemy. A system of training staff officers and a Staff Course were instituted, and had been in existence for two years when the war broke out; but the number of trained Staff officers were still insufficient, and this insufficiency was felt most acutely in the Admiralty. All the competent officers were snowed under with work. There was too little time for the present, less for the future, and none for the past.

From the very first day of the war the War Staff proved entirely insufficient in numbers to cope with the work to be done. The method of conducting the business had not been studied. On the first day of war a number of sections were bundled into a large room called the War Room, with the idea that they should be as close as possible to one another. The scene there, according to a trustworthy report from an eyewitness, may be compared with the state of things in the Grand Quartier at Metz in 1870, as described by General Fay :

'Never shall I forget the disorder and confusion which reigned in that room, its doors constantly opening to give passage to our chief, and strangers seeking the most futile

information. Orders and counter-orders literally collided with one another; the smallest telegraph despatch gave rise to feverish excitement entirely incompatible with that absolute calm which is one of the first essentials of a good staff.'

Admiralty experience and Mr Winston Churchill came to the rescue, and the War Registry was evolved. But there was still no division charged with the preparation and investigation of large plans. The Operations Division dealt with current work, but it was not possible for a Division loaded with the actual conduct of current operations to spend more than a very limited proportion of its time in the preparation and examination of schemes which might require three months' work to reduce merely to terms of time and supply. Committees are inefficient instruments for the purpose, for they rarely possess the capital of experience and information which a permanent Division accumulates.* Again, plans for the future must be kept in close touch with the present on to which they must be grafted; and those working at them must be in close touch with the Operations Division of the Staff.†

The result was painfully evident in the first year of the war, when the pressure of work in the Operations Division did not permit of an intensive investigation of big strategical questions lying beyond the horizon of immediate current work. The Dardanelles operations afford a conspicuous example of the possibility that, in an imperfect staff system, an energetic mind will override staff opinion, and of the inability of a 'division' absorbed in current work to cope with big questions requiring an immediate and decisive answer. Here an immense strategical effort was set on foot, based on a purely hypothetical and vastly exaggerated estimate of the bombarding capabilities of the 'Queen Elizabeth's' guns, an estimate unsupported by a single naval artillerist of repute. With no Plans Division to check it, the effort gathered way till it covered half the strategical

* A committee, if it fulfils a necessary and permanent function, tends to become a 'division,' as in the case of the Foreign Intelligence Committee of 1883, which became the Intelligence Department, and the Signal Committee of 1912, which became the Signal Section and later the Signal Division.

† Compare Lord Jellicoe's 'Crisis of the Naval War,' p. 16.

horizon and vied in importance with the Grand Fleet itself.

In 1916, when the menace of unrestricted submarine warfare hung darkly over our naval position, Lord Jellicoe came to the Admiralty. He diagnosed correctly the deficiencies of the staff system then in force; and the changes made by him in 1917 were of primary importance. First of all, the office of Chief of the Naval Staff* was merged with that of First Sea Lord. This was apparently a very simple measure, but it was one of great import, for it not only gave the Naval Staff a definite position on the Board but attached it to the principal naval member. The addition of a Deputy Chief and an Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff, with seats on the Board, meant a great acceleration of business, for they could act with Board authority and were able to relieve the C.N.S. of an immense amount of work.† The Anti-Submarine Division, instituted under Rear-Admiral A. L. Duff, was generically merely a belated Plans Division directed towards a special objective. Under Rear-Admiral Sir William Reginald Hall the Intelligence Division greatly extended its activities; and its chief did much to introduce closer co-operation with the other divisions of the Staff.

It is important to remember that this system was introduced by Lord Jellicoe during war and was forced on us by the exigencies of war. It was not a question of this or that theory but a question of urgent pressing necessity and of minutes loaded with fate. There was a time in 1917 when one could almost see the sands running out, and could only hope that the moment of final exhaustion would never arrive. It never did. The sands ran out for Germany while we still had some grains in hand; and one of the factors which contributed to this result was the development of the staff system which took place both at the Admiralty and in the commands at sea between 1916 and 1918. Let us endeavour to formulate briefly in a general form the principles of the system adopted in 1917, which was in its main outline that of Moltke and Lord Haldane adapted to naval needs.

* The term 'Naval Staff' was substituted for the term 'War Staff.'

† See Lord Jellicoe's 'Crisis of the Naval War,' cap. i.

The principal aspects of the command fall under three categories—Operations, Administration, and Technical,—corresponding to three lines of practical cleavage.* The first enshrines the main purpose and policy of a business; the second is responsible for its maintenance and equipment in an efficient state; the third deals with the scientific aspect of various applied sciences associated with it. 'Operations' is the premier function; and its special task is to appreciate the situation continuously, to assist the Command in the consideration and definition of requirements and with the preparation and conduct of operations, and to convert the intentions, policy, and decisions of the Command into orders and instructions. It has further to keep a record of the positions, strength, and movements of its own forces, to visualise the situation clearly for all other divisions of the Staff on charts of the situation,† and to furnish timely information of all requirements to the administrative services.

The principal divisions of a Naval Staff are Plans, Operations, Intelligence, and the Staff Secretariat. The Trade Division, which deals with the question of maritime trade and acts as a link between the Admiralty and Mercantile Marine, is generically an aspect of Operations. The same may be said of the Mercantile Movements Division (now extinct), which dealt with the important task of controlling all movements of convoys and sea-borne trade. The Anti-Submarine Division (now also extinct) belonged generically to the Plans aspect of 'Operations.' The function of the Intelligence Division is implied in its name. Its business is to collect, sift, and distribute information as to the position, movements, and strength of the enemy, and to assist 'Operations' and 'Plans' to appreciate the situation. All information in the Operations Division ought to be

* The Secretariat and Financial aspects are omitted as being essentials of every organisation. In a big business or industry, operations become financial, for the main purpose is usually to supply some commodity with a certain degree of profit.

† Until the Anti-Submarine Division was created, there was no operations chart in which a staff officer could see, clearly visualised, the positions of enemy submarines so far as they were known. Such charts had been started at the beginning of the war, but 'pink' (i.e. secret) telegrams were not allowed to be inserted on them—a defect which rendered the charts worse than useless, for practically all information of importance was 'pink.'

open to it,* but it ought to abstain religiously from any attempt to conduct operations or to frame plans. Any tendency to do so means a drift towards an amalgamation of the three functions, which must be kept distinct in any large business if they are to be properly performed. Any tendency towards fusion inevitably means confusion, for each sphere of work requires an organisation and environment of its own.

'Administration' and 'Technical' connote all the great services of maintenance and supply; and it is their business to ensure that personnel and *matériel* are ready and fit to perform the work required of them by the Command. These include Personnel, Fuel, Victualling, and Stores. Personnel includes a number of important headings such as entry, recruitment, training, discipline, pay, pensions, leave, recreation, welfare, victualling, and clothing. It should also include a permanent and independent Court of Investigation for all complaints, and an investigatory section to deal with questions of welfare. The principal technical services are hydrography, navigation, engineering, naval construction, gunnery, torpedoes,† electricity, signals, and wireless.

It is a principle of staff work that each service is responsible for its own internal efficiency and methods of business; and the Chief of the Staff is responsible only for the general co-ordination of them all. All these phases of work offer ample field for energy and talent. Even in the Administrative branches, which are generally regarded as less interesting, there is wide scope for study in principles of discipline, improvements in recreation and welfare, systems of accountancy, canteen management, and the conditions of naval pay and service. No one branch is to be regarded as more important than another; like the brain, heart, and lungs, they cannot be compared in terms of importance, for each of the three is complementary to the other two. If there are

* This was one of the deficiencies of staff work at the Admiralty during the latter part of the war. Operations did not always keep Intelligence acquainted with its plans and movements.

† This includes electrical work, which might well be attached to engineering. Seamanship might be added, but it is rather an application of other applied sciences to their use at sea. Medicine is a technical service attached to personnel.

no ships and guns, there cannot be any operations; if the operations are badly conducted, the best gunnery will be of no avail; a new technical design may revolutionise operations; and all operations must rest on a basis of sound discipline and good administration.

Two other functions attach themselves to a staff—History and Staff Training. The object of History is to observe what has been done and reduce it to clear and simple expression. This is an absolute necessity. It is the ledger of the business. There is no greater stimulus to efficiency than an accurate record of the work actually done and the method of its execution; and the want of such a record greatly increases the difficulty of staff work. A Training and Staff Duties Division has therefore been found necessary, to deal with principles of training and staff organisation, and to supervise staff training and the compilation of a staff history and manuals.

In peace, the work of a staff is mainly directed towards the collection of information, the study of operations of war, staff training, and investigation and research. It has been suggested in some quarters that the Naval Staff might be reduced. It has been reduced. The Mercantile Movements Division, the Anti-Submarine Division, the Minesweeping Division, have all been closed; but a Staff must at the very least consist of an Operations Division, an Intelligence Division, and a Secretariat. Moreover, the Naval Staff must have a Planning Division or Section attached to it and detached from current work (witness the experience of 1911—the Agadir incident; also that of 1917 in Convoy and Anti-Submarine work, and Minelaying). These divisions must not be independent, or they will work in opposition to one another (as was shown in 1909-12). They must be co-ordinated under a Chief of the Naval Staff. The C.N.S. must evidently see eye to eye with the First Sea Lord, and must possess weight and authority sufficient to meet the Chief of the Imperial General Staff on the same plane. In fact, he must be the First Sea Lord; witness the experience of 1912-16 and the appointment of Lord Jellicoe as First Sea Lord and C.N.S. in 1917. But the First Sea Lord has other functions to perform, and must therefore be assisted by a Deputy C.N.S., and, if the amount of work requires it, by an

Assistant C.N.S. This is the system which has gradually evolved itself from the Naval Intelligence Department of the eighties, as the outcome of actual war experience. It consists at present of eight divisions. Of these, five, namely, Operations, Plans, Naval Intelligence, Trade (all questions of maritime trade), and Local Defence (local defences, booms, mine-laying and mine-sweeping), are associated with strategy and the conduct of operations; two, the Gunnery Division and Torpedo Division, represent the principal weapons of offence and form a link with the technical departments; one, the Training and Staff Duties Division, deals with general principles of training and staff co-ordination, staff training and the compilation of historical monographs and manuals. Its essential form is based on two principles, namely, a distinction between 'Operations' and 'Administration,' and the attachment of the Office of Chief of the Naval Staff to that of First Sea Lord.

To regard this organisation merely as a naval or military one would be a narrow-minded point of view. It has a far wider aspect. It is a system of control which is found operative to some extent in all great houses of business, and whose study, with a view to its application, not merely to particular branches of industry, but to forms of government, will wonderfully repay study and investigation. It is to the credit of Sir Eric Geddes and Lord Jellicoe that they initiated rapidly and in time of stress a system which brought the war to a successful conclusion. On that great day in November 1918 (very different from 'Der Tag' as miraged in German toasts), when Admiral Beatty stood on the bridge of the 'Queen Elizabeth' watching in silence the German fleet being led captive into the mouth of the river inseparably associated with his name and fame—in that cloud of thought hovering around him, full of the battle-smoke of four long years of war, there must have loomed, bulky and immense in the background, the shadow, reaching out over all the oceans, of the Office of the Admiralty and the workings of its Staff.

ALFRED C. DEWAR.

Art. 8.—THE NEW GERMAN CONSTITUTION.

1. *Die Verfassung des Deutschen Reiches Vom 11 August 1919.* Taschenausgabe; Erläutert von Dr F. Giese. Zweite, verbesserte Auflage: Berlin, 1920.
2. *The German Constitution.* Translated into English. H.M. Stationery Office, 1919.

IN undertaking to provide themselves with a republican constitution, the Germans have assumed a task which, in the happiest circumstances, would have been one of great difficulty. But the document which they have elaborated in adverse circumstances holds the field at present as the constitution under which the largest incorporated state in Europe is organised; and it is of more than passing interest to inquire into the forces which have shaped it, and the form which it has actually assumed under the impact of those forces.

Among the most obvious of the difficulties under which the framers of this document laboured was the extreme pressure of time. The abdication of the Kaiser was officially announced in Berlin on Nov. 9, 1918, and was signed by him at Spa on the following day. The reins thus dropped by the monarch were not taken up by the Bundesrath or Reichstag, but were seized by anarchic committees, self-appointed and exercising local authority only, which arose, as if by magic, in every part of the land. These were the so-called Workmen's and Soldiers' Councils, formed on the model of the Russian Soviets, and aiming at a dissolution of society, similar to that which Lenin had brought about in Russia. The effective opposition to these Red Republicans came from the Majority Socialists, who, joining in the formation of the Councils, laboured from within to ameliorate the system, and eventually succeeded in bringing about the calling together of a National Assembly on the footing of universal suffrage. The elections for that Assembly were held on Jan. 19, 1919. The Assembly met at Weimar on Feb. 8 following, and proceeded at once to regularise the position by adopting a provisional constitution for the new German State. After two days' debate that provisional constitution was adopted by the Assembly, promulgated by its President and treated as

the fundamental law on which the Assembly could ground its authority, and by which it could regulate its proceedings for determining the provisions of the permanent constitution.

The consideration of that more elaborate constitution made, of course, larger demands upon the time of the Assembly. But the work was carried out with astonishing despatch. It was on Feb. 24 that the subject was brought forward in an introductory speech by the Secretary of State for Internal Affairs, Dr Preuss; and the completed document was signed by the President on Aug. 11, 1919, so that less than six months was consumed by the Assembly in discussing and revising the draft and in coming to an agreement upon the final form of the law. This rapid rate of progress was made possible by the concurrence of three conditions which it is not unimportant to bear in mind when passing judgment upon the work of the Assembly.

In the first place, there was something like unanimity upon the main features of the change to be effected in the constitution. In the next place, the universally entertained desire to be clear of the war and to make a fair start with the work of repairing the havoc it had produced was felt by the German people of every class with overmastering urgency. In the third place, the Assembly was provided with a set of drafts embodying all the views it was necessary to take into account, two of which, having some sort of official character, became, naturally and in fact, the centres about which the elaborated document could crystallise. Thanks to these facilitating influences a result was reached within the time limit of an ordinary session of the British Parliament, which, in terms at least, remade the German State, converting it from a crowned federation of German States into a democratic organisation of the German folk.

It probably is not generally appreciated in this country how profoundly the political outlook of the German people changed in the course of the war. All shades of political opinion were, of course, entertained in that country before the war; and in the scheme of Government now adopted there is no feature for which

a powerful party did not contend in those far-off days. But the reputation of the administrators of the old Imperial system stood very high; and aspirations towards a fuller comprehension by the Government of the views of the people and of a fuller participation of the people's organ, the Reichstag, in the acts and responsibilities of Government were held as pious opinions. Even those who held them did not then expect to see them become effective. But the pressure of the war, and especially the adverse turn of events which heralded its termination, produced a revolution in this point of view; and, when it became plain that not the joys of triumph but the labour of rebuilding a ruined state would furnish the programme of the immediately ensuing years, the governing classes hastily divested themselves of the desire to preside over the course of public events, and their chief representative, the Kaiser, came forward with a project for shifting on to the Reichstag the responsibility for policy and administration, which, in happier days, had been monopolised by an aristocratic Bundesrath and an autocratically governed administration. When, under the influence of the blows which shattered Germany's military power, the last of her militarist chancellors, Count Hertling, tendered his resignation, the Kaiser, in accepting it, announced a scheme for 'parliamentarising' the Government by making ministers responsible, not, as under the then existing system, to the Kaiser, but to the people in the Reichstag. The liberal Prince Max of Baden was installed as Chancellor to carry through the change; and, although the administration to which he succeeded was too discredited in public opinion to be able to carry out the reform, the fact that it was made the chief feature of his policy is evidence of the extent to which public opinion, even in the governing circles, had been converted to the view that henceforth the German people must take the control of their public affairs into their own hands and exercise the power of selecting as public servants the men who had won their confidence.

Thus the great obstacle to radical reform, the natural unwillingness to part with authority of the class which had held political power, and had exercised it during the years of peace to public satisfaction, had disappeared of

its own accord. The men who would have seized the more easily appropriated fruits of victory, if Germany had been triumphant in the war, were not candidates for the unpleasing duties of making peace with a victorious foe, and thereafter presiding over the sordid task of making ends meet with means that were manifestly inadequate. To a large extent, therefore, the German people were of one mind; and, although the plan of popularising the Government, which commended itself to everybody, could be carried out in an indefinite number of ways, the differences would in this strange access of unanimity present themselves to the minds of members of the Assembly as matters of detail to be discussed in the conciliatory spirit in which co-workers endeavour to arrive at an agreement, and not in the obstructive spirit in which debate is employed by antagonists to wreck hostile proposals.

Not only was the way cleared of moral obstacles for the National Assembly; it was also made plain by the relegation to other authorities of some of the more troublesome questions to which the drawing-up of a constitution gives rise. The transitory provisions with which the document is concerned in its concluding articles are eloquent upon this point. Thus, the grouping of the German people into states or provinces is a matter which is left over for the decision of the Reichstag, to be effected hereafter by a system of local option, if that should prove practicable, or, if not, then by resolutions which are to be in the nature of amendments to the constitution. How extremely contentious a subject is here adjourned for more leisurely consideration may be realised by merely considering the overgrown condition of Prussia as we know it to-day. By various annexations, mostly ill-assimilated, Prussia had grown before the war to be the largest state in Germany, including a territory of 134,000 square miles and a population of between forty and fifty millions. Even in the reduced Germany of to-day it figures as a self-contained state of 40,000,000 inhabitants in a republic of 70,000,000.

It need hardly be said that the smaller States regard this predominance with jealousy, not to say with misgiving. Prussia was tolerated so long as Prussian policy and Prussian administration led to victories and

prosperity. But to-day, when the leadership of that State has conducted the whole German Commonwealth into a morass, there is a strong current of opinion which cries out against the headship of Prussia; and there will doubtless be, within the newly acquired provinces of Prussia itself, an equally strong desire to recover the old independence which was forfeited as the result of Prussia's military successes in war. It was necessary that a question of this sort should be left over for later discussion if the new German constitution was to make a timely appearance; but its existence in an unsettled condition exposes the Constitution itself to the perils of violent disturbance in the course of settlement.

Of similar import, under the present point of view, are the provisions which leave open to further negotiation and, in the ultimate resort, to the decision of the High Court, the terms upon which the post and telegraph services in Bavaria and Württemberg and the State railways and other means of transport in other parts of Germany are to be surrendered to the administration in Berlin. If these difficult questions had come on for discussion at Weimar, it may well be supposed that the debates would be proceeding at the present moment.

It is not only difficult questions of administration which were withdrawn from the cognisance of the National Assembly. A question equally difficult to resolve, if it were to be resolved on reasoned grounds, is the question how the Parliamentary suffrage should be distributed. Ultimately this is the most important of all questions for the success of Parliamentary government. That, like all other forms of government, can continue only under the condition that it places in the seat of authority those persons who under the conditions of the time possess the power to govern. The representatives of a constituency, however unanimous, which lacks the intellectual faculty to understand the political situation, the moral force to form and express opinion, or the physical power to make its will prevail, will be thrust aside, in the rush of affairs, either by representatives of a more energetic section of Society or by the promoters of mere anarchy, never wanting in times of feeble public control. A thinker desiring to set up a Parliamentary government would carefully consider to

whom the responsibility of choosing the members of the parliament could be safely entrusted. He would inquire where the ultimate sources of political power lay, and would take care that the easiest and most direct channel for the conveyance of authority from its sources in the opinion and power of the people to the instruments of government should be by the appointed channel of Parliamentary election. The National Assembly, however, did not even entertain this question. Before its members could be elected, an electoral system had to be put in operation; and, if the transition from the old state of Germany to the new had taken a peaceful course, it may be presumed that the pre-existing electoral law would have served the provisional purpose of election to the National Assembly, and that the distribution of the electoral franchise in regenerated Germany would have been one among the weightiest questions submitted to that Assembly. That, however, did not happen.

Germany since the war has undergone two revolutions. The first, which put an end to the Imperial régime, was brought about by the usurpation of power by self-constituted Workmen's and Soldiers' Councils. They made a bid for establishing in Germany the conditions which have supervened in Russia, but they found that, as they were dealing with a social organism of a higher type than the Russian autocracy, they did not command the sources of political power and, after a few weeks of confusion, were constrained to make way for the more regular system which the National Assembly introduced. On one point, however, they were able to forestall discussion and to implant their theory in the future German system. Being in a position to superintend the elections for the General Assembly, the Workmen's Council of Berlin resolved that it should be held, not according to established law, but on the principle that every German man and woman of twenty years old and upwards should be entitled to vote. Naturally the representatives of such a constituency considered themselves absolved from discussing the merits of the system under which they had been chosen; and so the fundamental law of Germany is formulated in accordance with the views of the defunct Workmen's Council of the

Prussian capital. Whether it can give to Germany a parliament composed of members who will be able to handle affairs of state is, in the circumstances, a matter of pure chance, and, in any case, it raises a question which only the future can decide. If it should turn out that popular election leaves the effective political forces unrepresented in the Reichstag, we may expect to see the Reichstag of to-day set aside with as little consideration as was the Reichstag convened by the Emperor when it was opposed by an insurgent populace.

Putting aside these larger questions, the German National Assembly has addressed itself to those branches of constitution-making which relate to the substitution of the new posts and powers of President, new Reichstag, Reichsrath, and Judicature, for the Kaiser, subordinate kings, dukes, etc., old Reichstag, Bundesrath, and the old Judicature respectively.

The *ante-bellum* constitution of Germany was based upon the view that it was built up by the union, in a comprehensive federation, of a number of independently sovereign States. Prior to the Franco-German war of 1870 the union had been a simple confederation of those States—the German Bund—having as the organ of its common political life the Bundesrath. Every one of those constituent States had its own constitution comprising, as a rule, a deliberative as well as an executive council co-operating with the monarch in the exercise of sovereign authority. When, in 1870, Bismarck brought about the conversion of the confederated Germany into a federal Empire, he added to the system two organs of sovereignty, a Kaiser who assumed the personal headship of the whole State, and a supreme imperial Court of Law, the Reichsgericht. He also added a deliberative assembly—the Reichstag—for the whole Empire. The Kaiser, as head of the Imperial Executive, was provided with a staff of officers who were independent of the several States and administered those branches of the public business—Foreign Affairs, Imperial taxation, the Naval Service, etc.—which had been placed in the hands of the sovereign, while the Imperial High Court exercised a general power of appeal which reduced all State Courts to a secondary rank. The military control, vested in the

Kaiser upon the outbreak of war, was, in time of peace, divided in a complicated fashion between Empire and constituent States; and religious establishments were under State control, subject to an over-ruling authority in Reichstag and Empire.

In order to come to a practical understanding of the working of this somewhat complicated system, it is to be borne in mind that, throughout the whole history of this establishment, Prussia has exercised preponderating authority, an authority so preponderating that no other State has been in a position even to consider the carrying of opposition to Prussian wishes to any great length. The inter-state jealousies and rivalries that have arisen have therefore been confined within modest limits, and a system which on paper looks impracticably complicated has in fact been found workable.

When the Empire fell, the danger that the elaborately constructed unity from which the German people in the brilliant second half of the 19th century had derived so much power at home and so great a weight in the councils of the world would fall with it, was very obvious. The fear of this calamity seems to have been the principal consideration which destroyed the power of the usurping Workmen's and Soldiers' Councils. The various independent governments which had replaced the sovereigns of the German States sent delegates to a central conference on Nov. 25, 1918, who passed, as the first result of their deliberations, the following resolution:

'The maintenance of the unity of Germany is of capital importance. All the German tribes are resolved upon a German Republic. They pledge themselves to work unswervingly for unity and to strive against separatist movements.'

In accordance with this view the unity of Germany was kept in mind as the object of the first importance in the Constituent Assembly; and in that body a powerful section aimed at eliminating the federal elements altogether from the constitution and building the new Germany upon the artificial basis of assumed homogeneity. In that case the Bundesrath would have disappeared altogether, and the new State would have consisted of Kaiser and Reichstag under new names, the State executives being merged in the unified executive

of the new Commonwealth or surviving only in the diminished rank of local government bodies. Here, however, the jealousy of Prussia intervened. If there was to be a completely unified Germany, that Germany would be an expanded Prussia; and Bavaria, Württemberg, and Saxony in 1918 would share the fate of Hanover and Hesse in 1866. Constituted as the Constituent Assembly actually was, that was clearly impossible; for a Bavarian, Ebert, occupied the Presidential chair, and, in deference to South German susceptibilities, the Assembly held its meetings, not in the capital of Prussia, but in the Thuringian town of Weimar. The issue of the discussion of the point was that the old designation for the constituent States (*Staaten*) was dropped, and they were recognised under the less significant name of Lands (*Länder*); the active functions of sovereignty were assigned to the central authority, but a council of the Lands' representatives was retained, under the style of Reichsrath, as a member of the constitution with large, but not unlimited, powers of veto upon legislation and ample means of expressing, in an authoritative manner, the views of the various local governments.

It is therefore approximately true to say that the old Bundesrath is represented now by the new Reichsrath; but the statement is inadequate, for the new Reichsrath enjoys very much less authority than did the old Bundesrath. In matters of Imperial concern the final word lay with the Bundesrath, and without its consent no legislative measure could be passed. The powers of the new Reichsrath are strictly limited, and may be said to be, in a general sense, of an advisory character. The Reichsrath can formulate statutes and bring them before the Reichstag, when, if they are approved, they receive statutory force by virtue of the Reichstag vote. On the other hand, a law introduced in the Reichstag, and passed there, does not need for its validity to be considered by the Reichsrath at all. Within a fortnight of its passing, the Reichsrath is empowered to lay before the President an objection to its becoming law; and, in that case, the inchoate statute must be laid again before the Reichstag for consideration. If this further consideration does not lead to an agreement between the two Houses, the President is empowered to bring the question before the

public for decision by Referendum. Should he refuse so to do, the fate of the disputed measure depends upon the strength of the vote cast for it in the Reichstag. If it has there been passed by a two-thirds' majority, it becomes law in spite of the Reichsrath veto; if it has been passed by a smaller majority than two-thirds it is destroyed by the veto. Such is the legislative competence to which the new representative of the old sovereign Bundesrath has been reduced.

The position of the Reichsrath is the key to the new German constitution. That being understood, the rest can be stated quite intelligibly in a few words. The sovereign power is divided between the President and the Reichstag, each being elected by the whole body of the German voters. The President is thus placed in a very autocratic position, for he is head of the executive and has a power of dissolution which he can exercise over the Reichstag. In the range of his executive authority he outdoes the Kaiser, for he exercises, in addition to supreme Imperial control, a very large authority which, under the Imperial system, was vested in the State Governments of Germany. He is elected for seven years, is eligible at the end of that term for re-election, and is responsible only to the whole German people. The only method of removing him from office, against his will, would seem to be by a plebiscite; and this can only follow upon a resolution of the Reichstag supported by a two-thirds' majority vote. There is indeed a provision that the Reichstag may impeach him before the Supreme Court for abuse of his office; but, as no consequence is prescribed in case the court condemns him, that measure does not appear to be very effective. Furthermore, the President of the Republic is Commander-in-Chief of the army. It is clear that a short step would in conceivable circumstances convert his office into a monarchy.

The large powers and inaccessible position of the President, if the Reichstag should prove itself feeble and the President be both popular and ambitious, would probably enable him, without serious difficulty, to revive the Imperial system which in future—the nearer future at least—will be regarded as having provided the Fatherland, while it lasted, with a golden age. In the meantime the position of the President, even if he aims at

no more than a septennial office, is out of all proportion great, and may well satisfy the ambition of any ordinary man. So long as he retains the support of a majority in the Reichstag he is irresponsible, for without their vote the law cannot be set in motion against him. Representative of the nation in face of foreign Powers, head of the fighting forces, chief of the administration, promulgator of the laws, he lacks nothing but the trappings of majesty to make him more than the equal of the Emperor whom Bismarck set up in 1871. Such seem to be the legal potentialities of this great office.

By way of indemnifying themselves for having set up a potentate with this immense authority, the German constitution-makers have encompassed him with verbal limitations. Thus, his acts, so far as they can only be carried out by written orders, must be countersigned by one or other of the Secretaries of State, who when countersigning must accept Parliamentary responsibility for the measure. In a constitutional monarchy this, as we in this country know by long experience, is a very effective check on the exercise of executive power. But whether it is to act as any such check at all must depend upon the capacity which the new Reichstag may display for making that responsibility effective. By way of promoting its efficiency the constitution lays down the rule that the Chancellor and Ministers must possess the confidence of the Reichstag, and that any one of them from whom that body by express resolution withdraws its confidence must vacate his office. This is again a good rule, but no machinery is devised for its enforcement; and apparently, if the administration should set it at naught, the Reichstag must think out some tactical method of enforcing observance of the principle.

The constitution abounds in propositions of that sort, which are rather in the nature of advice than of law. A conspicuous instance is afforded by Art. 21, which lays down the duty of a member of the Reichstag thus: 'The elected members are representatives of the whole people. They are responsible to their consciences and not bound by mandates.' This example may be held to justify the introduction, common enough in written constitutions, of matter which is in effect manifesto. Considered as an enunciation of principle, the dictum

seems so trite as to be unimportant. But read in the light of the circumstances of the Assembly, it is full of matter, for it marks the difference between the Soviet system, with its privileged class and factious tyranny, and the parliamentary system as developed under free institutions. But whether conscientious candidates who refuse to accept the mandate of a caucus will be able to secure election by the German constituencies is a very moot question. Equally sound in principle, but of even less obvious practical import is the dictum of Art. 153 that 'Property imposes obligations. Its employment must subserve the public good.'

The outstanding feature of the German constitution, then, is a powerful executive limited in theory to constitutional modes of procedure. The authority appointed to enforce that limitation is the Reichstag, but in the constitution of the Reichstag this critical function is but little taken into account. To the making of effective criticism two conditions must, in general, be satisfied by the critic, that is to say, he must criticise with the authority derived from experience and under the restraints imposed by responsibility. An Assembly, therefore, which is to exercise the function of criticism in reference to the conduct of the Administration should comprise a body of administrators out of office, that is to say, the body which we, in this country, recognise under the style of 'His Majesty's Opposition.' With the experience of administrative office to sharpen their discernment, they are, as a rule, the keenest members of the Chamber to discover the weak points of a policy or of a scheme, and, with the prospect of having at some future time to justify in office the principles and professions which they put forward in opposition, they criticise with caution and moderation. In the practical working of the parliamentary system this element of a responsible Opposition is of capital importance. But popular election alone does not secure the presence there of this parliamentary Opposition; and in the new German Constitution there does not seem to be any attempt to secure it. There is indeed no indication that the draftsmen of the Constitution were at all aware either of its intrinsic value or of its practical importance

to the permanence of their work. In the machinery which they have devised and in the rules of practice which they have suggested we look in vain for any attempt to secure a parliamentary Opposition. Comparison under this head with the English practice will make the point clear.

In this country Ministers are, by practical necessity, chosen from the ranks of the Legislature for the simple reason that no person outside the membership of the House of Lords or the House of Commons, as the case may be, has the right to address either of those assemblies in political session. Thus, if a Ministry is filled by an outsider, he must forthwith be provided with a seat in one House or the other, in order that he may be able to fulfil the parliamentary duties of his office. The German Constitution, following in this respect the precedent of the Empire, provides that Ministers, although not members of the Reichstag, may attend and address the meetings. Again, it provides for the individual, and against the collective, responsibility of Ministers. These provisions are evidently intended to perpetuate the Imperial system of expert Ministers, and to impress upon the new Reichstag the doctrinaire character which was so marked a feature of the old.

An aggravation of this lack of the responsible element in the representative body is the provision for free recourse to a plebiscite. Thus, any law passed by the Reichstag may be submitted by the President to a plebiscite if he thinks proper so to submit it. In the same way the decision of the Reichstag may be superseded if one-third of the membership of the Reichstag and one-twentieth of the enfranchised population, or, apart from the Reichstag, one-tenth of the population, denounces it. The provisional veto upon Reichstag legislation exerciseable by the Reichsrath has been already mentioned. Thus the Reichstag is regarded by the constitution-makers of Germany as a body upon which no effective responsibility is to be laid; and, if its conduct should hereafter justify the distrust with which they evidently regard it, the part which it will play in the exercise of any useful public functions is very small. The executive power being vested in an independently elected President, its faculty of criticism

being limited by the perspicacity of the hustings and its legislative competence restricted by the conditional presidential veto, the Reichstag seems destined in the future to play only such a part as it has played in the past; that is to say, its task will be the facilitating of public business by heedless support of the Administration or the impeding of it by doctrinaire criticism and factious opposition. It may be that, in spite of congenital defects and adverse circumstances, the new Reichstag will prove equal to the task of controlling executive action and restraining executive ambitions, but in favour of such a conclusion the most plausible argument is that 'the unexpected always happens.'

There is, however, another body set up by the constitution from which it would seem that greater things are hoped. That is the Supreme Court, which is authorised to deal in the way of judicial consideration and decision with matters of State. Before this tribunal the President, the Chancellor, or a Minister of State may be arraigned if the Reichstag should proceed to an impeachment. The same judicial body is to decide, in case of a conflict of authority, between the State and any of the Lands, or in a dispute of that sort between two or more Lands among themselves. Its decision is to be invoked in controlling the action of a Land Government if such a subordinate government neglects the remonstrances addressed to it by the Central Government. Its jurisdiction extends not only to the decision of purely legal questions, but in certain specified matters it even covers points of administration. Thus, to take one example, the Bavarian and Württemberg post and telegraph systems are to be taken over by the State this year. But, if the executive authorities concerned cannot agree upon the terms of the transfer, their difference is to be referred to the Supreme Court for its award. The organic law governing this institution is to be passed by the Reichstag; and, until the Supreme Court itself is duly constituted, a provisionally appointed body, called a Senate, consisting of seven members, to which the Reichstag appoints four and the Court of ordinary jurisdiction appoints three, is to exercise its functions.

While the constitution of this High Court, and also that of the Courts of ordinary jurisdiction, are left to

subsequent legislation by the Reichstag and the various Landtags, as the case may be, the makers of the constitution have taken measures to secure the independence of the courts so constituted. The clauses relating to the appointment of judges have been taken and, in large measure, taken textually, from the provisions of the old Imperial Constitution in reference to that matter. Thus, judges are to be appointed for life; they are irremovable except as a result of a judgment against them by brother-judges, and are declared independent and subject only to the law. In this respect, therefore, the Republic may be expected to carry on the tradition of the Imperial Courts. Certain guarantees for the personal fitness of candidates for judicial office may indeed be found to have been given up; for the appointment of new judges is vested without express conditions in the President, but the status of the judge, when appointed, is to be at least equal to that which he enjoyed under the Empire.

A strong executive and an independent judiciary are the striking features of the new German constitution, while the third element, the Legislature, enjoys, as has been seen, very limited authority. Nominally the legislative power is lodged in the hands of the Reichstag; but, as all its decisions are liable to be challenged by a Referendum, it is difficult to say where the legislative authority actually resides. The Reichstag can deliberate and decide provisionally, but the disapproval of either the President or of the Reichsrath may render its decision liable to be subjected to a plebiscite. If a plebiscite is taken, the people can decide, but they cannot deliberate. An arrangement by which one body deliberates and another decides seems more likely to be productive of effort than of result. In any case a people acting under such limitations, whether through representatives with restricted powers or by a direct vote 'Aye' or 'No,' is not likely to make head against a powerful Administration. Personal changes on a large scale have been effected by the German revolution, but the depositary of power would seem to be, under the new constitution as under the old, not the German people, nor the elected representatives of the German people, but the German bureaucracy.

Among the institutions projected for the future of Germany is one the action of which will be followed with great interest by foreign observers. Art. 165 of the constitution calls upon the workmen and employes of industry to co-operate with owners in taking and administering measures for promoting the advancement and development of productive efficiency. With this object the organisations of both employers and employed are to be represented on industrial councils to be established in industrial centres and on a Central Industrial Council to be set up for the entire State. This Central Council is to be formed with powers limited to the care of industry, but powers, within those limits, very similar to those entrusted to the Reichsrath in respect of the local government interests. Thus, the Industrial Council is to be consulted by the Government upon all important measures within its province which the Government brings before the Reichstag; and its advisory powers include the right to lay its views before the Reichstag, even in opposition to the Government's proposals, and to submit, independently of the Government, not only its views but also projects of its own origination. This council is therefore intended to bring expert knowledge to bear at close quarters upon the discussions of social and industrial questions in the Reichstag, and to do officially and in set form for the German legislator what is unofficially and spontaneously done both in Germany and elsewhere by the press of the country. That any council will be able to supersede the press as the instructor of the public and of the legislature seems improbable; but it will be interesting to see what relations spring up between the Industrial Council and the press. Will the Council be able to present a more comprehensible or a more competent view of the situation discussed than that given by the press? Will the Council lead or be led by the press? Will it fall under the domination of factions or cliques? Will its advice be sagacious and public-spirited, or will it be the expression of narrow views and jarring interests? It would be foolish to prognosticate the upshot of the German experiment, but it will be of great importance to observe it.

A point of passing but immediate interest is raised by

the question: How is the constitution affected by the Treaty of Versailles? The answer is that the Treaty has in language been respected, but in substance opposed. Thus, the 178th Article includes a provision to the effect that 'the provisions of the Versailles Treaty signed on the 28th June, 1919, are not disturbed by the constitution.' But, on the other hand, Art. 112 provides that 'no German may be handed over to a foreign Government for prosecution or punishment,' thus negating the 228th Article of the Treaty, which provides for the handing over of war criminals for trial by the Allies. On this point the constitution-makers have prevailed, for the Entente Powers have agreed to abate the demand for handing over, in consideration of a German undertaking that a Court for dealing with these criminals shall be set up in Germany. Another Article provides for the interests of those persons when arraigned before the German Court, for Art. 116—which is emphasised in the document by the circumstance that it is headed by a rubric in Latin which reads *nulla poena sine lege*—lays down that 'any action can only be followed by punishment if the liability to punishment was expressly laid down by law before the act was committed.' Without cavilling at the success of the German legislators—for the two principles which they have acted upon are undeniably sound—it must be admitted that the Weimar Assembly has in this particular defeated the diplomatists at Versailles.

Another possible breach of the Treaty seems to be contemplated by Art. 61, which provides for the representation of German Austria in the Reichstag after her union with the German Commonwealth. It seems to have been with special reference to this clause that the German Representatives at Versailles on Sept. 22, 1919, signed a declaration that all provisions of the constitution which are in contradiction with the terms of the Treaty are null and void. If so, the declaration is entirely illusory, for the clause is not, in terms, in contradiction with the Treaty at all. The rights which it confers upon German Austria take effect only if she accedes, and after her accession to the Commonwealth, a condition which takes it out of the scope of the declaration; and indeed the Treaty itself provides that the Union of Germany

and German Austria may be hereafter sanctioned by the League of Nations. On the other hand, the two articles which refer to the War Criminals are clearly in conflict with the Treaty, but, as they are to be carried out by German officials, it is quite unimportant what view the Entente jurists may take of their validity. One of them has been already conceded, and, as to the other, it is certain that, whether the article of the constitution itself is valid or not, the sentiment which the Germans have thrown into a Latin dress will be held to justify the law. In fact, the use of a Latin rubric in connexion with this clause of the constitution—to all the others German rubrics are prefixed—may reasonably be supposed to be a cleverly thought-out vindication of the refusal of the German people to punish the men who fought for them or to permit them to be punished. The maxim is of old and acknowledged authority in German *strafrecht*, and will carry weight even in wider circles.

The translation of this document which has been issued by His Majesty's Stationery Office suffers, as official translations very commonly do, from the inattention of the translator to the significance of what he was translating. It would seem to have been the work of a scholar to whom the words are more familiar than the ideas, and consequently his choice of synonyms is often unfortunate. The translations of the words 'Reich' and 'Land' seem to have been made very much at hazard. For no obvious reason 'Reich' is rendered by 'Federation,' to which it is in no strict sense equivalent. It is quite true that the secondary sense in which alone the word 'Federation' could be the equivalent of 'Reich' is familiar in such a phrase as 'the Federation of British Industry,' used as the name of a particular society. But the word is only used when the society so named is constructed on a federal basis. It is therefore an unfortunate choice of a word for designating the new German body politic, for the question whether it, like the Russian Republic of Federated Soviets, is a federation or, like the French Republic, a unitary state, is a question hotly discussed and has been decided, so far as it is decided at all, in favour of the unitary state. The advocates of a Federation in the Weimar Assembly

were the Minority Socialists, who took their inspiration from Russia. They were beaten and turned out of the Government by the Majority faction, which carefully avoided any recognition of sovereign rights in the constituent 'Lands.'

This question of translation cannot be dismissed as one of mere verbal propriety, for the point of view from which the German system is regarded will be materially affected by the circumstance that it is called a Federation or an Empire, as the case may be. The truth seems to be that neither of these words is quite apposite. An Empire does not necessarily imply an Emperor, or we could not speak of the British Empire; and it is, no doubt, in that elastic sense that the word Empire is used to render the German word 'Reich' in the Versailles Treaty. But a federation implies constituent federative bodies, the character of which it simply reflects. A federation of academies should not include industrial corporations, nor should a federation of industrials include academies. A federated State consists, strictly speaking, of constituent States with general legislative powers; and in such a case the legislative powers conferred upon the federation are expressly delegated, as in the case of the Australian Commonwealth and the United States of America. When the general legislative power is conferred upon the central authority and only delegated powers of legislation are in the hands of the local assemblies, as in the case of the Dominion of Canada or the Union of South Africa, the whole body politic cannot be accurately called a federation, for it is a federation of provinces; and, although a federation of provinces may be the basis of a State, the State erected on such a basis is a unitary not a federated State. The new Deutsche Reich resembles the Canadian, not the Australian, model in this respect, inasmuch as full legislative authority resides in the Reichstag and only delegated legislative powers can be exercised by the Landtags.

The foregoing considerations would apply even if there were no historical considerations to be taken into account. But the circumstance has already been alluded to, that the exact nature of the Union was hotly debated in the Constituent Assembly, and throughout Germany when the name of the new State was being considered.

Three parties contended for three different views. The Conservatives wished to erect a federation of sovereign States on the model of the Imperial Bund. The extreme Socialists desired to erect a Federation of Workmen's and Soldiers' Councils. A third, which may be called, for lack of a better term, the Prussian Party, desired to abolish historical boundaries and erect a unitary State. The outcome was a compromise which resulted in the official 'Deutsche Reich'; and, if in rendering that in English the Treaty formula 'German Empire' is to be cast overboard, it would seem better to substitute some equally vague term such as German Commonwealth, instead of the singularly inappropriate 'German Federation.' It is a point not to be ignored in this connexion that the English word Commonwealth is very nearly the etymological equivalent of the German 'Reich.'

For the translation of the word 'Land' by 'State' there is more to be said, for this word 'State' is used in that sense in the Treaty of Versailles. But, as the status of these 'Lands' had not at that time been settled, it was doubtful whether they would become States in a true federation or provinces in a unitary State. The language of the Treaty is perhaps not quite conclusive on this point. What is now clear is that, whatever they are called, Prussia, Bavaria, Württemberg, and the rest are now Provinces, not States.

Less defensible, as it seems to us, is the decision to omit from the translation the rubrics which are prefixed in the original to the several articles. The light which such headings throw upon the text is sometimes considerable; how considerable it is in the case of the article relating to war criminals, the foregoing discussion has shown. The omission of the Latin aphorism from that passage is very much like striking out the Prince of Denmark from the play of 'Hamlet.'

J. W. GORDON.

Art. 9.—BOLSHEVISM AND DEMOCRACY.

1. *The State and Revolution*. By V. I. Ulianov (N. Lenin). Allen and Unwin, n.d. Written August-September 1917.
 2. *The Proletarian Revolution and Kautsky the Renegade*. By V. I. Ulianov (N. Lenin). The British Socialist Party, n.d. Written November 1918.
 3. *The History of the Russian Revolution to Brest-Litovsk*. By L. Trotsky. Allen and Unwin, 1919.
 4. *The Dictatorship of the Proletariat*. By Karl Kautsky. National Labour Press, n.d. Written towards the end of 1918.
 5. *Terrorisme et Communisme*. Par Karl Kautsky. Paris: Povolozky, 1919.
 6. *Labour Conditions in Soviet Russia*. International Labour Office. Harrison, 1920.
 7. *Report of the British Labour Delegation to Russia*. Trades Union Congress and Labour Party, 1920.
 8. *The Practice and Theory of Bolshevism*. By Bertrand Russell. Allen and Unwin, 1920.
 9. *Through Bolshevik Russia*. By Mrs Philip Snowden. Cassell, 1920.
 10. *The Constitution of the Russian Soviet Republic*. English translation in Publication No. 136 of the American Association for International Conciliation: New York, 1919. French translation in Buisson, *Les Bolcheviki*. Paris: Fischbacher, 1919.
- And other works.

THE first Revolution achieved by men calling themselves Marxists has been brought about in strange defiance of all the teaching characteristic of Marx. Marx, indeed, was two persons in one: a revolutionary agitator and an evolutionary philosopher. But it was his evolutionary doctrine which marked him off from his Communist predecessors: it was that which, in his eyes and in the eyes of his closest disciples, converted Socialism from a 'Utopian' dream to a 'scientific' theory. And, according to that doctrine, a country could only be transformed into a socialist or communist society—in his vocabulary the two adjectives had the same meaning—after it had passed through a capitalist stage, which had removed

from the workers all property in the instruments of production, concentrated wealth in the hands of a relatively small class, and converted the overwhelmingly large majority of those engaged both in agriculture and in manufacture into a wage-slave proletariat. He remained so far a revolutionary that he never believed the final transition could be effected by peaceful legislation: force, he declared, is the midwife of every old society when it is pregnant with a new one. But this very metaphor makes a long gestation the unescapable prerequisite: force applied too soon can only produce abortion. And Marx's passionate hatred of bourgeois self-satisfaction on the one side was equalled on the other by his cold scientific contempt for those who sought to 'clear by bold leaps, or remove by legal enactments, the obstacles offered by the successive phases of normal development.'

Russia, when the Bolsheviks seized power, was far from having reached the stage which orthodox Marxism had hitherto postulated as the indispensable preliminary to socialism. In proportion to its extent and population, it was less industrialised than any other considerable country in Europe. The country was still mainly an agricultural one: the peasants were commonly reckoned eighty-five per cent. of the population. In all other lands the peasants have been the despair of the socialist; and though in Russia the joint ownership of the parish or *mir* was only slowly giving way to individual property in the soil, there was no reason to suppose that Russian peasants would cling to their land less tenaciously than peasants elsewhere. In particular districts there were, of course, great large-scale manufactures, both textile and metallurgical. But numerically, the *Kustarny* or cottage industries were even yet considerably more important. They were going through the same evolution as 'the domestic industries' of other lands in earlier periods; they were being slowly detached from agriculture, and becoming more or less dependent on capitalist middlemen. But they were still very far from having reached the stage in which they could readily be socialised. A common estimate of the number of 'peasants engaged in one or other form of cottage industry' reckoned them at between ten and twelve

millions. The number of factory and mine workers, on the other hand, as given by official statistics, was under three millions, out of a population of some one hundred and thirty. By counting in agricultural labourers, the poorer among the cottage workers, and 'the intellectual proletariat,' it has been found possible to claim for the proletariat twenty-two per cent. of the nation. This was as early as 1900, but it included the more highly industrialised Poland, now detached from Russia. Such estimates are most insecure; but they are sufficient to show how far Capital was from having fulfilled the evolutionary rôle assigned to it by Marxist theory.

It is essential to realise this in order to understand the very remarkable fact that Bolshevism is opposed as much by the leaders of European socialism as by the organs of capitalism. Non-socialist criticism of Bolshevism, so far as it is intelligent, is based on the well-grounded belief that the institution of private property furnishes a useful stimulus towards the production of those material commodities on which rests the life of the whole community. It doubts whether, for a long time to come, that stimulus can be replaced by any equally effective force; and it believes that the evils attending capitalism can be vastly lessened without abolishing the existing system *in toto*. The socialist criticism of Bolshevism, on the other hand, while it assumes, as the Bolsheviks do, that capitalism is the enemy, disbelieves in the feasibility of introducing socialism in a country not yet ripe for it. As M. Martov, the leader of the Russian Mensheviks, has recently said:

'The Bolshevik party has seized the power of the state in a country where the numerical force of the proletariat is very small; a country where the economic and intellectual prerequisites for the organisation of socialist production are absent; and, running up against these objective conditions, they will find in them an insurmountable obstacle to the realisation of their ideals.'

The seizure of political power by the Bolsheviks in November 1917 had nothing novel or proletarian about it. It was simply a military *coup d'état*, like scores of others in times ancient and modern. There is no pretence among the Bolsheviks that it was anything else. Thus M. Trotsky writes:

'In the course of Nov. 7, the Winter Palace'—where 'the Government was still in session'—'was gradually surrounded from all sides by our troops. At one o'clock in the afternoon, *in the name of the Military Revolutionary Committee*, I announced at the sitting of the Petrograd Soviet that Kerensky's government no longer existed, and that, pending the decision of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, the Government authority would be assumed by the Military Revolutionary Committee.'

There is again no mystery about the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly in January 1918. Before it was allowed to meet, the middle-class Liberals, known as Cadets, had been put under the ban, their leaders arrested whenever they could be found, and their newspapers suppressed. That party had gained but few seats in the Assembly; but it had polled some 245,000 votes out of the 810,000 cast in Petrograd, and 260,000 out of 684,000 cast in Moscow. It was at first hoped that, having thus been purged, the Assembly would be amenable to Bolshevik domination; and it was not in fact dissolved until the anti-Bolshevik candidate for the presidency of the chamber had been elected by 244 votes to 153, and a series of anti-Bolshevik resolutions carried by 237 votes to 136. At the last moment, the explanation was vouchsafed by M. Lenin that the Constituent Assembly no longer represented the will of the people, because it had been elected on party lists drawn up before a recent split in the anti-Bolshevik ranks. But the revolutionary government had already subjected the Assembly to the right of 'recall,' and announced its intention to issue new writs, if half the electors in any constituency so desired. All the requirements of political equity could have been met by a number of fresh elections. The plain fact is that the Bolshevik leaders clearly perceived that no Constituent Assembly, elected with any semblance of freedom, would confirm them in power.

And there is no difficulty, in the last place, in understanding how it came about that the Bolshevik government got the support of the 'Soviets,' or Councils, of Workmen's, Peasants', and Soldiers' Deputies. These were bodies in which the middle classes were not represented: bodies which were flattered by the Bolshevik cry, 'All Power to the Soviets,' and which the Bolsheviks

had been bending all their energies to capture. It must not be supposed that it was the Bolsheviks who first created them. They had arisen, more or less spontaneously, in the revolutionary days of 1905, and had been employed to bring pressure upon the government to grant parliamentary institutions. They vanished when the reaction set in; but made their appearance again early in 1917. At first they were under relatively moderate socialist leadership; but M. Lenin was quick to see their capabilities for his purpose. By the time of the November *coup d'état* the Bolsheviks had already got themselves elected in sufficient numbers to the Petrograd and Moscow Soviets to direct their utterances. Everything now depended on the peasants, who would form a large element in the Third All-Russian Congress of Soviets which was planned to come together at the same time as the Constituent Assembly, so as to be ready to be put in its place.

At the beginning of the century the peasants already owned well over sixty per cent. of the land of Russia suited for tillage. They were hungry for more—with or without reason we need not stop to inquire. When the Russian reverses in the war with Japan and the incipient revolution of 1905 withdrew for a time the hold of the administration from local affairs, agrarian risings took place over a large part of the country; risings which aimed at 'smoking out' the nobles and dividing their estates. In 1906 order was restored, and the peasants lost what had seemed within their grasp. The government then came forward with a constructive policy on large lines, which might have solved the problem, if only it could have been given time. In the first place, it remitted the six years' payment still due of the redemption charges imposed on the peasants at the Emancipation in return for the assignment to them of their proportion of the seigniorial estates. In the second place, it passed laws to facilitate the withdrawal of land from joint village ownership. And, most important of all, it embarked on vigorous measures for the promotion of peasant holdings. In four years (1906-1910) three-quarters of a million acres of state domain were sold to peasants and ten million acres leased. At the same time a Peasants' Land Bank was hard at work, buying large

estates and cutting them up into small properties or holdings. By 1911 it had sold ten million acres. Altogether, in five years, between twenty-three and twenty-four million acres passed into peasants' hands, either in absolute ownership or with beneficial leases. It is doubtful whether any equally large land settlement has ever been carried through elsewhere.

The administrations which took the place of the Czarist autocracy were naturally anxious to expedite a process already so well advanced. To devise means by which this could be accomplished without entire confiscation of the rights of existing large landowners naturally took some time, especially as attention was distracted by the dangers on the Western front. The pressure from the peasants to make a clean sweep of the nobles was only held back by sharp differences of opinion within the revolutionary camp. The thorough-going Marxists, whether of the Majority (Bolsheviks) or of the Minority (Mensheviks), were loth to give the peasants more land, since they regarded peasant proprietors as essentially bourgeois, and a hindrance to genuine socialisation. The Social Revolutionaries—of course, like the Marxists, a party of town 'intelligentsia' but a party which championed the cause of the peasants—sought to reconcile divergent principles by an ingenious formula: 'Nationalisation of the land, but the use to the peasants.' And while the Kerensky government was still deliberating, the Bolshevik wing of the Marxists made up its mind to swallow its scruples and dish the rival party. Immediately after the *coup d'état* they issued a decree which in the same breath 'abolished private ownership' and 'turned it all over to the workers' without compensation, 'on the basis of equalised use of the soil.' 'Pending the decision of the land question by the Constituent Assembly,' the property of non-peasant owners was put at the disposal of the local councils (Soviets) of peasants' deputies. Thereupon, the peasants proceeded without more ado to take possession. Having got what they wanted, they had no more to hope for from the Constituent Assembly; and gratitude was sufficient for the time to bind them to their benefactors.

M. Lenin has explained explicitly again and again that the Bolshevik policy in this matter was dictated by

tactical considerations: he has always been great on 'tactics.' It was necessary to 'gain the adhesion of the peasantry' in order to put 'the proletariat,' i.e. the Bolsheviks, in power. They could not dispense with this 'temporary union with the peasants as a whole.' They realised that 'a common peasant revolution is still a bourgeois revolution, and cannot in a backward country be turned into a socialist one *without a whole series of transitions and successive stages*' (M. Lenin's italics). But they comforted themselves with the belief that, once in power, they could 'help the peasantry to test their petty bourgeois ideas, in order to pass from them as speedily as possible to the socialist demands.' One way of teaching them would be 'to rally to the Communist side the village poor against the village rich,' and 'carry through a social cleavage in the village': until this was done, 'the great agrarian revolution,' from the Marxist point of view, 'would inevitably remain a mere paper reform.' Squeamish people might accuse them of 'introducing civil war into the villages.' But this, says M. Lenin, 'we regard as a merit.'

Even with the support of the peasants assured to the government of the *coup d'état*, it may at first sight be difficult to understand why the 'capitalists' of the industrial centres were unable to put up a better fight against the combined processes of expropriation, requisition, and terrorism to which they were now subjected. In some ways such Capitalism as there was in Russia— islands of industrialism in an agrarian sea—was highly developed. Coming relatively late, it benefited by the newest plant and machinery, and the works were organised on a large scale. But it was in a sense exotic: the capital itself was very largely foreign in origin, so that the native shareholder element—one of the main forces on the side of the existing industrial order—was relatively far weaker than in more western nations. There were model factories here and there; but the evils of truck and of excessive fines which countries entering earlier upon the factory stage have generally abolished, were still very prevalent, as well as the more peculiarly Russian practice of personal chastisement. The *nouveaux riches* often aroused resentment by their ostentation, while they were devoid of that tradition of a share in

government which parliamentarism has given the business classes in other countries. The technical experts and superintendents were also largely foreign, without root in the country. Under such conditions, among a people accustomed to autocracy, weak-willed with a Slavonic weakness, a few hundred resolute men were able to have their way.

The history of Bolshevik rule during the past three years has been the nemesis of a false position—the false position of those whose political theory rests on economic conditions which have yet to be created. This can be shown in relation to the land, to the organisation of industry, to the army, to the tribunals, and to foreign affairs. On the present occasion we must confine ourselves to the constitutional machinery. And it may be remarked that there is small need to climb to the top of the Kremlin to learn the views of M. Lenin. I do not find that he has said anything to his visitors which cannot be learnt or anticipated from his writings. While the rôle of other leaders is to preside over city Soviets, to organise armies, to run railways, and to visit foreign capitals, his mission is to issue the Bolshevik gospel in a stream of new editions, and explain its foreordained adaptation to every human need. Many of the English translations of his pamphlets have been issued by obscure presses, with all the romantic charm of poor paper and worn type. But they have no other charm. All alike are cold and abstract, in form severely logical, full of formulæ and citations from the socialist scriptures of Marx and Engels. He delights in numbered ‘theses,’ for the acceptance of this or that congress or party convention. Only rarely does he condescend to argue with those outside the Bolshevik camp; but, when he does, he is easy master of a rich vituperative vocabulary.*

* Beside the books cited at the head of this article, reference may be made to the following pamphlets, which are placed in the order of writing: ‘Towards Soviets’ (April 1917), British Socialist Party; ‘Lessons of the Russian Revolution’ (July 1917), B. S. P.; ‘Theses’ (January 1918), in Publication 149 of the American Association for International Conciliation; ‘The Soviets at Work’ (April 1918), Social Information Bureau; ‘The Chief Task of our Times’ (March, with speech added of May 1918), Workers’ Socialist Federation; ‘The Land Revolution in Russia’ (December 1918), Independent Labour Party; ‘Manifesto of the Moscow International

The official style of the present government is the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic. According to M. Lenin and the Bolshevik propagandists, it is an 'immeasurably higher form of democracy' than the world has previously witnessed. Yet it is not a little remarkable that the feature in the Soviet system which has attracted most attention on the part of certain sympathetic writers in England is left very much in the background by M. Lenin himself. According to these English writers, its essential characteristic consists in its occupational constituencies. These, they say, represent real groups, with common purposes, in contrast to merely geographical constituencies, which, they assert, are meaningless agglomerations. M. Lenin does indeed make the occupational method of election one of the merits of the new system. But it does not bulk at all largely in his frequent expositions. And it will be better to follow M. Lenin's own line of approach.

Marx, he says, in 1848 had not got beyond the general idea that when the socialists should have seized power, the proletariat would be organised as the ruling class. He waited for experience to reveal the form which this rule would assume. The Paris Commune gave him what he was waiting for: 'the definite form of the proletarian Socialist Republic.' Its merits, in Marx's own language, and numbered for convenience of reference, were as follows:

1. 'The first decree of the Commune was the abolition of the standing army, and its replacement by the nation in arms.
2. 'The Council of the Commune consisted of municipal representatives elected by universal suffrage. . . . They could be recalled at any time.
3. 'From the members of the Council of the Commune down to the humblest worker, everybody in the public services was paid at the same rates as ordinary working men.
4. 'The Commune was to have been not a parliamentary but a working body, legislative and executive at one and the same time. Instead of deciding once in three or six years what member of the ruling class was to represent and repress the people in parliament, universal suffrage was to be the means by which the people, organised in Communes, was to

(March 1919), 'National Labour Press: another translation and M. Lenin's 'Theses' in Postgate, 'The Bolshevik Theory,' Richards, 1920.

seek out the foremen and clerks it needed for its gigantic business, in the same way as ordinary employers use their individual will (or suffrage) in choosing their servants.'

M. Lenin's advocacy of Soviets is based on 'their identity in type and socio-political character with the Commune'; so that we must now consider how far the Soviet government has in fact carried out the Commune principles.

Comment on the first point is hardly necessary, when we reflect that the Soviet government claims to have at its disposal a standing army of more than two million men, commanded mainly by officers taken over from the Czarist régime. In July 1917, M. Lenin taunted the Kerensky government with having 'no complete confidence in the elected soldiers' organisations, no full realisation of the principle of the election of officers by the soldiers themselves.' Nine months later M. Trotsky, now Minister of War, explained to the Communist party that the cry for elected officers had served its purpose :

'We were obliged to break, by means of the election of officers, the resistance which the personnel of the higher command always opposed. The new political power is in the hands of the working classes. Under the present régime of the army, the principle of the election of officers seems to me to have no political *raison d'être*. On the contrary, it is absolutely inimical to our present technical necessities. Besides it has already been suppressed by a decree.'

To the second point we shall return. The third, when M. Lenin wrote in 1917, he treated as the *articulus stantis aut cadentis ecclesiae*.

'Particularly noteworthy . . . is the lowering of the payment of *all* servants of the State to the level of the *workmen's wages*. Here is shown, more clearly than anywhere else, the *break* from a bourgeois democracy to a proletarian democracy. . . . And it is precisely on this most obvious point, perhaps the most important so far as the problem of the State is concerned, that the teachings of Marx have been forgotten. It is entirely neglected in all the innumerable popular commentaries. It is not "proper" to speak about it, as if it were a piece of old-fashioned "naïveté"; just as the Christians, having attained the position of a State religion, "forget" the "naïveté" of primitive Christianity.'

M. Lenin does not content himself with irony : he has an economic argument.

'On the basis of Capitalism the great majority of the functions of the old State have been enormously simplified and reduced in practice to very simple operations, such as registration, filing, and checking. Hence they will be quite within the reach of every literate person, and it will be possible to perform them for the usual "working man's wage."'

But as early as the spring of 1918 the Bolshevik government had learnt that to run great industrial and transport undertakings was by no means 'within the reach of every literate person.' They could not dispense with the experts, and to get good service out of them they had to pay them well. M. Lenin boldly faced the music his own earlier writings might not unnaturally awaken :

'We were forced to make use of the old bourgeois method and agreed to very high remuneration for the services of the biggest of the bourgeois specialists. . . . It is clear that such a measure is a deflexion from the principles of the Paris Commune. . . . Furthermore, it is clear that it is not merely a halt in the offensive against Capitalism (for Capitalism is not a quantity of money but a definite social relationship), but also a step backward by our Socialist Soviet State.'

His consolation is that this also is one of the temporary arrangements of a transitional period. The time will come when the imperfect Socialist achievement—'to every one according to his work'—will be replaced by the purer Communism—'to every one according to his needs.' Then things will so nearly run themselves, that the State, as we have known it, will have 'withered away.' But it is observable that this transitional period is progressively lengthening itself in M. Lenin's mind. It has now become 'a whole historical epoch.'

Meanwhile, in order that the recipients of these higher wages may have something to spend them on, 'illicit markets' have to be tolerated. In theory all food produced by the peasants above their own needs must be sold to the state for fixed prices paid in the depreciated paper-money of the government. More than one of the recent visitors to M. Lenin's office at the top of the Kremlin have reported that the paper-money

payment strikes him as really humorous. In actual fact, the peasants keep back what they can and sell at illicit markets. From the point of view of the government two useful purposes are served: they get the services of technical experts and officials, for a consideration; and they can drop down on almost any one they wish to make uncomfortable, with a charge of 'speculation.'

But it is the composition and working of the Councils themselves which must be the centre of interest: let us fix our attention on the second and fourth of the merits of the Paris Commune, reproduced in the Soviets.

The Paris Commune did, at any rate, get its Council elected by universal suffrage, even if many 'bourgeois' had left Paris or abstained from voting. It was the constant assumption of Marx that by the time a country was ripe for socialism, the overwhelming mass of the population would be proletarian, and would completely dominate the situation when elections were held by a revolutionary government free from bourgeois influence. Hence Marx could use the phrase 'the dictatorship of the proletariat' without being conscious of any conflict with what we may call the numerical conception of democracy. In M. Lenin's mouth the proletariat sometimes means the *industrial* wage workers: but I cannot find that he has ever distinctly claimed that a majority of the proletariat *in this sense* has a right to govern the whole country, however small a proportion they may actually form of the whole population: though this position has been assigned to him by one of the ablest of his English admirers. More usually 'the dictatorship of the proletariat' is to be understood as short for 'the dictatorship of the urban and rural proletariat and the poorest peasantry'—to quote from the Soviet Constitution (§ 9). And, in this sense, M. Lenin has persuaded himself that his government has the support of 'the great mass of the population.'

But he was not going to take any risks from the bourgeois vote. Accordingly, the Soviet Constitution openly disfranchises them.

'§ 65. The following persons enjoy neither the right to vote nor the right to be voted for:

'(a) Persons who employ hired labour, in order to obtain from it an increase in profits.

'(b) Persons who have an income without doing any work, such as interest from capital, receipts from property.

'(c) Private traders, middlemen, and brokers.

'(d) Monks and clergy of all denominations.'

When we consider that many of the cottage craftsmen employ assistants, like the journeymen and apprentices of 18th-century England, and that many of the factory workers own their own houses or have (at any rate had) deposits in the People's Bank, it will be readily seen that this clause might easily be made to disfranchise a considerable number of working people. The possibility is not lessened by M. Lenin's assertion that 'all bureaucratic formalities and limitations of elections are done away with; the masses themselves determine the order and time of the elections.'

Considering that the Constitution confirmed the Bolshevik Declaration of Rights of December 1917, by which the intention was announced of carrying out 'a complete transfer of all factories, mills, mines, railways, and other means of production and transportation to the ownership of the Workmen's and Peasants' Soviet Republic,' it was not perhaps surprising that the owners of the property to be confiscated should for the time be put out of the pale of citizenship. When the veteran German Socialist leader, Herr Kautsky, criticised such measures as a violation of the principle of democracy, M. Lenin replied that he only departed from 'formal democracy' and 'excluded the exploiters' in order to establish 'democracy for the vast majority of the nation.' And, in truth, the vast majority of the nation were the peasants, of whom only a relatively small proportion employ labour outside their own family.

Yet though kept in power by the acquiescence of the peasants, the Bolshevik government has never dared to trust them. The recent British Labour Delegation came back with news which some have found surprising: that in the elaborate Soviet hierarchy, passing from local through district and provincial Soviets to the supreme All-Russian Congress of Soviets, it is so arranged that the peasant vote shall count for only one-fifth of its numerical strength. But so it has stood in the Soviet

Constitution since it was formally adopted in July 1918.

'§ 53. Congresses of Soviets are composed as follows:

'(a) Regional: of representatives of the urban and county Soviets, one representative for 25,000 inhabitants of the county, and one representative for 5000 voters of the cities.

'(b) Provincial (Gubernia): of representatives of urban and rural Soviets, one representative for 10,000 inhabitants from the rural districts, and one representative for 2000 voters in the city.'

'§ 25. The All-Russian Congress of Soviets is composed of representatives of urban Soviets (one delegate for 25,000 voters), and of representatives of the provincial Congresses of Soviets (one delegate for 125,000 inhabitants).'

Not content with excluding all bourgeois and giving the peasants one-fifth of the voting power of the town workpeople, the Constitution makes assurance doubly sure by claiming for the government the prerogative of depriving any one of rights which can be used against it.

'§ 23. Being guided by the interests of the working class as a whole, the Russian Socialist Federated Republic deprives all individuals and groups of rights which could be utilised by them to the detriment of the Socialist Revolution.'

And this prerogative it has not been slow to use. On June 14, 1918, the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets voted the exclusion from the Soviets of the Right and Centre Social Revolutionaries, and a little later of the Left Social Revolutionaries, whose alliance had helped the Bolsheviks into power, and whose agrarian programme they had 'conveyed.' Since then local Soviets have frequently been dissolved, when an opposition majority managed to make its appearance. The Mensheviks are apparently not generally deprived of the franchise: in some of the big Moscow factories they can dispense with propaganda, and there are still 40 Menshevik representatives among the 1500 of the Moscow City Soviet. But all the primary elections are by show of hands, and, with a Revolutionary Tribunal in existence, it requires unusual courage to be independent; opponents of the government cannot get halls for their meetings; all their papers are suppressed; and the Bolsheviks monopolise all the known printing presses. That again

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seemed to surprise the Labour delegation ; but it is in the Constitution, quite nicely expressed :

'§ 14. For the purpose of securing freedom of expression to the toiling masses, the Soviet Republic . . . turns over to the working people and to the poorest peasantry' (i.e. to the Bolshevik rulers) 'all technical and material means of publication of newspapers, pamphlets, books, etc.'

If in the rural districts an opponent is elected, it is easy to refuse him a railway pass. M. Lenin never wrote anything more to the point than his sentence as far back as 1905 : 'Whoever wants to try any path to Socialism other than political Democracy, he will inevitably come to absurd and reactionary conclusions.'

The last of the novel merits shared by the Soviets with the Paris Commune is that they are 'working bodies,' not mere 'talking shops': they are executive as well as legislative : and all that the officials have to do is to carry out their directions. Moreover, the members of the local Soviets each 'represent not more than about five hundred votes'; according to the Constitution (§ 57) the minimum in cities is now a thousand. Representatives are all subject at any moment to the 'right of recall' and replacement. And the whole machinery, we are assured, 'works centripetally; the central body is controlled by the local constituent bodies.' If all this is so, the Soviet system must be vastly superior, from a democratic point of view, to mere parliamentarism. Accordingly, M. Lenin, when meditating his *coup d'état*, wrote :

'These last few days have brought face to face these two types of representation—on one hand the Constituent Assembly, in which one man represents 200,000 wills, and on the other the All-Russian Soviets, . . . whose every member is so closely connected with the very pulse of the people. The Soviet, being close to the people, must express realities literally, as the people itself expresses them. The Soviet is probably the most important contribution of the Russian Revolution.'

Such is the theory: probably at first the quite honest theory of idealists. But every one who has any experience of large elective bodies knows that it could not be realised in practice. A public meeting, in the very nature of things, cannot be an executive; and the

Soviets of the great cities, like the All-Russian Congress itself, are so big as to be of the nature of public meetings. Such gatherings are bound to have committees and officials; and these officials and committees not only become the executive, but also guide the gatherings in their decisions. The recent Labour Deputation had an opportunity of seeing what actually takes place now. According to Mr Bertrand Russell, who accompanied them:

‘Although the Moscow Soviet is nominally sovereign in Moscow it is really only a body of electors, who choose the Executive Committee of forty, out of whom, in turn, is chosen the Presidium, consisting of nine men who have all the power. The Moscow Soviet as a whole meets rarely; the Executive Committee is supposed to meet once a week, but did not meet while we were in Moscow. The Presidium on the contrary meets daily. Of course it is easy for the Government to exercise pressure over the election of the Executive Committee and again over the election of the Presidium, owing to the absolutely complete suppression of free speech and free press.’

Still more evidently does the vision of a people directly ruling itself fade away when we come to the central government. Constitutionally the supreme power belongs to the All-Russian Congress of Soviets. This is elected, and meets for a day or so, every six months; and when it does come together, it is a large assembly which merely votes its approval, without discussion but with much band accompaniment, of the decrees put before it. In the intervals between the Congresses, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee is the ‘supreme legislative, executive and controlling organ of the Republic’ (§§ 30, 31). It is elected by the Congress; it is only required to meet every two months; and, according to the Constitution (§ 28), it consists of not more than 200 members: the recent visitors to Russia speak of 300. This is the body which in fact most nearly corresponds to a parliament; and when it is realised that it is the result of a series of indirect elections, so complicated as to need a genealogical tree to make them intelligible, it is clear that it is a long way off from the ordinary elector. As Dr Haden Guest, one of the secretaries of the Labour Delegation, has written:

'The C. E. C. is much less directly in touch with the people of Russia than the British Parliament with the British people. It is perhaps rather less in touch with the Russian people than are the indirectly elected Port of London Authority, Water Board, or Metropolitan Asylums Board in touch with the people of London.'

In theory, the C. E. C. chooses the Council of People's Commissars, i.e. the Ministry. This Council has the power of issuing decrees, resolutions and orders (§ 38), and must immediately notify them to the C. E. C., which can suspend or revoke them (§§ 39, 40). But, whether this is an effective limitation of the power of the Commissars may be more than doubted when we observe (§ 41) that 'measures requiring immediate execution may be enacted directly by the Council of People's Commissars'; and the still more remarkable fact that, between its sessions,

'§ 36. The members of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee work in the various departments (People's Commissariats), or execute special orders of the C. E. C.'

A controlling body, most of whose members are ordinarily working under the orders of the Ministers, is not likely to perform its controlling functions independently.

The impression made upon an acute and sympathetic observer, Mr Bertrand Russell, is that 'the Soviet system is moribund.' M. Lenin we may suppose to have been quite sincere when he declared that his aim was 'to attract *every* member of the *poor* classes to practical participation in the management' of the country's affairs; 'to obtain the *free* performance of State obligations by *every* toiler, after he is through with his eight hours of productive work.' But the fact is there are not enough Russians who are convinced Communists, ardent for the common good, and sufficiently intelligent to take part in the work of government, to man the Soviets with voluntary members, exercising an independent judgment of their own. Quite early M. Lenin had to complain that 'the departments of the Soviets are turning in many places into organs which gradually merge with the commissariats,' i.e. the civil service.

It is hardly necessary to go on to explain the real
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governmental system of Russia to-day. That is pretty well understood, as the result of the recent visit of the Labour Delegation, and of the Reports and books to which it has given rise. The government of Russia, whatever it is in form, is run in fact by the Bolshevik organisation, which now calls itself the Communist party, and which does not claim to have more than 600,000 members, and probably numbers far less. It consists of fanatics and time-servers: it fills the vast civil service and enjoys powers and privileges which make life comfortable even in a Socialist country; and it drives along all the unwieldy mass of nominally representative councils. Its Congress speaks as master, with no pretence of subjection to a higher authority: 'it finds necessary' this or that, and it 'therefore decrees it.' The Bolshevik leaders realise the danger such power gives to individuals, especially in a country with the all-pervasive tradition of corruption inherited from Czarist days. It is against this that their Extraordinary Commission is established, quite as much as to beat down open opponents. But terrorism has never formed an effective instrument of government for a long period; and it is probably only terrorism which stands between Russia and a government like that of Tammany. Tammany was a society which, in the guise of philanthropy, misruled New York, by driving respectable voters away from the elections and manipulating the votes of the rest. And Tammany had only the municipal taxes and city contracts to play with: it did not control the whole industrial and commercial life of a great nation.

WILLIAM ASHLEY.

Art. 10.—THE WAGES PROBLEM IN AGRICULTURE.

1. *A History of the English Agricultural Labourer, 1870-1920.* By F. E. Green. King, 1920.
2. *Village Trade Unions in Two Centuries.* By Ernest Selley. Allen & Unwin, 1921.
3. *Report of the Agricultural Policy Sub-Committee.* Cd. 9079. 1916.
4. *Corn Production Act, 1917.*
5. *Orders of the Agricultural Wages Board, 1918-20.*
6. *Wages and Conditions of Employment in Agriculture.* Cmd. 24 and 25. 1919.
7. *Report on Financial Results of Farming and Cost of Living.* Cmd. 76. 1919.
8. *Report and Evidence of Royal Commission on Agriculture, 1919-20.* Cmd. 345, 365, 391, 445, and 665.

IN the turmoil of social, political, and economic complexities which is vaguely termed 'the Labour question,' wages form only one ingredient, although necessarily the most apparent. Agricultural workers being the latest class of wage-earners to become organised, have so far been pre-occupied with a struggle for higher wages; and while having, through their leaders, some contact with industrial Trade Unions, cannot be said to have developed at present any line of action outside the improvement of their economic status. It follows that a consideration of the wages problem in agriculture comprises in effect a consideration of the general position of the farm labourer under present conditions.

It is desirable, at the outset, to note the fact that there is in connexion with agricultural wages a problem which differs in some respects from that presented in other industries, although certain broad principles are common to all classes of wage-earners. A living wage—using that ambiguous term as signifying a wage sufficient to maintain a reasonable standard of life—and hours of employment which leave time for a fair amount of leisure, with provision for extra payment if such hours are exceeded, are among the demands of all workers, whether in the factory or the field. In the cultivation of the soil or the care of live stock, the conditions of employment are less under the control of

the employer than in other industries. There are, of course, other occupations in which the weather is an important factor. The work of a builder, for example, may be interrupted and his men become idle for considerable periods. But in farming there is not only interruption of work at certain times, but there is also the need for a compensatory excess of work at other times. If the building of a house is delayed by weather, its ultimate completion may be delayed for a similar period; but if work on a crop is stopped at one season, it by no means follows that its harvesting can be deferred for an equivalent time. Nature, not the employer, decides when it must be in-gathered. With live stock the helplessness of the employer is still more evident. A postponement of milking means not merely the breaking of a contract to supply milk, but in a very short period the total loss of the cows, which represent the cow-owner's capital. There is no other form of enterprise in which the employer's organisation of labour-power is so liable to disturbance from causes beyond his control. The special difficulties which arise in connexion with work on the land or with live stock do not, of course, prevent fair and satisfactory arrangements being made between employers and workers to meet them; but they necessitate recognition of the fact that the terms of employment in agriculture are subject to conditions which are exceptional and inexorable.

Another point of difference which has an important influence on the present problem is the fact that agriculture is the last of the great industries in which the workers have become organised. Attempts, beginning with the tragedy of Tolpuddle in 1833, were made from time to time to organise the agricultural labourers; but although some success was achieved it was but temporary. Six or seven years ago it is probable that not more than 10,000 farm workers were enrolled in any union, although in the time when Joseph Arch's campaign reached its highest level, about 1873, it was claimed that his union had a membership of nearly 90,000. It is natural, in the light of present-day knowledge, to look back, with regret, on the sorry history of the efforts of the agricultural labourers to combine, and the way in which those efforts were met. While it is possible charitably

to credit with honest convictions those who so strenuously opposed the men, it is not possible to acquit them of unwisdom. Their action left behind cruel memories, and the relations of farmers and labourers in many districts were embittered for a generation.

The nemesis of this delay has come in the guise of a further difficulty in dealing with the present situation. In other great industries the unions of the workers have been built up during a considerable period, with the result that their members have gradually acquired experience, and as numbers increased the organisation developed accordingly. In the case of agriculture, the growth of the unions has been so rapid that with the exception of a few leaders who have had an education in trade unionism outside agriculture, the whole body of members are inexperienced; and it is difficult to find amongst them a sufficient number of men qualified to represent the views of their fellows. In this connexion recognition should be made of the difficulty and responsibility of the task which has fallen upon the leaders of the National Agricultural Workers' Union and the Workers' Union. Any one who realises the possibilities which arise when, within the course of a couple of years, two or three hundred thousand men are organised, filled with expectations of immediate and tangible results, and excited by visions of a new heaven and a new earth, must recognise that they might be easily led into hasty and inconsiderate action. It is to the credit of those who have guided the counsels of the men that under circumstances of much difficulty, and at a time of great social and industrial unrest, they have carried on their campaign, on the whole, with moderation and discretion.

Nor are the difficulties arising from the rapid development of agricultural unionism confined to the workers' side. British farmers are the embodiment of individualism. They are probably the most obdurate class in the community to stir into collective action. They may be easily induced by some sense of grievance to hold meetings and express violent condemnation of the Government (whatever it may be); their indignation being frequently most hot against those who are attempting to further their interests. But for sustained action to achieve a definite and well-considered policy

they have in the past shown little aptitude. The majority of farmers have also inherited a mental attitude towards labour which renders it difficult for them to realise the change in all social relationships which the war so greatly accelerated. The dominance of the proletariat, to which all political forces have been tending during the past fifty years, has become complete and overwhelming. Like all political changes in this country, it came so gradually, that to those who lived in the backwaters of life it was almost imperceptible. The end of the war, and the return to civil life of the youth who had been for five years maturing in the hot-bed of war, brought about the completion of the development with apparent suddenness. The extension of the franchise, with its inclusion of women, signalised the event, but its full significance was not appreciated by farmers. Indeed, the experience of the war and the blandishments of which he was the object tended to arouse a belief in the farmer's mind that he would be in future a privileged person—a kind of national pet—to be humoured and helped and exempted from all the troubles which are the common lot of those who attempt to earn their living. The shock, therefore, was severe, when he realised that in the one phase of his business in which he had always felt free and unfettered—that of dealing with his men—he was to be subjected to drastic interference. That the law should compel him to pay a certain wage and should forbid him from making his own bargain with a man who wished to be employed, was almost inconceivable. No doubt, the control exercised over his freedom of dealing with his land and the produce thereof, had done something to inure him to State intervention in the conduct of his business; but, nevertheless, the idea of authority coming between him and his men was very startling. On the whole, farmers have accepted the new conditions, if not with cheerfulness, with surprising celerity. That the Orders of the Wages Board are obeyed with reluctance, and that attempts to ignore or evade them are common, is true; but this is not infrequently due as much to bewilderment as to deliberate resistance. The acceptance with so little disturbance of what is, in fact, a revolution in the economic relationship of farmers and labourers, is

largely due to the rapid growth of the National Farmers' Union and the wisdom of its directors.

No one now attempts to defend the rates of wages paid to agricultural labourers throughout the 19th century. In the current 'Journal of the Royal Agricultural Society,' Mr A. W. Ashby collects such materials as exist and gives the following figures, which represent the result of inquiries made at different periods by various authorities. They may be taken as approximately accurate, in the absence of complete data:

Year.	Authority.	Average weekly rate of wages.	
		s.	d.
1767-70	Arthur Young	7	3
1850-51	James Caird	9	7
1860	F. Purdy (Journal, R.S.S.)	12	3
1870-71	S. B. L. Druce (Journal, R.A.S.E.)	12	2
1880-81	S. B. L. Druce (Journal, R.A.S.E.)	14	2
1892-93	W. C. Little (R. Commission on Labour)	13	5
1898	A. Wilson Fox (Cd. 346)	14	5

Rates of wages, taken by themselves, are of little value unless they are related to the cost of living at the time, and to other factors which affect the economic position of the wage-earner. It is evident, for instance, that the rise in the real wage from 1860 to 1898 was much greater than appears from the mere average rate. The price of the 4-lb. loaf in 1860 was 9d., whereas in 1898 it was 5½d. Mr Green writes:

'Towards the end of this decade [the 'eighties], for the first time in their lives thousands of labourers who had hardly ever tasted any other meat than that obtained from the pig which they kept in their sties, or the rabbit which they snared in the field, began to taste mutton and beef sent frozen to England from the ends of the world. It is an ironical reflection on civilisation that the English labourer who fed the bullock in the yard which he overlooked from his cottage, and folded the sheep on the roots under his eye, had to wait until frozen meat came to him from the Antipodes or the ranches of America before butcher's meat became part of his diet, even once a week. This is no exaggeration, for men to-day have told me that the frozen meat which arrived in this country in the late 'eighties was the first time they had tasted mutton in their lives.'

While, however, the low wages paid for farm work may not be defended, it is not difficult to explain them. However reprehensible and, in the light of subsequent history, unfortunate was the resistance of farmers as a class to the attempts of farm workers to adopt the only means, that of combination, whereby they could hope to better their condition, they acted only in accordance with the principles of business then established, in paying no more than the 'market value' for the labour they required. The rise in farm wages which occurred during the latter half of the 19th century was mainly due to the fact that at the beginning of the period the number of men in the villages seeking employment was largely in excess of the demand for their services on the farms, and there was no alternative occupation for them in the country districts. This fact is demonstrated by the figures which I recently published * showing the relation of the number of agricultural labourers returned at each census in England and Wales to the extent of land occupied by farmers:

Year.	Cultivated Land.	Agricultural Labourers.	Labourers per 1000 acres.
	Acres.	No.	No.
1851 . .	34,000,000 . .	1,455,213 . .	43
1861 . .	33,000,000 . .	1,364,908 . .	41
1871 . .	30,839,000 . .	1,142,347 . .	37
1881 . .	32,212,000 . .	1,017,045 . .	32
1891 . .	32,919,000 . .	898,232 . .	27
1901 . .	32,417,000 . .	724,314 . .	22

As I pointed out in connexion with these figures:

'The census returns make no allowance for continuous employment. A man describes himself as an agricultural labourer, because that is his sole, or main, occupation; but in the old days large numbers of such men were only employed seasonally, and were idle for a considerable part of their time. The general practice of "standing-off" men in wet weather enabled the farmer to employ a maximum number in fine weather, or at certain seasons, and to dispense with them when work was slack. . . . In the earlier period there was, in fact, always a large surplus of labour in the villages, but as time went on facilities for transport increased, and the rural

* Food Supplies in Peace and War' (Longmans).

outlook widened. Labour became more mobile, men passed from the country which offered so meagre a living, and the number of agricultural labourers accordingly fell.'

As the number seeking employment fell the level of wages rose; and, the same causes continuing, the average rate in 1914, as shown by the inquiries made into the Wages and Conditions of Employment in Agriculture in 1918, was 16s. 3d.

The exploitation by employers of the condition of the 'labour market,' for which causes beyond their control were responsible, did not therefore arise from any exceptional dose of original sin, or any peculiar hardness of heart. Farmers acted, as employers in all other industries acted, in securing their labour as cheaply as possible. In other industries there was no amelioration of the workers' conditions so long as the price of labour was determined by the wage which a man out of employment was willing to accept. Farmers, however, strengthened their position by developing a 'class consciousness' and a class loyalty which they resented when exhibited by their men. Many an individual farmer would have raised wages—and some did, often surreptitiously—but for the feeling that it was unfair to do so unless his fellow-farmers would take the same course. The mistake they made was in failing to realise that what was sauce for the goose was sauce for the gander, and that the spirit of combination and of class loyalty which they thought commendable in themselves was not less commendable when exemplified in others. Much trouble, in the past and in the present, would have been avoided; amongst other things a legal minimum wage might have been unnecessary.

The demand for the establishment of a legal minimum wage for agricultural employment is quite modern. There is no indication of it in the early records of farm workers' unionism. It was first given prominence in the Report of the Land Enquiry Committee, of which Mr A. H. D. Acland was chairman, in 1913. The Committee stated:

'It is not to be expected that (a) the growth of small holdings, or (b) increased agricultural prosperity, or (c) Trade Unionism will lead in a reasonable time to a rise in the wages of labourers sufficient to enable them to live in a state of

physical efficiency and also to pay a commercial rent for their cottages. The evidence goes to show that low-paid labour is not really cheap labour. This is shown by a comparison of the low-paid areas with those areas where wages are high, owing to the presence of competing industries, and also by the evidence from those who have had experience of farming both in low and high-paid counties.

'We therefore suggest: (1) That, in order to secure to the labourer a sufficient wage, it is necessary to provide for the fixing of a legal minimum wage, by means of some form of wage tribunal.

'(2) That it should be an instruction to such wage tribunal that immediately or within a short and defined period the wage should be fixed at least at such a sum as will enable the labourer to keep himself and an average family in a state of physical efficiency, and to pay a commercial rent for his cottage.

'(3) That it should be laid down as an essential feature of any legislation dealing with a minimum wage that a farmer who is able to prove that a rise in wages had put upon him an increased burden should have the right to apply to a judicial body such as a Land Court for a readjustment of his rent.'

These recommendations, with others made by the same Committee, obtained very little support from agriculturists generally, and, indeed, were so immediately involved in the bickerings of party politics, that serious consideration of them, on their merits, became almost impossible. The Report of the Departmental Committee on the home production of food (Cd. 8095) in 1915, referred to the importance of 'the retention of skilled workers on farms,' but said nothing about their wages. In 1916, the Prime Minister (Mr Asquith) appointed a Committee, under the chairmanship of Lord Selborne, with the following reference:

'Having regard to the need of increased home-grown food supplies in the interests of national security, to consider and report upon the methods of effecting such increase.'

The Committee was termed the 'Agricultural Policy Sub-Committee,' and was instructed to consider post-war conditions rather than immediate issues. The Report was characterised by a comprehensive survey of the agricultural problem, and exhibited some recognition of

the fact that the agricultural policy of this country has to be considered from a new standpoint. The Committee expressed the opinion 'that the conditions of agriculture must be made so stable that out of its profits the agricultural labourer can be assured a fair wage, the cultivator of the soil a fair return for his capital, energy, and brains, and the landowner a fair return for the capital invested in the land'; and they recommended 'that the State should fix a minimum wage for the ordinary agricultural labourer in each county, guarantee to the farmer a minimum price for wheat and oats, and take steps . . . to secure the increase of production which is the object of the guarantee.'

This recommendation was at once accepted by the Government, and formed the basis of the policy announced by the Prime Minister (Mr Lloyd George) in the House of Commons on Feb. 23, 1917, and subsequently embodied in the Corn Production Act.

By that Act, an Agricultural Wages Board was established for England and Wales—with corresponding authorities for Scotland and Ireland—charged with the duty of fixing minimum rates of wages for agricultural workers, such rates to be enforceable in a court of summary jurisdiction under a penalty of a fine of 20*l.*, and of 1*l.* per day for an offence continued after conviction. Powers are given to the Wages Board to make the minimum rates applicable universally, to vary them according to districts, or kind of occupation, and to fix rates for overtime. The Board are also empowered to issue permits, exempting from the provisions of the Act workers affected by mental or other infirmity or physical injury. The Board were further authorised to establish District Committees for such areas as they may determine, and they have, in fact, established thirty-nine such Committees.

Apart from its other implications, the establishment of the Agricultural Wages Board marked a dramatic development in the history of the agricultural labourer in this country. For the first time he was officially recognised, not only as being intimately concerned in agricultural administration, but as entitled to an equal voice with farmers in the settlement of important questions of agricultural economics. It was a sudden change.

Many official bodies had been set up from time to time to consider agricultural questions, but it never occurred to any one that those who formed the large majority of the agricultural population should be represented in their counsels, or have a voice in their decisions. Now and again an individual, such as Joseph Arch, might be called to give evidence before a Royal Commission, or might even have a seat on an official committee. But, if so, he was always in a hopeless minority; and any idea that he had an equal interest, or was entitled to an equal voice, with farmers, would have been rejected.

The constitution of the Agricultural Wages Board not only establishes the status of the labourer as not less an 'agriculturist' than the farmer, but it introduces the principle of self-government in agricultural affairs, to a degree which is without precedent. Within the limits laid down by Parliament, the Board is independent and all-powerful. Its Orders have the force of law, and there is no appeal against them or their administration by the Board, except to a Court of Law. Its operations govern, in a large degree, the economic relations of over a million employers and workers, and thus affect directly or indirectly, the lives of at least five million persons. And this is done by a body consisting of representatives equally of farmers and labourers. The pregnant fact that these powers lie, not with a Minister or a Department, not even with the Cabinet, but with agriculturists themselves, is not commonly recognised. It is partly obscured by the presence of a minority (less than one-fifth) of non-representative members appointed by the Minister, to whom the actions of the Board are frequently attributed. It is overlooked, however, that if the representative members agree—as in the past they have done on many of the main issues—the appointed members are powerless; and that in any case, if they are called upon to intervene, they can only do so by securing a majority of the Board which involves the support, or at least the absence of opposition, of the representative members.

The abrupt intrusion into agricultural affairs of a body so constituted and so armed was naturally very startling. It is not at all surprising, therefore, that the Wages Board has been the subject of severe and

persistent criticism and of a considerable amount of misunderstanding. No authority entrusted with responsibility for dealing with Labour questions in any industry during the past three years could expect to escape either. The actions of bodies representing other great industries—most of which have long years of experience to guide them—have not always commanded universal assent, and the wisdom even of the Cabinet itself in dealing with labour has been questioned by some. In their efforts to deal with the economic and social complexities involved in the task entrusted to them, the representatives of agriculture might perhaps claim some sympathy from those whose interests they are trying to serve. They are not, however, greatly surprised if they do not receive it.

The effect of the operations of the Wages Board on the wages paid to agricultural workers is inevitably a matter of dispute. Many farmers think that the Board has forced wages to a higher level than would have been otherwise reached; while, on the other hand, many labour leaders believe that if there had been no Wages Board, they would have been able by direct action to secure higher wages for the men. No one can seriously contend that, while the wages in all other classes of employment were rising by leaps and bounds, those of agricultural workers could, by any possible means, have been prevented from rising. It is extremely unlikely that farmers generally would have spontaneously and voluntarily increased wages; and it follows, therefore, that they would only have raised them under pressure. Whatever the result in the end, it would only have been attained after very serious disturbances throughout the country, and at the cost of irretrievable injury to the interests of agriculture. This is not a time, if ever there could be one, when a contest between farmers, on the one hand, and the forces of organised labour, which would have necessarily been drawn into the struggle, could be anything but disadvantageous to farmers as a class. If the Wages Board has been instrumental, so far, in preventing such a catastrophe, its members may claim to have done the State some service.

Of one fault, at least, the Wages Board has never been accused—that of inactivity. It is, indeed, fairly open to the charge of issuing an excessive number of

Orders. This was mainly due to the unavoidable circumstances of its institution. The minimum wage was dangled before the eager eyes of the agricultural labourer in February 1917; and there are still many simple souls—to be found not only in the country districts—who regard a statement by the Prime Minister as equivalent to an Act of Parliament. It was not, however, until August of that year that the promised measure became a statute. The Act fixed a statutory minimum of 25s.; but during its passage through Parliament the figure had been violently attacked as inadequate, and by the following year the case for its increase had been greatly strengthened. The result was that the Wages Board had to begin its work immediately; and, having decided to set up District Committees, it was bound to deal with the recommendations of each Committee individually, with the result that a separate Order had to be made for practically every one of the thirty-nine areas. It had also to deal, in similar detail, with rates for women and boys, special classes of workers, overtime rates, board and lodging allowances, cottages, and other 'benefits or advantages.' Gradually, the wide diversity arising out of the various recommendations of the Committees has been reduced, and the number of Orders materially diminished.

Since its establishment in December 1917, the Wages Board has fixed the general minimum for adult male workers four times. The first recommendation, received early in 1918, was from Norfolk, for a rate of 30s.; this was accepted by the Board, and subsequently applied to all areas, except those where a higher figure was recommended. A year later, the minimum was raised, after very considerable discussion, to 36s. 6d. In April 1920, it was again raised to 42s., and in the following August to 46s. 6d. In every case there were certain counties which had a higher minimum.

On the two first occasions these rates were fixed by agreement—reached after prolonged discussion and negotiation—between employers and workers. The increase in April 1920 was made in opposition to the workers, who demanded 50s., the employers eventually agreeing with the appointed members to fix 42s. In the latest case, all attempts at agreement failed. The workers' representatives demanded 50s., and would agree

to nothing less; while the farmers' representatives refused to assent to any increase on 42s. The appointed members, as in duty bound, made several suggestions with the view of bringing the sides together, but without success. In the end, the deadlock was overcome by the appointed members bringing forward on their own responsibility a proposal for 46s. 6d., and the representative members, on both sides, abstaining from voting. The appointed members subsequently published a statement, setting out the case as it presented itself to them, in which they said :

'All the increases made this year are based upon, and consequential from, the alteration in the lowest minimum rate for male workers of 21 years and over, which came into force on April 19th after prolonged discussion and deliberation. The employers' representatives then proposed 40s. and the workers' representatives proposed 50s.; and 42s. was eventually accepted by the employers' representatives, the workers' representatives refusing to agree.

'In bringing forward again their proposal for a minimum of 50s., the workers' representatives have contended :

'1. That the previous increase was inadequate.

'2. That even if it were then adequate the subsequent increase in the cost of living makes it now insufficient.

'3. That the statutory duty of the Wages Board is, by the terms of Section 5 (6) of the Corn Production Act, to fix such minimum rates of wages "as will enable a worker to maintain himself and his family in accordance with such standard of comfort as may be reasonable in relation to the nature of his occupation," and that the Board have no right to consider any consequences which may fall on the agricultural industry by the adoption of this principle.

'4. That the rise in the wages of agricultural workers since 1914 has not been in proportion to the rise in the cost of living, and that in any case it is not sufficient merely to place the agricultural worker in the same unsatisfactory economic position as in 1914.

'5. That there is evidence to show that farmers can afford to pay higher wages than those now fixed.

'6. That wages in other occupations, especially those of railway men, have risen much higher than those of agricultural workers, who are more skilled and equally deserving.

'To these contentions the employers' representatives have rejoined :

'1. That the increased cost of living does not press so hardly upon workers in agriculture as in other industries.

'2. That the provisions of the Corn Production Act must be considered as a whole, and that, in fixing minimum wages, the Wages Board must have regard to the effect which such wages will have on the production of food, and the employment of labour.

'3. That the rates fixed by the Board are only minima which must be paid to the least efficient workers, and that higher wages can be, and in many cases are, paid to the more efficient.

'4. That the weekly wages under the Board's Orders must be paid whether the worker can be profitably employed or not; and that in this respect agriculture differs essentially from other industries in which the workers are continuously employed on productive work.

'5. That there is evidence that the present rates of wages are causing land to be laid down to grass and throwing many men out of employment.

'6. That the increase in agricultural wages has been not less than in many other industries.

'7. That any further increase in wages must result in decreased production and higher prices of food.

'The Appointed Members have given anxious consideration to the arguments advanced on both sides, and they fully realise the serious responsibility which falls upon them. They cannot but view with concern the reduction in the area of land under arable cultivation, and also of the number of men for whom remunerative employment can be found on the land. On the other hand, they cannot admit that the remedy for these evils can be found in the underpayment of the workers in agriculture. If the financial results of farming under the present conditions are insufficient to allow of the payment of adequate wages to the workers, it is the duty of the Government to take such measures as may be necessary to establish the economic position of the cultivators of the soil on a sound basis.

'The Appointed Members are bound to observe further that if, as has been argued, the Board had to consider nothing in the Act but the terms of Section 5 (6), it would follow that the Board has no responsibility in respect of any workers except those who are married and have families. They cannot accept this view, and they consider that the Board not only has responsibilities in respect of all workers in Agriculture, male or female, married or single, but that they must also have regard to the effect of their actions upon the interests of the industry as a whole.

'The Appointed Members made every effort to secure an agreement between the employers and workers, and made various suggestions with the view of attaining that object. Neither side, however, was able to make any approach to agreement. The employers were unable to agree to any advance on the present minimum rates, while the workers were equally unwilling to accept less than the advance which they proposed. It fell, therefore, to the Appointed Members to bring forward a compromise, and they submitted to the Board a motion that a proposal should be drafted and sent to the District Wages Committees for consideration, to increase the present minimum wage for male workers of 21 years and over in all areas by 4s. The effect of this, if adopted, would be to raise the present minimum for ordinary workers from 42s. to 46s. in 26 areas and in the remaining 13 areas to a higher figure.'

It was remarked, with perfect truth, that this statement did not explain why the figure of 46s., and no other, was adopted. That the cost of living had risen substantially since the former rate was fixed, was obviously a material factor in convincing the Appointed Members that a further increase was necessary, but it was not claimed that this consideration alone influenced them in their decision. The fact is, that the settlement of a fair and reasonable minimum rate of wages is not a matter of mathematics or logic. If it were, it would be comparatively easy instead of being extraordinarily difficult. It is often argued that some scheme should be adopted whereby agricultural wages should rise or fall automatically with the rise or fall either in the cost of living or in the prices of farm produce. Such schemes appear attractive until they are closely examined. The initial difficulty is to fix a datum line. On the cost of living basis, it is evident that it would be illogical to differentiate between workers on a farm, and other workers living in rural districts but employed in other occupations. The agricultural labourer is entitled to claim as high a standard of comfort as his fellow-workers in other industries; but it is obvious, for many reasons, that he cannot secure it, and that the result of attempting to enforce it would, under present conditions, only result in widespread unemployment. To relate wages to the prices of farm produce has often been

suggested; but an equitable basis would be very difficult to arrive at. Prices rise or fall from causes over which neither farmers nor labourers have any control, and are, in no sense, a measure either of the profits on the one hand or the value of services on the other.

If any sliding scale for the automatic adjustment of agricultural wages were adopted, probably the most equitable basis would be that of the gross output of the farm. It is true that this also is largely determined by causes beyond human control, the weather being still the dominant factor. But, taking one season with another, the efficiency of labour is probably the greatest of sublunary influences on the amount of produce obtained from the land. If it were possible to devise some means whereby the worker would have a pecuniary interest in securing the maximum output from the land on which he works, the advantages are self-evident. It is for this reason that the application of the principle of profit-sharing or co-partnership to farming attracts many of the wiser and more far-sighted occupiers of land. There will be no stability in British Agriculture, and no contentment among the rural population, until the workers on the land feel a direct interest in its production. Agricultural labourers are the largest class of food-producers in the country; but they have no real consciousness of it. When the farmer and the labourer establish co-operative relations, when each, in his degree, has an equal incentive to make the earth yield her increase, then, and not until then, will the labour problem in agriculture approach solution.

R. HENRY REW.

Art. 11.—THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE.

By establishing the Permanent Labour Organisation as a part of the machinery of the League of Nations, the authors of the Peace Treaty of Versailles were acting in accordance with the oft-repeated wishes of the organised international working-class movement. At international congresses and conferences of both Trade Unionists and Socialists the pressing need for an institution of this kind was frequently urged. Far-seeing and progressive employers had also demanded some form of international regulation and co-ordination of labour legislation; and since 1890, when the first international conference on labour legislation was held at Berlin, most of the industrial countries have been sympathetic to the idea. At the Berlin Conference, which was attended by Government representatives from Germany, Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, France, Great Britain, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden and Norway (then united), and Switzerland, standards were adopted concerning the employment of women and children, work in mines, Sunday labour and factory inspection. But no conventions were then drawn up, nor were any further official conferences held for fifteen years. In the mean time, several unofficial conferences had been organised, and a pseudo-official body, the International Association of Labour Legislation, had been created for the purpose of bringing about the regulation of labour conditions by international agreement. This Association, however, carried on its activities in circumstances of great difficulty. Its office at Basel was chiefly supported by small subsidies from certain interested governments. Its total expenditure did not exceed 80,000 francs a year; while the staff consisted only of a Director with five or six assistants. In spite of its limited resources and powers, the Association, however, did excellent work. It issued a periodical Bulletin on Labour Laws in French and German, and, later, also in English, and published from time to time special reports on subjects, such as the systems of factory inspection in the various countries. But there was no driving force behind the Association. At the Official

Conferences it had no representatives, nor were employers or workmen represented. These gatherings lacked interest, and the officials who attended them showed little zeal for the subjects they were called upon to discuss. The results were disappointing. At the outbreak of the war the position, from the point of view of those who believed in international action for the improvement and general levelling-up of the conditions of labour, was entirely unsatisfactory.*

The new organisation brought into existence by the Peace Treaty is built on more solid foundations, and is furnished with a clear and definite mandate, as well as with the means for carrying it into effect. Part XIII of the Treaty, under which the International Labour Organisation is constituted, contains the preamble:

'Whereas the League of Nations has for its object the establishment of universal peace, and such a peace can be established only if it is based upon social justice;

'And whereas conditions of labour exist involving such injustice, hardship, and privation to large numbers of people as to produce unrest so great that the peace and harmony of the world are imperilled; and an improvement of those conditions is urgently required: as, for example, by the regulation of the hours of work, including the establishment of a maximum working day and week, the regulation of the labour supply, the prevention of unemployment, the provision of an adequate living wage, the protection of the worker against sickness, disease, and injury arising out of his employment, the protection of children, young persons and women, provisions for old age and injury, protection of the interests of workers when employed in countries other than their own, recognition of the principle of freedom of association, the organisation of vocational and technical education and other measures;

'Whereas also the failure of any nation to adopt humane conditions of labour is an obstacle in the way of other nations which desire to improve the conditions in their own countries;

'The High Contracting Parties, moved by sentiments of justice and humanity, as well as by the desire to secure the

* 'The International Labour Organisation: A Comparison,' published by the International Labour Office, Geneva, gives a short account of the International Association for Labour Legislation and its work.

permanent peace of the world, agree to the following:’ (here follow the articles establishing a permanent organisation for the promotion of the principles set out in the preamble).

In Article 427 of the Treaty the following methods and principles are laid down as being ‘well fitted to guide the policy of the League of Nations’ and to ‘confer lasting benefits upon the wage-earners of the world’:

‘1. The guiding principle . . . that labour should not be regarded merely as a commodity or article of commerce.

‘2. The right of association for all lawful purposes by the employed as well as by the employers.

‘3. The payment to the employed of a wage adequate to maintain a reasonable standard of life as this is understood in their time and country.

‘4. The adoption of an eight hours’ day or a forty-eight hours’ week as the standard to be aimed at where it has not already been attained.

‘5. The adoption of a weekly rest of at least twenty-four hours, which should include Sunday wherever practicable.

‘6. The abolition of child labour and the imposition of such limitations on the labour of young persons as shall permit the continuation of their education and assure their proper physical development.

‘7. The principle that men and women should receive equal remuneration for work of equal value.

‘8. The standard set by law in each country with respect to the conditions of labour should have due regard to the equitable economic treatment of all workers lawfully resident therein.

‘9. Each State should make provision for a system of inspection in which women should take part, in order to ensure the enforcement of the laws and regulations for the protection of the employed.’

This striking declaration of principles and methods obviously required for its execution the institution of an authoritative international body equipped with ample powers and resources. Hence the Treaty set up a Permanent Labour Organisation as a largely autonomous department of the League of Nations. The details of the Organisation, its constitution, powers, and duties are carefully worked out and set forth in forty-one articles

(387 to 427) of the Treaty.* It is provided that the original members of the League of Nations shall be the original members of the Organisation, and hereafter membership of the League of Nations shall carry with it membership of the Organisation. Germany and Austria, although the former has not yet been admitted to the League, are also members.

The Organisation consists of a General Conference of representatives of the members and an International Labour Office controlled by a Governing Body. Fifty States are now members; the United States and Russia being the only great States remaining outside it. All States, irrespective of size or importance, have equal rights at the Conference. Each is represented by two Government delegates, and one Employers' and one Workers' delegate, who vote individually. The Employers' and Workers' delegates have to be chosen by the Governments of each country in agreement with the industrial organisations which are most representative. In practice, for the Conferences which have been already held, the National Trade Union Organisations have appointed the Workers' representatives, and the National Employers' Organisations the Employers' representatives. The Workers' representative of Great Britain is selected in agreement with the Parliamentary Committee of the Trades Union Congress, the body having the greatest number of affiliated workers' organisations; the British Employers' representative is selected in agreement with the chief associations of the employers. In addition to the delegates, technical advisers may be appointed to assist in the discussions of subjects in which their expert knowledge would be valuable. A session of the General Conference must be held at least once a year.

The General Conference, which may justly be called an 'International Social Parliament,' cannot pass legislation immediately binding on its members. Every country still clings too firmly to its sovereignty to permit of this.

* For a complete statement of the constitution, powers, duties, and standing orders of the Organisation, see 'Permanent Labour Organisation: Constitution and Rules,' International Labour Office, Geneva, 1920. Also 'Labour and the Peace Treaty,' with an introduction by the Rt Hon. G. N. Barnes, issued by the Ministry of Labour, H.M. Stationery Office.

But the Conference discusses and votes Draft Conventions, by which States agree to observe strictly certain regulations, and Recommendations which should be taken as guides in framing and passing national legislation, or in issuing administrative orders relating to the conditions of employment or other matters affecting labour. These may, it is true, vary in different countries, but they have to conform to one and the same principle. The Parliaments of the member-States are not bound to adopt the Conventions agreed to by the General Conference; but if Governments refuse to submit them for their ratification, the States concerned incur the risk of having applied against them the economic penalties provided for in the Treaty (Arts. 409-420). Once the Conventions have been ratified by a State, or the Recommendations become the subject of special legislation, the State is bound to respect them. Any violation may bring the International Labour Office and its Commission of Inquiry and the International Court of Justice into action, armed with powers for enforcing the decisions of the Conference.

The International Labour Office, the secretariat and administrative machine of the Organisation, is under the control of a Governing Body of twenty-four persons, twelve of whom represent the Governments of the member-States. Of the remainder six are elected by the Employers' delegates to the Conference and six by the Workers' delegates. Eight of the persons representing Governments are nominated by the States of chief industrial importance,* and the remaining four are nominated by States selected for the purpose by the Government delegates to the Conference, excluding the delegates of the eight States mentioned above. The period of office of the Governing Body is three years. It meets every three months.

The functions of the International Labour Office include the collection and distribution of information on all questions relating to the international adjustment of industrial conditions of life and labour, and the conduct

* The eight States that rank at present as of chief industrial importance are Great Britain, France, Italy, Germany, Belgium, Japan, Denmark, and Switzerland.

of such special investigations as may be ordered by the Conference. It is entrusted with the duty of seeing that the terms of the Conventions ratified are duly carried out, and it can, by means of commissions, conduct inquiries into any complaint of violations of ratified Conventions, and, if the complaint is found to be justified, it can, through the League of Nations, take measures to bring the defaulting nation to account.

It will be realised at once that the scope of the activities of the Office is wide and entails an enormous amount of detailed work. Contact must be kept not only with the Governments of the member-States, but also with the national and international organisations of employers and workmen. The great problems created by the war are, generally speaking, mainly economic in character, and affect the conditions of the masses in every country. As a result, the workers throughout the world are making demands for modifications of the existing industrial system, demands which the Peace Treaty recognises as in principle well-grounded. In order to meet these demands by sound constructive measures it is necessary to build on a foundation of accurate information regarding every aspect of the social and industrial conditions and problems of, at least, the chief countries of the world; a task of considerable magnitude, requiring the services of a large expert staff.

The International Labour Office has already organised two meetings of the General Conference: one, the inaugural assembly at Washington in October and November 1919; and the other, the Conference at Genoa in June and July 1920. The Conference at Washington met under less than favourable auspices. The League of Nations had not been formally established, and the debates in the Senate on the question of accepting the Peace Treaty, including the League of Nations, had aroused acute political differences in the United States. The foremost advocate of the International Labour Organisation in America, President Wilson, was too unwell to take part in the Conference. In spite of these untoward circumstances, the Conference was successful. It was unfortunate that, owing to the fact that its proceedings were overshadowed by events nearer

home, its significance was hardly recognised in England and Europe. Representatives of forty countries attended. Three important States, however, were not represented. The United States had no official delegates, as the Peace Treaty had not been ratified by the Senate; but the Conference was presided over by Mr W. B. Wilson, the United States Secretary of Labour. Germany and Austria (invited by an almost unanimous vote at the opening of the session) were not able to send delegates in time to take part in the business. The delegations, in normal cases, included representatives of employers and workers as well as of Governments, making in all 143 individual delegates.

In a session lasting one month the Conference discussed and passed six Draft Conventions, some on highly controversial subjects, and six Recommendations. In addition to these, it considered matters relating to the composition and standing orders of the Conference and the like. The Conventions agreed upon dealt with: (1) The application of the principle of the eight hours' day and the forty-eight hours' week. (2) The prevention of, or provision against, unemployment. (3) The employment of women before and after childbirth. (4) The employment of women on night work. (5) The minimum age of employment of children in industry. (6) The employment of young persons on night work. The Recommendations related to: (1) Public Employment Exchanges. (2) Reciprocity of treatment of foreign workers. (3) The prevention of anthrax. (4) The protection of women and children against lead poisoning. (5) The establishment of Government Health Services. (6) The application of the Berne Convention of 1906 on the prohibition of the use of white phosphorus in the manufacture of matches.

The procedure adopted by the Conference was to appoint Commissions to prepare the Conventions and Recommendations. The discussions on these Commissions, to which technical advisers as well as delegates were elected, were extremely valuable. Points of difference between nations as well as between employers and employed had to be threshed out and drafts arrived at for submission to the plenary meetings of the Conference. 'Conventions were so thoroughly discussed

in the Commissions, and such a degree of agreement was arrived at, that with comparatively few alterations they were adopted by the General Conference.*

In spite of the mass of work accomplished in Washington it was not carried out hastily or superficially. The delegates were animated by good-will and a keen desire to achieve practical results. They threw into their task a remarkable degree of energy and zeal, and overcame with extraordinary success the most difficult obstacle of international assemblies—diversity of language. The business was rendered especially complicated by the necessity of taking into account and making exceptional provisions for the conditions prevailing in backward countries. The constitution of the International Labour Organisation declares that 'in framing any Recommendation or Draft Convention of general application, the Conference shall have due regard to those countries in which climatic conditions, the imperfect development of industrial organisation and other special circumstances, make the industrial conditions substantially different, and shall suggest the modifications, if any, which it considers may be required to meet the case of such countries.' In drawing up Draft Conventions the various Commissions had, therefore, to make special provisions for Japan, India, and other countries where the industrial system and the regulation of the conditions of labour are less highly evolved than in Europe or America. For the eight-hour day question a separate Commission on Special Countries was set up, the Recommendations of which were afterwards embodied in the Draft Convention drawn up by the Commission on the eight-hour day. Japan, which showed its interest in the Conference by sending a delegation numbering, with its technical advisers, secretaries, and interpreters, more than fifty persons, naturally took a conspicuous part in the debates on this subject. A majority of the Conference agreed with the view held by the representatives of the Japanese Government and Employers' representatives that Japan could not be expected to advance in two years so far as countries which had been developing

* 'International Labour Conference, 1919. Draft Conventions and Recommendations; with an Introduction.' H.M. Stationery Office.

their systems of industrial law for half a century. The decision finally reached represents relatively greater progress for Japan than for almost any other country. The working hours in the Japanese silk industry are to be reduced from the present total of 93 per week to 60, and a 57-hour week is to be introduced in other industries. Young persons under 15 and all underground workers in mines are to be granted the 48-hour week. The Japanese delegates also agreed to the introduction of a weekly rest period of 24 hours—an important point for Japanese workers, who have no customary rest from labour on Sundays.*

The representation of women was a feature of the Conference, and was rendered possible by the institution of technical advisers empowered to act in the place of delegates on occasions when questions in which they are specially competent arise. Thus women technical advisers took part in the Commissions on the Employment of children, Childbirth, and Maternity, and were largely responsible for the preparation of the Conventions on those subjects.†

The results of the Washington Conference, although not fully appreciated by the general public, are rapidly becoming recognised, especially by organised workers, as of paramount importance for the welfare of the working classes of the whole world, those of the Orient as well as those of Europe. The Washington Conventions are known in Labour circles in Great Britain as the 'International Labour Charter.' The report of the Parliamentary Committee of the Trades Union Congress, adopted at Portsmouth in 1920, is interesting:

'The Washington Conference was not only unique from the international standpoint, but without parallel; and, as

* As evidence of the earnest desire of the Japanese Government to carry out the obligations incurred by members of the Permanent Labour Organisation, it should be mentioned that the Government has established at Geneva an Office with a large staff, whose functions are to keep in close touch with the International Labour Office and to study labour problems in the Western world. As a means of doing so effectively the Japanese Government has appointed the head of this Office as its representative on the Governing Body of the International Labour Office.

† Among the technical advisers from Great Britain at the Washington Conference were Miss Mary MacArthur and Miss Margaret Bondfield, the well-known trade-union leaders, and Miss Constance Smith, Senior Lady-Inspector of Factories.

will be seen from the short statement of the Conference's work appearing in another portion of this Report the results exceeded expectations. It was indeed remarkable that, with representatives of the most backward nations (from an industrial standpoint) brought into consultation for the first time with representatives of the most highly-developed nations, questions affecting the industrial workers of the world should have been discussed with such keenness and with a genuine desire on the part of the former to bring their countries into line industrially with the more advanced and better organised countries. Common agreement was reached on many points, and it now remains for the various Governments to give legislative effect to Recommendations from the Conference.'

The arrangements for the second session of the General Conference were made by the International Labour Office with such expedition that it was possible to hold it at Genoa about six months after the close of the first. The conditions of the work of seafarers was the sole subject of discussion; but it proved so intricate and refractory that it was not possible to come to a definite conclusion on the chief question, of the application of the principle of the eight-hour working day to seamen. The Commission which considered the matter succeeded, after long and vehement debates, in framing a Draft Convention. But this failed by a fraction of a vote to secure the necessary two-thirds majority when it came before the General Conference, and no decision on the subject was reached. Draft Conventions, however, were agreed to on the following questions: (1) The minimum age for admission of children to employment at sea. (2) Unemployment indemnity in case of loss or foundering of the ship. (3) The establishment of facilities for finding employment for seamen.

Recommendations were also passed dealing with:

- (1) Limitation of hours of work in the fishing industry.
- (2) Limitation of hours of work in inland navigation.
- (3) The establishment of national seamen's codes.
- (4) Unemployment insurance for seamen.

Further, a Joint Maritime Commission, consisting of representatives of shipowners and seamen, was elected to consider the drawing up of an international seamen's code and other questions affecting seafarers.

Although the Conference at Genoa did not arrive at a conclusion on the main item on the agenda which it had met to discuss, nevertheless, it demonstrated, by an interesting sequel, the value of the International Labour Office as an instrument for finding solutions to complex industrial problems. Shortly after the close of the Conference the International Seafarers' Federation Congress was held at Brussels. The delegates, disappointed at the negative outcome of the deliberations at Genoa on the eight-hour working day, were naturally in a combative mood, and a resolution was proposed that steps be taken to organise an international seamen's strike to enforce the reduction of the hours of labour in accordance with the seafarers' demands. To this, however, an amendment was carried which provided that, before action was taken, the International Labour Office should be requested to endeavour to bring about a conference of shipowners' and seamen's representatives for the purpose of securing an international agreement on the matter. The International Labour Office responded to this request and entered into negotiations with the International Shipping Federation. That organisation agreed to meet the seamen's representatives; and at a recent sitting of the Joint Maritime Commission at Geneva, it was agreed that a conference should be held at Brussels in January 1921, and that the Director of the International Labour Office should be invited to act as chairman. This Conference will be the first at which employers and workers organised on international lines will have met to discuss labour problems.

The next session of the General Conference will be held in the spring of 1921 at Geneva. The International Labour Office is now actively engaged in preparing the various reports on the subjects to be discussed, which include the regulation of the hours of labour, unemployment, the work of women and children, technical education, living-in conditions, protection against accidents and sickness and provision for old age (all in relation to agricultural labour); the use of white lead in paint; the prevention of anthrax; the weekly rest-day; and certain questions concerning the employment of children at sea.

This full programme includes only a small proportion of the suggestions brought forward at Washington (and those sent to the Office since from various quarters) for consideration at future meetings of the Conference. So great was the number of the subjects proposed that the Washington Conference referred the final selection to the Governing Body. The number and variety of questions brought forward indicate not only the vitality of the Conference, but the vast opportunity confronting the Permanent Labour Organisation.

The question arises as to how far the States which took part in the Washington Conference have tended to ratify the Draft Conventions which were agreed upon. It is one of the foremost functions of the International Labour Office to enter into communication on this subject, through the League of Nations, with the Governments of these States. The latest information in regard to the stages of procedure towards ratification in various countries is as follows:

'Austria: The application of the Conventions will involve only insignificant changes in the existing law. They will be ratified speedily.

'Belgium: The Conventions have been signed by the King, and a Bill ratifying them *en bloc* will be introduced in the present Session of Parliament.

'Chili: Three Bills, which in their main provisions correspond to the Conventions, have been presented to the National Congress. One dealing with hours, however, departs to a material extent from the Washington Convention.

'Czecho-Slovakia: The adoption of the majority of the Conventions and Recommendations will not call for any important modification of present legislation. It is expected that all necessary measures for the adoption of the Conventions will have been taken before the end of the present year. A Government motion to this effect was submitted to the National Assembly on Sept. 4.

'France: Bills to ratify five of the Conventions (the exception being that relating to unemployment) have been presented to the Chamber of Deputies. French legislation already contains almost all the provisions of the Washington decisions, but difficulties of procedure have arisen in connexion with the formality of ratification.

'Germany: The Government have in preparation a Bill to give effect to the Convention concerning hours of work.

They do not yet see clearly the legislative measures which it may be necessary to take in respect of the other Washington decisions; but they intend to submit the Conventions and Recommendations to the Reichstag shortly.

'Great Britain: The Hours of Employment Bill is under revision before being again introduced into the House of Commons. Bills have already been introduced dealing with night work of women and young persons, the age of employment for children, and the employment of women and children in lead processes. The question of the employment of women before and after childbirth is still under consideration by the Ministry of Health. The Conventions and Recommendations concerning unemployment do not necessitate new legislation.

'Greece: Parliament has passed six laws ratifying the Conventions, and a further law embodying one of the Recommendations which related to the prohibition of the use of white phosphorus in the manufacture of matches. The Government has sent formal ratification of all the Conventions to the League of Nations.

'India: The Conventions are being examined by the Government, in consultation with the provincial Governments and organisations concerned. No decision has yet been taken.

'Italy: A Bill consisting of a single clause ratifying the six Conventions has been presented by the Government to the Chamber of Deputies.

'Japan: Drafts of Laws for the purpose of carrying out the Conventions have been prepared for the consideration of the Legislative Office of the Cabinet.

'Luxemburg: The Government has pronounced itself in favour of ratifying the Conventions by legislative means.

'Norway: Committees appointed by the Government are examining the Conventions and Recommendations, and if any changes in existing laws are found necessary a Government Bill will be presented to the Storting.

'Poland: The Ministry of Labour is studying the Conventions and Recommendations. It has asked whether the Polish Government could ratify them, subject to reservations in regard to the employment of women before and after childbirth, the employment of women at night, and unemployment. The question has been answered in the negative.

'South Africa: The Government is bringing the Conventions before Parliament with a view to their ratification *en bloc*.

'Spain: The Conventions have been sent to the Institute of Social Reform, which is engaged in preparing the necessary

legislation. As soon as the new Parliament meets Bills ratifying the Conventions will be brought before it.

'Sweden: An Act limiting hours of work, which is in general agreement with the Washington Convention, is already in operation. The Conventions and Recommendations will be examined by Parliament during the next Session which begins in January 1921; it is doubtful whether the Convention concerning the employment of women before and after childbirth will be accepted; but no difficulty is anticipated in regard to the rest.

'Switzerland: The Department of Public Economy is examining the procedure to be followed with regard to ratification. A conference of employers' and workers' organisations has considered the Conventions and Recommendations, except that relating to hours of work, and has approved them, subject to some reservations.

'Venezuela: The Conventions and Recommendations have been submitted to the National Congress of the United States of Venezuela. No decision has yet been reported.' *

Occupation with the ratification of Draft Conventions and preparations for approaching sessions of the General Conference do not, however, by any means exhaust the list of the activities of the International Labour Office. Space will permit only of a brief summary of the more important of the other matters which it has in hand. Investigations, world-wide in extent, are being made into the urgent problem of unemployment, the results of which are to be considered by a special Commission of experts. In the same way reports are being prepared for discussion by a Commission on Emigration, with the object of arriving at an international agreement for the regulation of emigrant traffic and the treatment of working-class emigrants. A special section is concerned with the subject of co-operation. Another branch is making inquiries and preparing reports on insurance against sickness, disablement, old age and accidents, and on widows', orphans', and maternity insurance. A department, created by a decision of the Washington Conference, is engaged upon the question of industrial

* Information relating to the progress in the process of ratification of Draft Conventions by the member-States is given in the Bulletin of the International Labour Office, which is issued at intervals of about one week. This publication also records the activities of the Office.

hygiene, for the purpose of drawing up Draft Conventions and Recommendations to be submitted to future sittings of the General Conference. The Scientific Division, which is responsible for most of the publications of the Office, has already issued a number of studies and reports in English and French which will cover ultimately the following subjects: (a) Industrial relations (the activities of trade unions and employers' associations) and political activity in its relation to questions of labour. (b) Economic relations. (c) Employment and Unemployment. (d) Conditions of Labour. (e) Social Insurance. Disablement caused by the war. (f) Safety in industrial methods. (g) Industrial Hygiene. (h) Conditions of life of the workers. (i) Co-operation. (j) Protection of women and children. (k) Education. (l) Agriculture. (m) Questions affecting seamen. In addition the Division is responsible for the Legislative Series which contains reprints of the texts of laws, decrees, orders, and regulations affecting labour, issued in the different countries of the world. The series, which is published in English, French, and German, constitutes a continuation in a new form of the series published by the old International Labour Office at Basel. This Division is also conducting a special inquiry (requested by an association of steel manufacturers of America) into the three-shift system in the blast furnace industry. A monthly Scientific Review will appear shortly, which will survey the world of industry from an international standpoint. An important investigation is being made into the pressing question of the causes of decline in production and the speediest and most effective methods of removing them. The conditions of labour in Bolshevik Russia claim the attention of another section, and a report on the subject has been issued, to be followed by others, based on authentic material obtained from that country. A Commission of Inquiry was appointed to proceed to Russia; but the Soviet Government refused to allow it to enter. On the other hand, a similar Commission has visited Hungary, and a report on the industrial situation there has been prepared.

This is but a condensed and, in some respects, an incomplete statement of the work of the Permanent
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Labour Organisation during the first year of its existence. It is a record which, one may venture to say, needs no *apologia*. There are critics, by no means unfriendly, who assert that the Office is attempting too much, that it is forcing the pace too quickly. The answer to this is that the Peace Treaty has laid upon the Office imperative duties, and that if it does not attempt to perform its tasks with the utmost speed compatible with thoroughness and soundness, it will not be serving the purpose for which it was instituted, namely, the removal, as rapidly as possible, of the causes of the industrial unrest which is disturbing and disrupting the world. On the other hand, there are critics, often openly hostile, who contend that the methods by which the Organisation is bound to work are too slow, and that nations should be compelled at once to adopt in detail the principles relating to the treatment of labour set out in the Treaty. These critics forget that the means they favour are at variance with democratic ideas. If some nations are tardy in ratifying Conventions, it is in the power of the public opinion of those nations to bring pressure upon their Governments. The energy, good will, and zeal displayed at the meetings of the General Conference, prove that there are great possibilities for the peaceful and orderly settlement of industrial problems by the meeting together of Government, Employers' and Workers' representatives, as permitted by the composite and elastic character of the constitution of the Conference. But corresponding qualities are needed in each nation in order to bring the work of the Conference and the International Labour Office to full fruition.

In conclusion, it should be remembered that Part XIII of the Treaty is mainly British in origin. For this reason the belief is justified that the Government and the Employers' and Workers' organisations of Great Britain will render powerful assistance to the International Labour Organisation in its efforts to ensure that the Peace is 'based upon social justice.'

ALBERT THOMAS.

Art. 12.—ENGLISH TRADITIONS IN ART.

The Walpole Society's Publications. Volumes I-VII.

Printed for the Walpole Society: Oxford University Press, 1912-1919.

'THE English,' says Coleridge, 'have a morbid habit of petting and praising foreigners of any sort, to the unjust disparagement of their own worthies.' It is a trait which has been noticed by other writers. When Coleridge said 'worthies,' he was using too general a term; he was probably thinking of artists. It cannot truly be said that in the domain of literature we have been in the habit of preferring foreign talent to English; possibly because we are not adepts in foreign languages. But of native music, as of native painting and sculpture, there has certainly been a kind of distrust, not easily overcome. A continental reputation, even the mere bearing of a foreign name, has often brought easy success in England, while native artists, of equal or superior gift, have languished in the cold. Some may maintain that the disparagement has been just, or that there has been due appreciation when our artists had proved their merit. Yet, to recall a signal instance of quite modern times, we had in Alfred Stevens a great sculptor, a great draughtsman, an artist of a completeness of mastery rarely matched since the Italian Renaissance; and how comparatively small a number of Englishmen, even now, know his work or attach a significance to his name! Slowly, very slowly, he is coming into his due of fame; and the recognition of his genius owes much to the enthusiastic admiration of a Frenchman, Alphonse Legros. The belief that we have no sculpture in England is still deeply rooted. Would any other country, we may well ask, so long neglect its greatest sculptor?

Why do we show so much quicker an appreciation of our men of letters? In literature we can boast of a long and magnificent tradition, starred with renowned names; and we take a just pride in it. That, beyond doubt, is the art in which this country has shown by far the greatest genius and the richest powers. It still remains matter for speculation how far the plastic and pictorial

arts have been depressed by neglect and indifference. For these arts demand the whole time and energy of those who practise them; they cannot be pursued in the leisure of a career devoted to more lucrative activities. Most of our poets would have starved, had they attempted to subsist on poetry alone. Is there an undercurrent of Puritanism, with its suspicion of the sensuous and plastic expression of the desire for beauty, that persists in our race, even though it no longer bursts forth in open hatred? Our streets, our buildings, are witnesses to the public indifference to dignity and comeliness in national self-expression. And then, we cling to our habit of leaving everything to private enterprise; there is no central public authority in matters pertaining to the arts; there is next to no encouragement or support by the State; no effort to express or to guide such public opinion as exists. All is left to accident.

It is not only to living artists that indifference has been shown. We have been very little concerned to do honour to English artists of the past. The great portrait painters of the 18th century, with Turner and a few other masters, have been enthroned, indeed. Auction records have given them just that prestige which impresses the average man. But how large an element of fashion and caprice enters into this! Minute study has been given to the sifting of Italian and Flemish Primitives. But the study of our own masters has remained in the uncritical stage, where every work of merit tends to gravitate to one of a few conspicuous names, and artists of great gift are forgotten. Here surely we may with justice be reproached for a lack of piety which perhaps no other country of Europe has betrayed to such a degree. It was to remedy this lack and to encourage interest in our native art of the past that the Walpole Society came into existence. It was founded in 1911, and has been the means of bringing together the few serious students of the subject. Seven annual volumes have been published. A review of the work which the Society has accomplished during the nine years of its existence will show how extensive and how little laboured the field still is, and how much remains to be done.

The Society names itself, of course, after Horace

Walpole, whose 'Anecdotes of Painting in England' remains the classic work on our subject for the period it covers. As is well known, Walpole's work was founded on the notes and documents collected by George Vertue, the antiquary and engraver. What is less well known is the fact that Vertue's notes, still existing in the British Museum, have never yet been published; and the notes contain a great deal of information, sometimes of much interest, which Walpole neglected to use. It would naturally occur to the members of the Walpole Society that here was a task which it was most fitting that they should undertake. But examination of the note-books proved that to publish them in full would be a costly undertaking, beyond the Society's resources. In the third annual volume Mr A. M. Hind gives a list of the note-books in the British Museum, forty-four in number. A few volumes of the original series are not in the Museum, and can no longer be traced. But it will be readily understood that to publish the Museum collection *in extenso* would absorb an indefinite number of the annual volumes of the Society; and, desirable as the publication is, subscribers would find it indigestible matter for so prolonged a repast.

To Mr Hind's list, Mr Lionel Cust adds some 'proposals' for the publication. He contends that to print a careful transcript would not suffice; it would be difficult to make clear what were Vertue's own actual corrections and additions to the original notes; and he suggests that the best solution would be to publish the notes in photolithography and that a special fund should be raised in the name of the Walpole Society for this purpose. The war has prevented, but we hope only postponed, any such further steps being taken. If this project be realised, it will at last be possible for us to estimate at their due value both the prodigious labour and insatiable research of Vertue and the lucid art of Walpole. The pith of Walpole's book consists of Vertue's collected material. But the writing of the Anecdotes, the translation of this mass of scattered notes into that easy, graceful narrative, is a feat that excites the greater wonder the more one reflects on the difficulties of the task and the rapidity with which it was done. As an instance of Walpole's omissions we may take the

practically unknown Gawen Hamilton (not to be confounded with the later Gavin Hamilton) about whom Mrs Finberg writes in the sixth of the volumes before us. Vertue left many notes upon this artist, but Walpole barely mentions him.

Let us briefly glance over the whole field, and see what the Walpole Society's publications have done to supplement existing knowledge.

The average educated Englishman is persuaded that there was no English school of painting before Hogarth; and, as to sculpture, it is a received opinion that there never was an English school. Yet all the evidence proves that England in the Middle Ages had her schools of the arts and the crafts, as flourishing and active as in any country of the Continent. Arts like the illumination of manuscripts and the embroidery of vestments and hangings have happily survived in numerous and splendid examples, because such work could be hidden from the ransacking rage of iconoclasts. But the destruction of all the sculpture except the effigies on tombs in the interiors of churches, and the whitewashing of the frescoes on their walls, have left a palpable bareness which seems to accuse our Middle Ages of a poverty of imagination which is far from the reality. Some of the remains of the Westminster School of painting, still existing, and reproduced by the Walpole Society from Mr Tristram's water-colour copies, arouse poignant feelings of regret and loss. Mr Lethaby, than whom no one speaks with more authority, tells us that

'the most brilliant period of English art was the second half of the 13th century, and its chief centre was Westminster, where, under the patronage of Henry III, a great concourse of artists gathered from all parts of Europe to assist in the works which that king was always undertaking at Westminster and at his other palaces.'

Walpole says of that monarch—

'Henry's reign is one of the most ignominious in our annals; that of Edward the First of the most triumphant. Yet I would ask by which of the two did the nation suffer most? By sums lavished on favourites and buildings, or by sums and blood wasted in unjust wars? . . . Who will own that

he had not rather employ Master William and Edward of Westminster to paint the gestes of the Kings of Antioch, than imitate the son in his barbarities in Wales, and usurpations in Scotland?’

William of Westminster was a monk and ‘the King’s beloved painter.’ Mr Lethaby suggests that he may be the author of ‘the noble wall-painting in St Faith’s Chapel in the Abbey;’ and to Master Walter of Durham he would tentatively ascribe another wonderful work also painted about 1270, namely, the retable now preserved in the Jerusalem Chamber. The Walpole Society has reproduced in colour (Vol. 1), Mr Tristram’s fine copy from one of the panels of the retable, and also his copy from the head of Edward the Confessor, painted on the back of one of the sedilia in the choir of the church. The exhibition at the Victoria and Albert Museum of a series of the water-colour copies on which Mr Tristram has spent so much skill and patience must have opened the eyes of many. With that severe yet ardent figure of St Faith before them they must have felt that English art in the time of Cimabue was no negligible thing.

Mr Lethaby’s researches disclose the names of many English mediæval painters (though there are few works to which we can attach the names) and yield a number of interesting particulars about the London Guild of Painters. Would that we could discover the painter of the magnificent portrait of Richard II in Westminster Abbey! There are, of course, critics who maintain that this, and the exquisite diptych at Wilton, representing the same king with saints, are foreign work; but there is no evidence that disproves their English origin. These two pictures stand out with a peculiar splendour from the English pictorial traditions of the Middle Ages. For, as Mr Strange says in his article on the Rood Screen at Cawston in Norfolk—again illustrated in colour from copies by Mr Tristram—English mediæval art for the most part, abundant and flourishing as it was, exhibits ‘a high level of craftsmanship, but little individuality.’

The history of early sculpture in this country is fairly parallel with that of the early painting. In both cases, clues and links in the history are lacking, through

the systematic destruction. But far more survives of mediæval figure-sculpture than is usually assumed. Prof. Prior of Cambridge contributed to the Walpole Society's first volume a documented and well-illustrated introduction to the subject. The 13th century was the finest period of English sculpture, of which Wells Cathedral supplies the richest series for study. To the same century belongs an extremely interesting relic of English art—the figured tiles made at Chertsey or in the neighbourhood. Mr Lethaby published in the second volume a number of tiles originally in Chertsey Abbey, illustrating the Romance of Tristram and Iseult—'remarkable documents which have been curiously neglected.' These tiles are in all probability the earliest extant illustrations to the Romance; but, apart from this historical interest, the designs are of real beauty, full of vigour as of grace. Such fragments speak eloquently for much that Time has lost us.

The English style of painting influenced the art of Norway and Sweden in the early Middle Ages. In the 15th century, altar-pieces of alabaster, carved in England, were exported to all parts of the Continent, and are still to be found in France, Italy, Germany, Austria, and Scandinavia. But probably it was in manuscript illumination that our mediæval painting most excelled. From the fifth century, when Irish monasteries began to produce the marvels of pure design which distinguish the Celtic school, till the early 15th century, there is a scarcely interrupted tradition, varied by the adoption of elements and influences from outside, but fused into a style which passed through different phases yet kept a native character. Through Alcuin of York, and his long labours for Charlemagne, it helped to create the Carolingian school in France. And for part of the 13th and 14th centuries the mature Anglo-Norman school displays an excellence scarcely rivalled on the Continent. This field of art, having rich material for study, has become comparatively familiar ground; but Mr J. A. Herbert's article on the illuminations in a Royal Psalter painted in the transitional style of the beginning of the 13th century, will be none the less welcome to students. With the invention of printing, manuscript illumination received its death-blow. With

the Reformation, mediæval art and its traditions perished. And now, with Holbein, began the dominance of the foreigner in the art of England.

'Every old picture,' says Walpole, 'is not a Holbein.' The phrase sufficiently attests the power of Holbein's name; and we know how many smaller reputations have been absorbed by its splendour. Every portrait of Henry VIII is still popularly attributed to Holbein, though he was dead before the great majority of them were painted. Who were the painters who succeeded him? One of the most notable and prolific masters of the time is a painter whose signature H.E. in monogram form is found on a great number of portraits. Vertue suggested that these portraits were the work of Lucas d'Heere of Ghent, painter and poet, who came to England as a refugee from Spanish persecution in 1568 and remained here till 1576. This old attribution, to which Walpole gave currency, has been accepted ever since. The difficulty is that there are portraits signed with this monogram bearing dates ten or more years earlier than D'Heere's arrival in London. If the painter is not D'Heere, who can he be?

The problem has been solved and many of the painter's works have been described in an essay by Mr Lionel Cust (Walpole Society, Vol. II). The Lumley Inventories which have now been printed in the Society's sixth volume, supply the clue. The artist is now identified beyond all doubt as Haunce (or Hans) Eworth, variously spelt Euwouts, Ewottes, or Heward. He came from Antwerp, of which town he was native, and settled in England about 1543. He was still working here in 1574, at which time he was making designs for Masques for Queen Elizabeth's Office of the Revels. Henceforward Eworth's name must take a conspicuous place in the annals of our early portraiture. He was a master of secondary rank, but of no mean talent. Some of his work seems to have passed hitherto under the name of that masculine delineator, Antonio Moro; and who that has seen it can forget that artist's masterpiece in the Prado, the tragic portrait of Mary Tudor? Eworth also painted that queen. At Woburn is a portrait of her with her husband; she sits in a room with brocaded hangings on the walls and a window opening on the river. Philip stands beside

her; and, with Titian's portrait in one's mind, it is curious to note the puny appearance of the man. Titian had given him in some subtle way a melancholy dignity; Eworth's vision reflects him more literally.

The extensive catalogue of portraits by or attributed to Eworth, which Mr Cust has compiled, forms a very solid contribution to the history of Tudor portraiture. It has already enabled other students to add to the list of the painter's works; as witness the notes contributed by Miss Mary Hervey and Mr Richard Goulding to the Walpole Society's third volume. A similar substantial addition to our knowledge is Mr Cust's catalogue of portraits by Marcus Gheerardts the younger in the same volume. Mr Cust's concluding note of warning 'that some of the earlier portraits may be the work of Gower, and some of the later that of John de Critz or Robert Peake,' indicates that there is still plenty of research-work to be done. But Mr Cust's labours make his successors' easier; they form a landmark for the study of painting in England. The profuse illustrations to these catalogues are invaluable. Were all the old pictures in English country-houses photographed and published (portentous enterprise!), many problems now troubling students would automatically solve themselves. Meanwhile the numerous reproductions given by the Walpole Society are the best possible foundation.

But the 16th-century painter who claims our warmest interest is a true-born Englishman, and, as seems specially to befit an Elizabethan worthy, a man of Devon. Nicholas Hilliard did not compete with the panel-painters of portraits, since he confined himself to miniature. In this art he is the first great English master. Something of the old tradition of the illuminators, who made the vellum pages of manuscripts so rich and comely, seems to revive in Hilliard; he has a singular delicacy, a fine decorative sense, and a love of his materials such as the old monks had. What a refreshment it is, after the rather wooden presentments of Elizabethan men and women so frequent on the walls of old country-houses, to take into one's hands a miniature by Hilliard! It is not only that his portraits are so intimate and alive, so free from pose and pomposity, and the painter's interest

in his sitter so keenly engaged ; it is the sensitive fineness of the man's art. His drawing for the Seal of Queen Elizabeth in the British Museum shows what a firmly modulated line his pen could trace. In the little portrait of a young man leaning against a tree at South Kensington, could anything be more beautiful than the rose-leaves and rose-blossoms on the tall briars that seem to embower this curly-headed youth, and make a pattern light on his dark short cloak, and dark on the white hose that encase the slender elegance of his legs ? Beside Hilliard's art, the Flemings' robust journeyman's work seems of an altogether coarser world. Hilliard betrays a fastidious temperament, a constant choiceness, a love of fine persons and fine manners, a sympathy with aristocratic youth and its passion for distinction. Fundamentally, we find in him an affinity with Gainsborough.

A few of Hilliard's delightful miniatures are reproduced in the Walpole Society's first volume, others are reproduced in the volume which consists of an annotated catalogue of the famous collection of miniatures at Welbeck. But the first volume also contains a very important document for the history of English painting, Hilliard's treatise on the 'Art of Limning,' here published for the first time. It is surprising that no one should have thought of printing this treatise before. It is interesting not only for its account of the technical method pursued by Hilliard, but for its opinions, personal touches, and reminiscences. Hilliard has much to say in praise of Albert Dürer, 'the most exquisite man that ever left us lines to view for true delineation'; but he holds it a defect in his art that he had only German models to draw from, and not the 'faire creatures' that the Italians had seen ; and such 'rare beauties,' he maintains, 'are more commonly found in this isle of England than elsewhere.' Raleigh once posed Hilliard with a problem of portrait painting, and Hilliard showed him how it was possible to draw a tall man and a short man on two tablets of the same size and yet make it plain to the eye that one was short and the other tall. He has some shrewd remarks on light and shadow ; for, allowing that strong light and shade help a picture which is to be seen at a distance, he points out that there is no such necessity for a miniature held in the hand. He is all for what he

calls 'the truth of the line,' for 'line without shadow showeth all to a good judgment, but the shadow without line showeth nothing.' In this preference for a draughtsmanship which suggests modelling by expressive line—so to shadow as if it were not at all shadowed is best, shadowed'—and in his disdain for the easy method of getting relief and roundness by hard, strong shadows, he is at one with Holbein and with the Oriental masters. And he recalls how he discussed this matter with Queen Elizabeth when he first drew her portrait. The Queen agreed with his view, but wanted his reasons, which he gave; and she chose to sit for him 'in the open alley of a goodly garden, where no tree was near.' In short, the 'Art of Limning' (carefully transcribed and edited by Mr Philip Norman) shows Hilliard not only as a thorough craftsman but as a thoughtful student of art who was well acquainted with the work of Continental masters.

Hilliard's treatise is the earliest of a group of similar treatises still extant in manuscript. The most important of these other tracts is the 'Miniatura,' by Edward Norgate, in the Bodleian Library. This was quite recently edited by Mr Martin Hardie for the Clarendon Press. Norgate originally wrote his treatise about 1630, and revised it about 1650. It is delightfully written and full of interesting things, and has lively comments on contemporary European artists, besides elaborate technical instructions. For both Norgate and Hilliard painting was not a profession but a pastime. Perhaps it was not an uncommon accomplishment in Elizabeth's day. John White, the 'Governor' of that 'First Colonie' of Virginia, sent out by Raleigh, which disappeared before it could be firmly settled, was a good draughtsman and painter in water-colour. A book of his drawings, made in Virginia and the West Indies, is in the British Museum, and is of extreme interest from the geographical and ethnographical point of view; it has considerable interest also as art.

Exquisite as is the art of Hilliard, it is a rather isolated flower, a form of painting which has little relation to the other arts. There was no general movement in England, and no single master capable of flooding the old traditions of competent craftsmanship with the

intellectual curiosity and imaginative ardour which had carried the arts to such heights of achievement in Italy. The Renaissance came late to England. Inigo Jones brought grandeur of style into architecture, but his figure-drawing partakes to the full of the mannerisms into which the Italian style had fallen. Yet everything related to this great name is of interest. Jones' designs for masques, at Chatsworth, still await publication.

The Walpole Society has done good service by publishing, with very full illustrations, the Note Book of Nicholas Stone, preserved in the Soane Museum. This forms its latest volume. It has been admirably edited by Mr Walter Spiers, late Curator of the Soane Museum, who died in 1917. Unfortunately, he did not live to see his work published and enjoy the appreciation it has earned. It is a valuable contribution to the history of English sculpture. Stone worked under Inigo Jones for a time. He was a master mason who knew his craft thoroughly, but he was also a sculptor and architect, and his numerous memorial monuments show a remarkable variety and inventiveness of design. The diary of the younger Nicholas Stone on his travels in Italy—a document of lively interest—is printed for the first time as a supplement to this volume.

English painting in the 17th century is overshadowed by Van Dyck and by Lely. There were English painters of distinguished talent, but little has been done to sift their work and make it known. In the Garrick Club, which contains so fascinating a collection of English pictures, often by men whose names are forgotten, there is a remarkable portrait of Nat Lee the dramatist. It is well-known from engravings. This picture is still generally referred to as a work by William Dobson, though that painter was dead before Lee was born. That is an instance of the kind of indifference to any precision and the ready acceptance of casual attributions which we meet with continually. The Walpole Society has published several careful and informing articles on 17th-century portraiture. The group of Lely's English contemporaries who worked mainly in pastel presents a dark problem, on which Mr Bell, of the Ashmolean Museum, and Mr Collins-Baker have now shed some light. Edmund Ashfield and

T. Thrumton are artists to whose names known works can now be attached.

Interesting as these painters are, the one who stands pre-eminent among them is Samuel Cooper, a master who has never received anything like his due of fame from his own countrymen. Had he painted in oils, and on the larger scale—his portraits are miniatures, but there is nothing small about his style—he would doubtless be more famous. There are portraits of women by his hand which are singularly intimate and expressive of subtle personality; beside them, the women of Lely, and many of Van Dyck too, seem superficial. With this insight, he had the delicacy that only real power achieves. There is nothing in Cooper of the later vague, elusive prettiness into which miniature painting decayed; he has precision, but is never dry. This school of portraiture, which from Hilliard descends through the Olivers to Cooper, Flatman, and Hoskins, can show many a small masterpiece. In it the mediæval tradition of the manuscript painters seems to have a sort of survival or revival. The union of firm craftsmanship with a sort of modesty and reserve is characteristic in both.

The 18th century brings us to Hogarth, who for most people counts as the originator of the English school of painting. In the art of this century there is less work for investigators to do, though artists of some interest have been rediscovered in recent years. Some day, perhaps, the Walpole Society may devote attention to the 18th-century book-illustrators, who have passed into an obscurity not entirely deserved.

The beginnings of landscape art in England provide again a field in which discoveries may still be made. It is curious that England should have been so late in producing her school of landscape, afterwards so vigorous and distinguished. In the recently published 'Miniatura' of Norgate, already mentioned, we find directions for painting landscape; and though an art 'so new in England,' he writes of it as having got much credit and being 'much in request.' One cannot help thinking that even in the 17th century there was more painting of landscape than has hitherto been supposed, passing now under foreign names, or destroyed, or

lurking forgotten in country-houses. If, however, there was anything like a school of landscape painters in *gouache* at this period, it cannot have had much strength or character. Such landscape art as there was probably depended on Flemish example. The decorative landscapes by R. Robinson, published by Mr Tristram in the third Walpole volume, are curious as showing a passing influence from Chinese compositions on 17th-century art. These are panels which once decorated a house in Botolph Lane, and have happily been preserved with the room they adorned. But it is not till the 18th century that landscape art becomes serious achievement. Mr Bell contributes informing notes on some of our early masters in water-colour, bringing one or two hitherto unknown personalities to light, and correcting, from newly discovered material, received accounts. The fully illustrated articles on Turner's sketch-books by Mr A. J. Finberg also form valuable documents. All this is the kind of work which, when the subject was minor Italians of the 15th century, has been pursued by English students with solemn enthusiasm; but why should not the art of their own country receive some of their attention?

Compared with France, or with the Netherlands, England can show no persistent and commanding tradition in the arts. In the Middle Ages England was not behind the countries of the Continent; at certain times, and in certain arts, she led. The Black Death came, a destroying blight; the Hundred Years' War, the War of the Roses, unsettled life, diverted money and wasted blood, treasure, energy at once. Puritanism both obliterated all it could of the once-cherished art of the past, and frowned down beauty in its own experience of life. The Renaissance came late to these islands, too late and tired and weakened to breathe fervour and force into the English arts. Traditions had been too effectually broken. The embers were cold. The imagination of the race flowed into literature. We see a man like Blake, who, born in the later Middle Ages, with a heritage of sound craftsmanship, might have shone for later time with a glory of rare achievement generating masterpieces in his successors—we see him reaching out from the prison of his own age to the half-discerned Gothic grandeur, striving to bridge over that

immense and lamentable gap, and to recover the tradition's broken thread. Rossetti and his group, for whom Blake in his turn was a prophet, make another splendid effort to take up the interrupted story and bring back imagination to the arts of their country. But it is always a difficult fight; strife absorbs energy that should flow into creation. For this is the disabling circumstance: the arts have been divorced from the imaginative life. It is not that gift has been lacking. Any one who studies English painting in the 19th century must be struck by the abundance of fine talent—sensitive eye and dexterous hand—put to the service of an almost inconceivable triviality. The imaginative life of the century is scarcely hinted at; it is as if it did not exist. We must accuse the patron more than the artist.

Broken, obscured, beset by fatality and all kinds of untimeliness, the English tradition in the arts has been. But the capacity for expression in the arts has never died out. To recall and revive works of beauty made by our countrymen; to make known what fine traditions have been interrupted and neglected; to correct the prevalent ignorance and incredulity; this is the honourable task which the Walpole Society has undertaken. It is relevant also to the art of our own time. For the artist by instinct looks both before and after; he needs the support of previous achievement in working for the future, and he needs the faith of his countrymen in the national genius.

LAURENCE BINYON.

CORRIGENDUM.

In the number for October 1920 (No. 465), p. 365, line 4, for 'Russian' read 'Rumanian.'

